I.NDea.Ce .
I.N.D.u.C.'s'statement of arguments and aims! rests upon the following assumptionss
(1) The '..policy adopted by now Campaizn up until Scarborough was one of working in alliance with the traditional left of the Labour Party" but now "The Nuclear Disarmament movement can no longer afford to rely exclusively on this ‘ alliance with the Labour Left."
(2) Because efforts to ensure the selection of Labour candidates who are unilateralist is wekened by the fixing of selection conferences and the fact that many former unilateralists have deserted on reaching Westminster and therefore 'we shall not get far by this strategy alone.! ‘ (3) Dismissing the 'voters' veto! it argues that 'There seems to be a good chance that our electoral influence cculd, in so me cases, be decisive.'
(4) To establish itself electorally it must achieve some by-election success and then go on to consider 'general election strategy."
It outlines the supposed advantages of participation in by-elections and goes on to state the policy of its candidtaes, these are in addition to unilateral renunciation of H.Bombs, bases, nuclear alliances, etc. disengagement, strengthening the United Nations, positive neutralism and "those aspects of economic and social reform arising from the above points.!
Considering the implications and consequences of selected by-election intervention, it argues thats:
(1) Interventioy+in by-elections will provide a strong rallying point for all unilateralists ana brush aside the objection that candidates would only get very small votes,
(2) That while the struggle for unilateralism in the Labour Party is by no means over the effect of intervention might be to stimulate sections of the party not sympathetic to unilateralism to press for the implementation of conference decisions on such matters as disengagement in Zurope.
All this appears to me to be extraordinarily naive and rests upon some very mistaken notions. I think it is obvious that despite the talk of this being a step forward, etc. that primarily I.N.D.3.C. is the product of frustration. Frustration with years of marching, demonstrations, mass meetings, etc. without any apparent result. Frustration with the reversal of the Scarborough decisions in the Labour Party.
It is necessary, all the more, to be comradely and non—dogmatic when discussing with these comrades. le must face the fact that they have now committed themselves to this line of action and, therefore, there is little chance, no matter how brilliantly we may argue with them, of stopping them going through this experience. That is not to say that we should 'leave them to it'. A disc-— ussion on this question will greatly assist in clarifying our ideas on the fight aginst nuclear weapons. But first to consider some of their arguments:
(1) It is not just not true to say that the policy of the anti nuclear weapons movement has been that of an alliance with the Labour Party left. On the contrary the opposite mistake has been made, if anything, in the official leader— ship's attempt to be 'non—political'.
(2) Except under very special circumstances, e.g., the Acland by— election, the vote of a 'unilateralist' candidate would almost certainly be der— isive. This is not because people don't care about nuclear weapons, but because the great mass of the voters, and especially those who want to do away with nuclear weapons, want to use their votes in the way they think most constructive. This explains why many, many C.N.D. supporters would vote even for a non-unilateralist Labour candidate in preference to a 'unilateralist! independent because they feel that this is the best way, from a long term point of view, of helping to do away with nuclear weapons.
(3) Far from helping the left inside the Labour Party to fight for unilateral policies, as the statement implies might happen, the whole business will considerably weaken such a fight. The net effect will be to pull people out of the Labour Party and give the right wing the opportunity to purge unilateralists on a far wider scale than those who help I.N.D.u.C.
Lastly it needs to be said that the activities of I.N.D.3.C. will provoke faction fighting on the left. This will happen quite independently of their intentions. To do anything at all they must have a big vote in elocctions. The people who stand in their way and represent the biggest danger to them will be precisely their former comrades still inside the Labour Party who argue that the fight should be conducted there. This is a dilemma that cannot be escaped. N.B. This is not a full exposition on the anti-nuclear weapons struggle -— we hope to publish more material on this subject in subsequent bulletins,