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BASIC DOCUMENTS 0. F THE INTERNATIONAL MARXIST GROUP (FOURTH INTERNATIONAL) The following documents are basic policy statements adopted by the International liarxist Group over the period since the election of the 1966 Labour Government.
They are produced in this form to give new members and sympathisers an overall guide to attitude of the Group towards the Labour Government and towards the task of building a Revolutionary Marxist Party in Britain. For the Group's attitude towards international problems, the publications of the Congresses of the Fourth International should be consulted (especially "Dialectics of World Revolution", adopted at the reunification conference of the International).
In publishing these documents the Group is aware that notall the pimoses contained them were verified by subsequent events. However, we are pleased to note that the general line has been thoroughly vindicated. Unlike some other tendencies on the left we do not seek to distort or hide our past - this is, a Lenin said, the sign of a serious party.
For day to day statements of policy, World Outlook should consulted as this regularly contains the statements of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International. This can be obtained from:
Pioneer Book Service, 8, Toynbee Street, London E. l. costing 1/9 per issue post paid.
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THE LEFT AFTER THE 1966 GENERAL ELECTION by Peter Peterson This paper makes certain assumptions which have been discussed elsewhere but which should be reiterated; (1) That British capitalism is in a state of chronic decline regardless of whichever party is in power; (2) That for the forseable future this crisis will take a chronic form rather than that of a sharp collapse; (3) That because of this all British political institutions are undergoing a crisis of policy and the former relative political stability of British politics has been considerably shaken; (4) That the clearest expression of this is the state of the Tory Party rent by political differences and forced, under the pressure of political expediency and economic realities, to shed much of its ‘ideological' baggage: its attempt to become the 'European' party and its corollary, the dropping of the glory of Empire etc.; (5) That this is also reflected in the Labour Party, in that, in the absence of a socialist option, the right wing leadership is forced to promote anti-trade union legislation. Thus the party which was created by the trade unions to defend the unions on the political front becomes the first party in recent times to bring forth specifically anti-trade union laws; (6) That Labour's left is not free from this crisis of policy; in fact, owing to its weakness it has been relatively harder hit; and (7) The experience of the movement has shown that despite the continued right-wing evolution of the Labour Party leadership experiments, both old and new, in trying to build a movement outside the framework of the traditional worker's organisations has been a failure: the Communist Party, despite its 'Parliamentary' road is in a worse position electorally than almost at any other time; and the S.L.L., despite its success in winning a significant number of young people, has only an ephemeral influence going from one struggle to another and being impotent in the decisive struggles.
We have to state quite unambiguously that events turned out somewhat differently from what we had expected when we welcomed the election of the 1964 Labour Government. Briefly, we had expected the Labour Government's measures, forced upon it by economic pressures, to create unemployment which in turn would have led to the emergence of a left-wing revolt, having even an echo in the Cabinet. The failure of this left-wing to emerge can be put down to two main factors: firstly, the boom caused by the upswing of the American economy, mainly in response to the Vietnam war, led to a big increase in world trade which benefitted British capitalism (although, even so Britain's share was less than that of other countries), secondly, the traditional left proved totally inadequate to meet the challenge of Wilson, a section of it going over to the right (Greenwood, Castle, etc.), and most of the rest thrown into absolute confusion. Another important factor was Wilson's balancing act between the various pressures: he used his small majority to quieten the left; the small majority and threat of a left revolt to avoid decisive unpopular measures called for by foreign bankers, etc. 1
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The significance of a big Labour majority is that it has broken the impasse in British politics, But before considering its effect, we must note: (1) Labour's vote was a mere 800,000 up (a fact which could be put down to a new register as against the very old one in 1964) and in fact was less than that gained in 1950 and 1951, despite the increase in the electorate since then; (2) The biggest gains for Labour were in those areas where antiimmigrant prejudices in a section of the working class had affected the result in 1964; (3) In no way could it be said that the mass of Labour supporters thought that they were voting for a Government which would introduce socialism; (4) The real factor at work was massive Tory abstention; upwards of 10% of the Tories voters of 1959 abstained - a few voting Liberal - from voting Tory in 1966, Having said all this, the 1966 victory for Labour was a favourable result helping to create objective conditions for the building of a mass leftwing in this country. There can be no excuses because of the small majority this time either for Wilson or Labour's left M.P.s. What is more, Mr. Wilson and his team can no longer buy time and will be forced to take decisive measures. The unknown factor is the subjective response to the situation. That is where our intervention is most important, We have two main tasks; to help to create a big left wing which in the eyes of the mass Labour supporters presents an alternative to Mr. Wilson's team; and secondly, to create a hardened out cadre force within this left. The big left-wing must be one which is capable of exerting influence to the extent of being a factor in British politics, one which to the mass of the people makes a socialist option a living reality: only in this way can we hope to change the course of political development in this country. The idea of gradually building up a cadre force in one's and two's until it is big enough to present a challenge is utopian in the extreme. On the other hand, the cadre force that we must build up within this left is absolutely essential; our experience of left leaders is such that we know that we can only really influence them with our ideas - but, however, our ideas have to have an organised expression. That is the role of the cadre force. What is more, it is inevitable that such a left would be subject to all kinds of pressures and fissions; our cadre force would stiffen up the left and endeavour to ensure its leftward evolution, We have to be on guard against two mistakes in this work: the danger of ultra-leftism, and the risk of opportunist adaption, Ultra-leftism is a menace because it takes valuable militants out of the struggle. The loss of several hundred young socialists, many of whom are now organising such things as football tournaments and dances to raise funds for Keep Left Young Socialists, was a grievous blow to the left inside the Labour Party. Especially as it took place on the eve of the attack on the trade union movement, when the unity between the Labour Party and trade union oppositions was all important, Ultra-leftism on the industrial front has taken militants out of the struggle in important unions: e.g, very misguided efforts to take people out of the TGWU yesterday and today. A striking example is that of the Seaman's Union; in the past the ultra-left could 2
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call for it to be smashed and claim that there was no purpose in working within it because there was no perspective whatsoever of winning it, or it ever leading a struggle, yet it was the first union to strike against Wilson's incomes policy. On the other hand, opportunist adaption, for the best of motives, can lead us to being separated from the militants and lead us to doing the dirty work for the right wing. Its most dangerous form is the abstention of criticism of left leaders because we want to work with them, Of course, no one in his right senses advocates name calling, so common from the sects as a substitute for effective action (as Trotsky said: in the absence of being able. to physically assassinate political opponents, the ultra-left tries to do the job verbally) but we have a duty for the good of the left trade union leaders etc,, to criticise them to counter the right-wing pressures upon them. How many have been lost because they were not told in unmistakable terms that they were evolving to the right?
The difference between our criticism and that of the ultra-left is that we do not call into question the good faith of people until it is clear that they have gone over. There is no point in*denouncing people for our own satisfaction, in terms that cannot be understood by the rank and file that these people influence. Of course, we have the duty to train a cadre force and this can only be done by explaining the limitations of the centrists, but such training and explanation is best done by a sociological analysis of their role. Personal and subjective denunciation teaches people nothing, The method evolved by Hull comrades - that of issuing open letters is excellent, especially as it uses the real method of exposing "fake lefts": that of asking them to do things which seem perfectly reasonable to the people they influence, The Budget, and Wilson's denunciation of the striking seamen as "enemies of the state" makes it clear that the Government have decided to put their eggs in the tough incomes policy basket (although the deflationary effects of the Budget should not be overlooked). The Budget showed, furthermore, that the Government is anxious not to provoke an immediate response from the workers as a whole to its policies. This is why the payroll tax, the effects of which are gradual, was dished up together with measures which could make it appear that all sections were being made to make sacrifices: the betting tax and 40% Corporation tax, However, the gradual but continuous increase in the cost of living, at a time when the Government will be trying to hold wages down, is bound to make for simmering discontent, It must be said that response of the left to the Budget has been feeble some have even greeted its "socialist character", see Tribune - and that the only real protest has been sectional (some of these could be quite important in a limited field; the Co-op movement must feel that it has — been double-crossed with a vengeance), It is very unlikely the Budget will lead to any big revolt.
It now seems clear that the Government will resort to the use of its emergency powers against the striking seamen. The use of the Navy in the Western Islands could be the thin end of the wedge, tried out to see the response, It is clear that the Government is being forced to act tough on the one hand but that it must be well aware of the warning given by Bill Hogarth of the danger of a general strike, The seamen's strike looks like 3
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being the first of many struggles of this kind if the Government attempt to impose a wage restraint policy on an organised working class that is in no mood to accept it. Obviously the main stimulus for the building of a mass left opposition to the Government will be through the unions under these circumstances. We should not, however, underestimate the possibilities of a big left emerging on foreign policy issues too, At the USDAW Conference the incomes policy was approved but delegates voted against the Government (and their leadership) on Vietnam, The situation in Vietnam is so open and shut now with the struggle between the Buddhists and the military that sections who have kept quiet up to now will start to oppose. On this question is a mtter of fighting for a political line which will be both principled and have the effect of unifying the various oppositions strands, The Vietnam Solidarity Campaign can help to play this part. The decision of the Hampstead Labour Party "to re-examine its relationship with the national Labour Party if troops are sent to Vietnam" is an indication of the explosive situation that would come about if Wilson takes this step. Nothing indicates that he is willing to withdraw from the position of slavish support for the Americans as his recent answers to question in the House of Commons demonstrate, On the industrial front in addition to the journals in which we have influence taking up every struggle, the campaign for workers' control is vital. This again enables us to combine principled politics with a unifying role. The campaign properly organised and consolidated around our journals can enable us to build industrial factions in most of the major industries and unions, In summing up our achievements and weaknesses it must be said that we have not solved. the problem of converting influence and prestige into organisational links. We have become nationally known but have failed to build the cadre force - and this is a political weakness as well as a question of emphasis. The state of other sections of the left The biggest left force remains the C.P.G.B. Just now it seems to be getting the worst of both worlds; owing to its increasing emphasis on electoral means it is not getting the response one would have expected it to get from militants (hardly any people at all have left the Labour Party and joined the C.P.G,B, even in this period), On the other hand, owing to its essentially sectarian nature it is capable of making incredible blunders which shatter all its unity talk; witness, the putting up of a candidate in Hornsey against a left-wing Labour man and losing the seat for Labour, In the few areas where it had the perspective of gaining parliamentary representation it has suffered the worst losses: South Wales and Scotland, Having said this we must have a positive attitude towards C.P. members and this is not facilitated by sectarian attacks on the organisation to which they give their loyalty. As in all fields we have to work on different levels; in ideological work we have to be ruthlessly critical of the 4
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history and politics of the C.P.G.B., but in our day to day work these matters are secondary and we should st i : members, stress our kinship with rank and file C.P. Dissidents: although the anti-revisionist have made many correct criticisms of the opportunism of King St. they have been quite unable to provide an alternative. The Forum group, in the first issue of its new paper The Communist, talks of up to 16 different groups. We can teach them nothing about splitting! However, there is no doubt that many good comrades have got themselves into a trap, We should combine joint working with them on the Vietnam question, etc,, with.an equally ruthless ideological criticism of Maoism and the social fascist theories many of the groups have. A small section of them have appeared to move towards many of our ideas. We should use all means to establish working relations with this group.
The sects: nearly all the groups have made gains in the past period, mostly because of Transport House's almost incredibly bad handling of the Y.S. Because we reject their ultra-leftism they regard us as traitors.
We have tended to ignore the attacks upon us - but again we must combine joint working on issues with a ruthless attack on their ultra-leftism. We cannot wish people out of existence and we must use the polemic with them to help to train cadres, AFTER BRIGHTON - A NEW PERIOD OPENS by Peter Peterson This article follows on from my previous piece "The left after the election" and should be read in conjunction with it. I have, therefore, not repeated the arguments which underpin my basis position.
It is as well to start this assessment by saying a few words about the purpose of such papers. The main point is that once having worked out our basic conceptions, i.,e., our estimate of the general international situation, the role of social democracy, the declining position of British capitalism, the role of the colonial revolution, the nature of the Soviet Union etc., such questions as the tempo of events, nuances of policy of the Government, the mood of the left, are decisive. This approach sharply differentiates us from the sectarians: for them it is merely necessary to learn slogans and formula, recite them by rote and apply them to all situations, "Centrists betray, therefore all centrists are traitors"; "Labour rules in the interests of the ruling class, therefore Harold Wilson was bound to take the path he did"; "Only a struggle for socialists policies can take us forward";. "The only answer is to build the revolutionary party"; these are the stock phrases of the sectarians, In a very generalised sense they are true. But in the art of politics such questions as exactly when the centrists betray (to use the emotional vocabulary of the sectarians) ; at_what stage do Wilson's policies start alienating the working class; what kind of socialist policies are most likely to evoke a response in the mass of the population are all-important.
One is reminded of what Trotsky had to say about the German Communist Party of the early thirties, in the period when Hitler was coming to power: 5
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i of the Communist Party of Germany aean impossible to defeat fascism —— all first defeating social democracy. rag ee ee ec ee it i conditionally correct. ip : ere aid, that is, by stale repetition, one can solve the questions of the day. An idea, correct from the point of view of revolu —. strategy as a whole, is converted into a lie and at that into a reac — lie, if it is not translated into the language of tactics. Is it correc that in order to destroy unemployment and misery it is first necessary to destroy capitalism? It is correct, But only the biggest blockhead can conclude from all this that we do not have to fight this very day, with all our forces, against the measures with whose aid capitalism" (operates the system). (From Germany: the Key to the International Situation). "In fact....the Central Co itte proceeds from the idea that it is It is useful in analysing the situation in the Labour movement today to compare the 1965 Blackpool Labour Party conference with the one this year in Brighton. Several quite fundamental differences can be gleaned: (1) The completely different atmosphere of the conference and in particular the attitude of delegates to Wilson. At Blackpool he was king: when he came into the hall the only people who did not give him a hysterical ovation were the very hard left and the trade union opposition - notably the TGWU. At Brighton his image was completely tarnished and the platform had to work hard to get applause for him. In general the conference was less enthusiastic, less passionate and expressed the deep anxieties which even those who voted consistently with the Government feel, This change in attitude reflected both a change in the mood of the country as a whole and in the mood of Labour activists in particular. In the country as a whole whilst there is general support for the Government's policy including the wage freeze, people feel that Labour is in a mess, In particular even though Wilson is still popular he is no longer regarded as a super-politician. Among Labour activists, Wilson is now no longer unchallenged, At Blackpool he was the man who had taken Labour to power after all those years of Toryism, he symbolised a deep feeling in the Labour movement of elation because of that success. Even many of. those who criticised the platform and voted against it felt that Wilson had won the election for Labour, Today, although the majority of Labour supporters feel they need Wilson, they express this in the negative sense rather than positive (who would take his place? They will ask). (2) Although the voting figures only show a small shift to the left (a useful yardstick is to compare the vote gained against the Government's economic policy and for disassociation from the Americans over Vietnam at the two conferences) the platform suffered some defeat: This amounted to a@ very simple thing: while the conference was prepared to support the general lines of the Government's policies, when skilful opposition concentrated attention on the worst and most concrete results of the policies it was a different matter. While conference was prepared to vote for the economic policy of the Government it was not prepared to vote for the extreme result of the policy: the deliberate creation of unemployment: hence the defeat over work-sharing, Similarly, it could vote not directly to support the American bombing of the north, *See Appendix 2 6
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This fact makes for a completely different situation aft : er Blackpool, th platform seemed unbeatable and militants could easily get into a state tae . mg bee they thought the struggle inside the Labour Party was hopeless and pointless, After Brighton there is at least a perspect i able to beat the platform. Rvore Yossie” (toes Under these circumstances we can call upon people to come into the struggle inside the Labour Party. The coming months will see thousands of people stimulated into industrial action; these new forces can now more easily be brought into the Labour Party, Other features of the Blackpool conference were: (1) the position of the TGWU being the "official" and even institutionalised opposition to Wilson was further developed and deepened. This factor has gained significance wider than before: it is now seeping into the minds of millions of ordinary people into this country. In particular the militants and those affected by the Government's policies are beginning to identify themselves with Cousins: after the car workers who came down to lobby conference, booed and shook their fists at Wilson they cheered Cousins, Again we have to note that opposition to the Government on Vietnam was more successful than on incomes policy, This is an apparent contradiction to all that we have ever said about the relationship of opposition on foreign and domestic subjects. The most likely explanation is that the CLPs are moving to the left on Vietnam, especially after the bankruptcy of all Wilson's peace missions, but that, by and large, they tend to be confused by the Government's propaganda on incomes policy. (2) That the political capital of the so-called lefts who have remained within the Cabinet is still substantial. Despite the campaign of Tribune and others, all the members of the Cabinet who stood for the NEC were successful. There was an important but not dramatic loss of votes (See Appendix 1). The main reason why the Greenwoods and Castles can still pose as lefts is that no real alternative to them has emerged on the parliamentary front. The extremely weak response of the back-bench lefts has been quite unable to arouse opposition or act as a focal point for anti-Government forces. It is precisely on the latter point where the Parliamentary lefts are weakest, They have refused point blank to pose themselves against the Government; instead they seek to advise it to "mend its ways". (3) There is a tremendous fund of support for democracy within the Labour Party as was indicated by the very wide sympathy gained over the John Palmer, Ken Coates and Nottingham cases. (4) That despite everything, conference, in essence, gave Wilson a mandate for his policies, A fact the right-wing will not be slow to use. The prime political tasks facing revolutionary marxists: These are: (1) Helping to build a left-wing united front which understands the fundamental nature of the Labour Government, (2) Working out a correct and working relationship with the TGWU/5-union opposition to the Government, ?
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Maintaining and developing our own organisation in this situation. 2) aunt confuse a peed opposition to Wilson with an opposition which will inevitably develop and reach a higher consciousness. Ris general opposition to Wilson could easily be diverted by pee p34 bog measures; already Brown is 'proving' his independence from the aes by demanding that China be admitted to the United Nations. A sound ; opposition which has the perspective of developing a real alternative ° Wilsonism can do only on the basis of understanding the essential nature of the Wilson Government. Moreover, the only way to work out an alternative policy and leadership is to reject completely Wilsonism, the Labour Cabinet must be regarded not as merely being mistaken but as the enemy. It has to attack the working class, because resistance by the working class is the most important obstacle to the capitalist rationalisation of the institutions, industry and economy of Britain. The Government must, having rejected the socialist option, try to change decisively the relationship of forces between the working class and the employers to the favour of the latter. On this point we must recognise the confusion which exists in the minds of a large proportion of the existing left-wing opposition to Wilson, and especially the leadership. In practical, political and social terms even Cousins and Jenkins are saying that they could and would make a better job of rationalising British capitalism and without attacking the working class, Wilson and co, are quite correct to point out the contradictions in their position, Of course the very positions the TGwu/5 union opposition has taken will tend to evolve along a different path, However, we must face the enormity of the ideological job which needs to be done, A task which is made all the more difficult because of the prestige and loyalty which Cousins and Jenkins et al will be able to command. To set about this ideological job, without in any way committing sectarian errors, is the major job of all our publications. This is of course, intimately tied up with the job of defining a correct relationship between ourselves and the union opposition. To hold any position other than that of critical - and even on occasions enthusiastic support for this opposition would be suicide. On the other hand the very strength of this opposition, the resources which it has at its disposal, etc., creates a powerful basis for opportunist adaption. This is all the more the case because all kinds of people, including many disappointed right-wing careerists will be attracted by the new union opposition (witness Mayhew, and Cousins' ready acceptance of Mayhew as the seconder of his resolution on defence costs), To arrive at this correct relationship we need first of all to have an objective sociological assessment of this tendency; one free from wishful thinking on the one side and negative, sectarian conservative thinking on the other, We need to analyse this trade union opposition not in terms of the individual psychology of its leaders (a common subjectivist mistake made by the oh-so-marxistleninist sectarians) but in terms of the social forces operating upon them, The starting point of this analysis is the fact that because of the dual nature of the trade union bureaucracy:the fact that it rests upon workers organisations as well as being the instrument of the employers pressure on the working class - it is bound, 8
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in a period of crisis, to differentiate into right and left tendencies, These tendencies reflect in an often indirect and complicated way the pressure of the two class forces on the bureaucracy. It is no accident that the TGWU has within its ranks dockers and busmen who for particular reasons have a tradition of militancy. On the other hand, the five technical unions, organise big and growing sections of the new working class. There is moreover in both cases a powerful inducement to be militant because in that way membership and organisation can be facilitated in new sections of industry, Our trump card in our relationship with the sections of the new union opposition is the fact that we have a global viewpoint, Because we organise in various fields: in the C.L.P.s, the T.U.s, on the ideological front, in the peace movement, etc., we can link the various strands of opposition together, Our international contacts are also of immense value.
We have to arrive at a position where these sections of the T.U. opposition need us, and respect our independent critical stance and support.
In this situation, where the prospects for the left are more favourable, it is all the more necessary to stress the importance of building our group. Apart from the obvious fact that only by a bigger and more effective group can we intervene more successfully in the coming struggles there could very well develop in our ranks a substitutionist tendency, Comrades will feel a powerful pressure to become completely integrated in the mass struggles at the expense of our organisation, To put it another way, if comrades are taking part in vigorous struggles they will be pulled away from group activities by lack of time - at the same time they will have their consciences "salved" by - their participation in these struggles.
We have to establish a situation where the group organisation is felt by members to be essential to assist them in their participation in these big activities, Two major political questions will determine the course of events in the next immediate stage: (1) Will the TGWU/5 union opposition seek to hold back rank and file struggle or will they seek to stimulate it and use it in their struggle against the government? (2) Will the growing union opposition to the Government stimulate political opposition with the Labour Party and Parliament or will it substitute for it?
The major job that faces us is to make sure that these two qeustions are resolved in such a way that the left is developed and strengthened. Our influence on those sections of the movement we can reach can help to decide which way these two key political problems evolve. Above all our "globality", which enables us to link up different sections of the movement and different struggles into a whole, can be an effective counter to both bureaucratic conservatism, on the one hand, and de facto syndicalism on the other,
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APPENDIA ONE FROM TRIBUNE 14/10/66 NEC VOTING: TH! FIGURES SHOW A 14% SWING TO THE LEFT by Ian Mikardo An analysis of the votes at the Labour Party Conference for the Constituency Section of the National Executive Committee reveals two interesting conclusions, The first is that there was a swing of about 14 per cent away from Ministers and to Left-wing lay members. That's a very considerable swing: if it happened in a parliamentary general election, or even in a parliamentary by-election, a swing of that magnitude would be considered sensational. Of the Ministers who stood both in 1965 and in 1966 every one except Merlyn _Rees_lost_votes, Here are the detailed figures:- = BE ee eT ee ae en eee Bip “papaaec paras gs 1 t 1 ' Votes, thousands Percentage change fF ee < innate sacaimaa : aap F nkitadn ono) get i { 1965 1966 Salk book SE a ee SO ON SOE SER none ee ee Ee ee NE AERA OE Sh AE REN Ee Ge aS Oe ee Sy MNS NO On ae renee eNE i 1 ! I ! | Castle 628 | 590 4 bi6y0es ! Benn 562 517 8.0 | Crossman 1 532 474 10.9 1 | Callaghan } 542 1 447 1 1 17.5 3 | Greenwood i 562 jaxngh5uco 4 1 18.9 4 | Rees { 86 I 97. I 3 is ! Davies { 137 14 46.0 | L-Cuomas._.- a bolssus 96_2josoaSS_oi dicen scitel 22 4.-45.0___! | Total | 3146 | 2699 | t 14.2 4 Rain eraceccicesaianecacs = Se o ae eee eee Se Ne ; In contrast, of the Left-wing lay members who stood both in 1965 and in 1966, every one except Sydney Silverman and myself gained votes. Again, here are detailed figures:ge re ras see i Gites Does o ! H Votes, thousands | Percentage change H ee a ew oe ee ee ew oe oe ee oe ew ee he ee ee eee t 1 1 i ! ! 1 | Driberg 415+ 5254 10.6 | | Mikardo 1 475 $ 433 ' orm 2 | Allaun 259 siif oHIwitig 27-8} Silverman \ 300! 246 ‘ 1 18.0 | 1 Zilliacus \ 130! 167 ' 268.3} ' {| Orme ' 82 ! 154 H 87.8 | \ Jenkins ! 84 1! 140 ' 66.7 } ' | Mendelson. _______ - GEER 28222 MO Sek a ee ae ie Re ee 1 ' | Total pet Gea’ 1 Sy eet This, as I say, is a large swing. If there were a repetition next year of this movement of votes, the election results would be startling. 10
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APPENDIX TWO - COMPARISON OF VOTING AT THE 1965 & 1966 LABOUR: PARTY CONFERENCES I have tried, as far as possible, to make a comparison between roughly equivalent resolutions. On the issue of Vietnam, the key vote 1965 was the resolution, moved by John Mendelson, which called for. the Government to. dissociate itself from U.S. policies and military action in Vietnam, it also strongly criticised the American bombing of the North.
It was lost by: 4,065,000 votes to 2,284,000.
This year the nearest comparable resolution, from Epping, called upon the Government to dissociate itself entirely from the present American policy in Vietnam and urged peace negotiations in Vietnam, to include the representatives of the N.L.F. This was lost ic’ 3, 899, 000 votes to 2 ,473,000.
Thus we see a small switch of votes, but the switch would have probably been bigger if it had not been for the fact that. some.smaller unions could claim that they carried out conference policy by supporting the F.B.U. resolution.
This called for the ending of the U.S. bombing of the North and urged the Government to bring all pressure on the U.S, to.end the war, It was passed, against the advice of the platform, bys 3,851,000 votes to 2,644,000.
On the incomes policy question, it is more difficult to make an assessment for a number of reasons. The most’ comparable resolutions are firstly, the 1965 emergency resolution from the TGWU disapproving the decision to enforce advance notification of union claims, this being lost by: 3,643,000 votes to 2,540,000; and the 1966 TGWU resolution protesting at the interference with free collective bargaining, this was defeated by: 3,925,000 votes to 2,471,000, This apparently shows a small shift to the right, but there is a simple explanation for this: in 1965 the AEU voted for the emergency resolution.
This year they voted against the TGWU resolution. As readers will know the AEU delegation has some degree of democratic control, and it tends to reflect rank and file opinion more accurately than the mandate it. receives, Thus. when the TGWU emergency resolution this year, on work-sharing, was voted upon the AEU delegation voted against the platform. The resolution wes carried by: 3,289,000 votes to 3,137,000.
The vote on cutting overseas expenditure. should also be noted. ‘The resolution, moved by Cousins and seconded by Mayhew, called for substantial, cuts in overseas military expenditure and,, withdrawal from Malaysia, Singapore and the Persian Gulf by 1969-70. It was carried against the platform by: 3899,000 votes to 2,473,000. 11
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BRITAIN, 1967: THE NEED FOR A TRANSITIONAL PROGRAMME by Peter Peterson The experience of the Wilson Government has demonstrated not only the complete betrayal of even reformist principles by that Government but also, and more important for us, the utter bankruptcy of all the traditional leftwing forces in this country, In fact there seems to be an almost mathematical relationship between the speed at which Wilson adopted more and more right wing policies and degree of response from the traditional left. The relationship has, sad to say, been an inverse one: the more Wilson has gone to the right the less effective has been the resistance of the left. Two examples are instructive: (1) The attitudes of the left parliamentarians, When a solid block of Labour M.Ps. started to abstain on certain issues in Parliament, many on the left, including this writer, greeted this phenomena, We regarded this as the beginnings of an institutionalised parliamentary opposition to Wilson. We hoped that more and more M.P.s would follow this course, and that eventually some would actually vote against the Government. How wrong we were! The exact opposite process has taken place: less and less M.P.s abstained and then, finally, even this token resistance was dropped, Vicious antitrade union legislation has been passed through the House of Commons during 1966 with left M.P.s voting for it. (2) Trade union opposition. In 1966 the most savage attacks on trade unionism for decades took place. It is not necessary for me to re-iterate them in detail but let us recall that the principle of taking legal action against trade unionists for calling official strikes has been established; and that freely negotiated wage increases have been stopped by the Government which has threatened the employers who wanted to pay them. The response to these vicious attacks has been minimal both officially and unofficially. There has been only one major strike against the Government: the seamen's strike, which was completely unsupported by the rest of the movement. The number of working days lost by strike action is drastically down, If we subtract those days lost through the seamen's strike from the total we get some measure of comparison for unofficial or locally based responses. The comparison is a gloomy one: the number of days lost in 1966 is only half of what were lost during the comparable period of 1965. Thus the Wilson Government has been successful in carrying out the. traditional role of a social-democrat government: that of getting the working class to accept anti-working class measures without a real struggle. However, an objective examination of this process, aimed at breaking the impasse is not helped by a ritualistic denunciation of the "fake lefts". This profoundly non-marxist approach, which substitutes the psychology of Labour leaders for an objective social analysis, is, indeed, the reverse side of the coin of the opportunism of the traditional left leaders. In fact some responsibility for this state of affairs accrues to the sectarians for diverting important cadre forces away from the struggle at a crucial stage, The pulling out of several hundred young people from the Labour Party by the S,L,L.3; the attempt by sections of the International Socialism Group to rationalise a move away from the Labour Party by making a fetish of shop stewards and unofficial bodies; and the "social fascist" theories advanced by various Maoist tendencies are mistakes just as reprehensible as that of the Communist Party tail-ending the left parliamentarians, 12
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In considering our role in helping to solve this problem and taking into account our modest forces, it seems to be that the following are both very necessary and possible: (1) to help to intertwine and fuse all the sectional struggles into a generalised one against the Government; (2) to help to ensure that some successes are gained in the struggle against Wilson and his Cabinet; (3) to resist the tendencies towards latter day syndicalism in all its forms; ta to counter the tendencies towards adaption by the left; and (5) to give the movement a strategy.
In other words to elaborate a transitional programme, From sectional struggles to an overall struggle When there is a low level of resistance to attacks against workers' standards the dangers of sectionalism are intensified, Those areas and factories which have the most highly organised and conscious workers will tend to go into battle into isolation, We must fight against this tendency and stress the need to always generalise the struggle. This means intervening in these struggles with a set of slogans which pose the local fight in national terms, Pioneer work in this respect has been done by our supporters but we need to make a conscious effort to make this the rule rather than the exception.
To ensure some successes The whole morale of an army - political or military - is determined by the extent to which it is confident that it has some perspective of success, In the present situation of a low level response to the attacks of the Government this can only mean taking certain struggles which are on a fairly small scale and mobilise every possible bit of assistance for them. In particular it means, on the industrial front, trying to ensure that the unions like the giant TGWU or the dynamic ASSET, use their resources to inflict defeats, We can assist in this by using our national network and by rationalising this line of argument.
Opposing syndicalism There are bound to be powerful syndicalist tendencies developing in the organised working class, This is particularly so because the attacks on the unions are coming from a Labour Government. ‘Syndicalism can take the form of unions "going it alone" and giving up the idea of trying to achieve political solutions to their problems, Concretely this could quite easily take the form of some militant unions like ASSET or SOGAT relying entirely on industrial struggle and even severing their connections with the Labour Party. At the present stage such action could only isolate the more conscious workers from the rest of the class, Rank and file syndicalism can be equally directed against right wing contxolled unions, Again, however tempting it might be, it could only divide the working class, The fight against syndicalism involves linking the political and industrial struggles. 13
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It means that we should call upon the industrial militants to insist that the Labour Party rank and file supports them, It means pioneering wherever possible a strategy of militants going into the Labour Party to take over units, Opposing adaption The evolution of Anthony Greenwood is one which possible for anyone once they put tactical considerations above those of principle. We have .a duty to, in a sensitive and non-sectarian manner, point out to the left wingers we work with the path they are treading once they move in this direction, However, it also means building movements which demonstrate that it is both possible to stick to principle and retain wide support, The limited successes of the VSC in this respect should be emulated on other fronts, Giving the movement a strategy We should elaborate a transitional programme to be adopted by a united front of trade unions in opposition to the Government, the minorities of those unions which support the Government, left wing Labour Party members and other socialists. Such a united front would be meaningless unless it involved leaders who, in the eyes of millions of Labour supporters, appeared as alternative leadership to Wilson and co, No doubt this would have to be achieved in stages, but the popularising of the idea of a broad conference of the left, convened by nationally known trade union leaders, and at least some unions and Labour Parties should be started. The programme put forward should include: (1) Immediate abolition of the wage freeze and anti-trade union legislation; (2). The re-iteration of the principle of full freedom of negotiation by unions} (3) A sliding scale of wages to compensate for increases in the cost of living; (4) Development of campaigns for welfare; +2) Huge cuts in military expenditure; 6) Nationalisation of the commanding heights of industry under workers control; (7) A workers plan for the development of the British economy, including the "solving" of its balance of payments problems by more East/West trade and long-term trade agreements with under-developed countries; (8) Opening the books of all employers and workers councils in all places of work to control hiring and firing, welfare allocations, etc.; (9) A socialist foreign policy, with Labour on the side of the oppressed instead of being partner in their suppression; and (10) A call for an all European conference of Labour to meet the threat to workers conditions posed by the greater unity of European capitalists, PERSPECTIVES: 1967 by Kork In outlining the major tasks before us during the next 12 months, we must not only assess our experience during the past period, but also re-evaluate our central strategic aims in the light of the present political conjuncture. 14
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During the whole of our existence one fact has distinguished us from all other proximate groupings on the left: that is that we have seen our prime goal as being assistance in the regroupment of left wing forces, around a transitional programme, to provide an integrated focus for the left, capable of producingan alternative leadership for the Labour Movement, This accounts for all ovr offerts to co-ordinate and synthesise the activities and programmes cf the west forceful and intelligent groupings on the left into first a unified centre and ultimately a unified movement, It has been, througnaout the mee years, true that no such integration could have meaning unless it brouzgat its force to bear upon the struggles within the Labour Party, which for all the treacheries of its leadership has remained the authentic orgenisation of the overwhelming mass of the British working class. The ovshlems we face under the Wilson administration are not fundamente!iy @istinguished from those we faced while Labour was in opposition, in sae tne mass character of the Party is unchanged, while its deminent mMAtIYG inviuence upon the political understanding of the most advanecec 3 .£ the trade unions (and indeed of the party itself) has not been met o oilenged by an affective alternative programme, leadership and organisation, The central commitment of our whole group has remained work within the Labour Party, and all our efforts sgetror such bodies as Union Voice, New Left Review, I.&S./., yD, tne medical aid to Vietnam campaign and sundry other pad.wodes cunesigas have all been subordinated to that commitment, As 4 vessih. we have been able to mark out a definite and honourable space for cutselves, within the general landscape of. the left, It is wrong to prosent these struggles as a mere succession of campaigns: some wove indesc. sponeequentiye struggles, participation in which were of g-en5 ion .aoe3 but others have been ) on-going institutions, throush ube Wt hewe contimzously made.our presence felt. That a few campsigus (e.g. sae housing campaign) were unsuccessful should certainly mot be denies; it is inevitable that experiments should be made, some of woich will prove unfruitful, But any adequate balance sheet would carefully distinguish such failures from such considerable successes as our intervention on behalf of medical aid, or our struggles on comprsensive education. Of course, the criteria of success or failure is vreeiseiy the impact which is made upon the general Labour sovenas bi end it is tius impossible to evaluate any such experiment in vacus, abstz ed from its context in the central struggle to which we have been dedicated, .
In this sense it is important to see the distinction between our work with the B.R.P.F, and all the other sctivities in which we have been engaged. While the B.R.P.F. activities are having an increasing impact upon the Labour Movement (20 trade union general secretaries having sponsored our exhibition on war crimes, key figures now participating in the Tribunal, and so on) it remains true tat the main impact of this work is on the international scene. da seme sconses this work has even held us back in this country, although overali it as certainly produced a considerable advance. But in any event. 2 »alarce sheet would have to include a careful assessment of the huss tnterratoc é mee which this work represents, and upon the strenrih < ‘esponsible body of socialist internationalists would have to evaiuea eEraTGAy positively. The War Crimes Tribunal will be a truiy historic event, in which our
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participation is not merely important but even in some areas decisive. It would be the height of provincial narrow-mindedness to stint this work, which can raise the whole international movement by a head and more. However, it must be said that we cannot afford to abandon our domestic duties, however pressing these other demands may be. The onslaught of the Wilson government upon trade union freedoms and against the living standards of the working class have, up to now, met with scant resistance, so that our opposition, which has been an elementary obligatory assertion of principle, has up to now been somewhat isolated, Even so, we should not underestimate our impact on events. The witchhunt which was not an accidental development, revealed the strength and tenacity of our roots, Gunter was compelled to speak of 'a significant lobby' in our favour, All the evidence is that goodwill towards us is increasing not diminishing, within the broad Labour Movement. Key trade union cadres in the T&GWU, the NUM, and the AEU are moving closer towards us all the time, But clearly this must be mistaken for the result to which we are aiming: to wit the formation of a broad trade union left, around which a political movement can develop effective mass support for a socialist transitional programme, It may be that the struggle will take longer to bear fruit than we had hoped: but it is still clear that only in this struggle can the movement be regenerated, and that our participation can be a crucial factor, We shall accept that our experiment in the formation of C.S.E., which was qualitatively different from all our other campaigns in that it attempted to create institutional links between our comrades of N.L.R., the Voice and other left groupings, proved in one sense to be premature, The groundswell upon which such a movement needed to base itself was delayed by the astute politics of Wilsonism and it could not put on mass flesh, It did, however, group together an important corps of militants and particularly in a number of important cities which hitherto lacked any permanent left forum, it has had a significant role to play. We should certainly continue to invest a controlled effort in this work, and while we may find that the work in some towns does not merit the formation of a local C.S.E., we shall certainly endeavour to persuade any forum movements in which we may be involved to link under the national umbrella, Although it is most important that the conferences on workers! control and kindred questions should be developed, it is also clear that in the immediate future there is little prospect of inserting C.S.E. into the centre of trade union controversy, although local trade union affiliations are possible in very many locations. This means that we must exercise our main force in allied but distinct efforts to come to grips with the developing trade union opposition. A key role will be played by the Voice in the next year, and we must sensibly stir ourselves to repair the slight breaches which have been made in this work. In particular, the work around Voice of the Unions must be revived and taken further, This means that strong efforts must be made to link up, in London, with the main centre of the Voice, as well as serious thought being given to the redevelopment of local issues. Nottingham and Scotland, in particular, should see what resources might be harnessed to this end, There should be an organised effort to contribute 16
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to the Voice chain in the form of articles and local conferences of Voice supporters, particularly in connection with forthcoming trade union elections, At the same time, it is urgently imperative that we take steps to repair the situation in which many comrades have no persistent and unremitting long term work project in the labour party, A special sub-committee should be set up to discuss with every comrade in what ways his work can be orientated, and place those comrades who, for one reason or another, are not involved, within a specific mutually agreed field. In both London and Nottingham this becomes a matter of very high priority. We shall have failed seriously if we cannot field a team of delegates at the next L.P.
Conference: this goal is chosen not out of some fetish, but as an elementary measurement of our capacity to intervene effectively. Every working group must make this task a top priority and dispose of its forces in the most rational way possible ta ensure success.
There remains a problem which we must examine with some urgency: that of assembling a small but talented cadre for youth work, In all the fields in which we are engaged, it is clear that we are badly handicapped by the lack of a co-ordinated youth cadre, This question cannot be separated from the L.P, work, although it does include the problem of our work within the YCL, The fact remains that throughout our ancillary and fraternal organisations, every field needs to be coursed in order to group together a serious task force capable of exploiting the possibilities of the L.P.¥.6. at the same time that it links with activities in all he: other relevant youth fields, In sum, this document calls for: a serious and conscientious effort to regain all the territory we have held in the L.P., with the increments which are due from our oppositional effort, which cannot be capitalised, for all their considerable extent, without a task force of adequate strength: a turn to youth wherever this is possible: a keen effort around the Voice: and the maintenance of all those operations to which we are committed in defense of the Vietnamese revolution and in support of the initiatives of Russell, 1?
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INTERNATIONAL MARXIST GROUP AIM: The International Marxist Group is dedicated to the struggle for the everthrow of the capitalist system of production, the abolition of wage slavery and with it the end of the oppression of man by man, and the establishment of a socialist world community. In pursuit of this aim, the Group recognises that the only consistent political principles by which its actions can be guided are those of revolutionary marxism, These principles find their most rounded and developed contemporary expression in the programme and perspectives of the Fourth International, Therefore, the Group is based on the first four congresses of the Communist International and the World Congresses of the Fourth International, In this light the group sees its basic task as that of grouping the most active and intelligent of the workers and their spokesmen under the banner of the International, with the object of co-ordinating in the most insightful manner the struggle for socialism, and at the same time developing and sharpening the equipment of the International - bo theoretical and practical, The International Marxist Group has no interests of its own, which are separate from or opposed to the interests of the working class, as a whole, Its activity is concerned solely with the attempt to consciously realise these interests. By elucidating in the struggle, a programme which can be seen by the working class to contribute to this end, the Group works to create a leadership of the working class, able to catalyse its reaction against the rule of private property, into the overthrow of that rule. This requires the establishment of a worker's government, inaugurating the democratic dictatorship of the working class cver the former property holding class, which regime will endure wtil all organs of political control and authority become superfluous. The Constitution of the I.M.G. is accordingly based on the principles of democratic centralism, involving full freedom in internal discussion and complete unity in action. Such principles cannot be achieved simply by writing a constitution, but have to be pUrsued in an arduous and difficult struggle in which insight of science is dialactically married to the strength of the working class. This constitution then, is interpreted in this light, ARTICLES : 1. NAME: International Marxist Group. 2. INTERNATIONAL AFFILIATION: The International Marxist Group considers remetrd fo) a —— ° : ag International and strives to group er & corps of marxists Britain seotion by that body. worthy of recognition as @ be HEMPERSHIP t 4% Any person who accepts the programme and constitution = ers who acts politically under the direction of the local fe) odies is eligible for membership of the organisation. ») Normally, every member must b ea : group, but in exceptional cases, where no working oy ete ee ay
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nenber and work under the control of the N.C. @: Application for membership must be made through a working group (where one exists) and if accepted, must be ratified by the N.C. ad) Except in places where there is an effective working group, applicants for membership shall be on probation for six months, at the end of which period the applicant will either be admitted to membership or reduced to the rank of a sympathiser; both being subject to confirnation by the N,C., which may at its own discretion extend the period of probation, 4. WORKING GROUP: a) The basic organisational unit of the I.M.G, is the working group, composed of an area group or an industrial group of not less than 5 members, Where the working group is of sufficient size it may be divided by the N.C, with the agreement of the members concerned or on request by then, b) Each working group shall meet at least fortnightly shall, where necessary, eleét a working group committee at an annual general meeting of the group or at a specially convened meeting. c) Specially convened meetings must be called by the working group secretary at the request of not less than one third of the working group membership. Also, a working group secretary may convene a special meeting of the working group, if they consider this to be necessary. d) Area aggregates be called at regular intervals. 5» NATIONAL CONFERENCE : a) A National Conference of the membership shall be called each year by the 3.C,. , This shall consist of — de'egates from each working group, and shall constitute the highest authority of the I.M.G. b) The proportion of delegates to members shall be determined by the N.C. c) Delegates with consultative votes may attend in accordance with the permission of the N.C. d) N.C, members who are not elected as delegates from working groups may attend in a consultative capacity. e) Draft resolutions and reports of the N.C. must be submitted at least. two months. prior to national conference, Working groups have the right to submit resolutions or amendments to the draft submitted by the N.C. Final amendments can be submitted by delegates in the course of the conference, shall f) The working groups, in consultation with the A OGamrint a standing orders committee for the conference. g) No binding or imperative mandate may be imposed on any delegate to national conference, h) All decisions at conference shall be made by a simple majority, except for ammendments to the constitution, which shall require a two thirds majority. 6, NATIONAL COMMITTEB a) The national ccnference shall decide upon the number and elect a national committee, and alternatates, and shall
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vest the N.C. with full authority between national conference, ») National Conference shall elect such national officers as it deems fit who shall be members of the N.C. with full rights. c) The N,C, shall meet at least every three months.» ad) The N.C, shall elect from its own members a political committee, which shall meet as often as it deems necessary. Members of the P.C, shall | as a normal practice have responsibility for a deemed area of greupactivity . and shall report on this to each meeting of the National Committee. e) The N.C, shall appoint a secretariat to assist in the day to day organisational work of the group, This is to be resident in the vicinity of the national H.Q. f) N.C, members are not subject to the discipline of the P.C. inside the group. The P.C. is only a sub committee of the N.C. Therefore it cannct be considered a higher body; its authority is drawn from the N.C, g) The N.C. can, as it deems fit, set up sub committees, and may co-opt non members on to them, 7. MEMBERSHIP CONTRIBUTION: a) Weekly contributions may be determined from time to time by the N.C.; in ad@ition there will be a monthly levy for the International, b) Members two months in arrears shall be considered in bad standing and not permitted to vote; members three months in arrears shall be consiézed :lapsed; after due notice by the branch or national treasurer, c) W.G.s have the right to modify individuals! dues in consultation with the national treasurer, a) W.G.s two months in arrears shall be considered suspended after due notice has been given, e) All units of the I.M.G. shall issue annual balance sheets of all finances. f) All contributions referred to in this article are national dues and as such are wholly at the disposal of the national organisation, 8. DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND DISCIPLINE: a) All decisions of the governing bodies = national conference, N.C., P.C., and the working group = are binding upon all members and subordinate units, Any member, whilst co-operating in carrying out the decisions of the majority, has the right to express dissenting opinions within the group, to circularise the membership with any material stating these opinions, b) The N.C, shall maintain an internal bulletin as a medium for expressing these dissenting opinions, All material submitted for it shall be published within 21 days of receipt, there being no right of censorship by the N.C., other than that required to keep within legal limits, The right to have material circulated in the internal bulletin is as axiomatic as the right for any comrade to speak at any meeting of the group, 20