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Vietnam: A Balance Sheet of Russian Aid

International, first series, Vol. 1, No. 2, June 1968 · p. 11 · 1,202 words

The scan: intl-v01n02-june-1968.pdf (PDF, Marxists Internet Archive)

Read by machine from the scan, then tidied: columns reconstructed, wording unchanged. Check the scan before quoting.

(Editorial note: this article has been translated from the Belgian socialist weekly, LA GAUCHE, The introduction is by LA GAUCHE.)

Every time we notice a red star on a supply convoy bound for Vietnam, whether Soviet, Chinese or other, we commend it because we want this aid to increase,

Until now, in the face of the tremendous and scientific character of American aggression, this aid from socialist countries has remained insufficient, in our opinion, and badly co-ordinated,

The report of Gerard Chaat, a comrade specialising in strategical questions, proves it to us, at least insofar as it concerns the Soviet Union. Has this aid increased much recently? It remains to be seen!

Day and night, for the last two years, a flood of fire and steel, without historical precedent, has crashed down on Vietnam, a socialist country. The workers' states affirm that they are furnishing "all necessary aid" - but necessary to whom? Soviet aid, if it increases, always follows rather than precedes the degrees of American aggression. At each stage of escalation there is a "readjustment" of Soviet aid. These "readjustments" constitute defensive acts, which just allow Vietnam to hold on but in any case will not serve to stop the escalation, and, for a very strong reason, repel it, In this article we analyse the quality of the military aid furnished by the USSR, in the context of the armament that it can technically give.

Such an analysis, however summary, is overwhelming for the Soviet leadership: the military aid given is in every respect very much short of Vietnamese needs and, above all, the military possibilities of the USSR.

The restrictions pertaining to the Russian military aid have political reasons: they derive from the strategy of "peaceful co-existence" that the Soviet leadership applies to Vietnam as elsewhere, In any event, they try to avoid involvement in a potential direct confrontation with the USA. They must reply to escalation with counter-escalation. That is why Soviet aid only represents a mere minimum in the face of American air-power, necessary for survival but not for victory.

IS THE QUALITY OF THE MATERIAL GIVEN INFERIOR?

EXAMPLE 1: FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

The MIG 21C, the most modern apparatus given to North Vietnam, "doesn't carry much weight" at the side of the Phantom F4 of the American Air Force. The latter beat the world speed record of the E-66 in [illegible], a specially streamlined version, with an overpowering [illegible] turbo reactor, stripped of its armament, of the MIG 21, which is, of course, superior to the 21C.

The frontal radar of the MIG 21C, lodged in the cone of the air-intake is fairly sufficient to spot the enemy. It cannot be used for fire-direction, nor for a good reason, to guide the machine, like that of the F4A. The result is that the MIG 21C can only fight in clear weather, for the clouds interrupt the infra[illegible] The MIGs 21 D, E, F, have a flexible capacity for use in all weathers.

But: (1) [illegible] of the MIG 21E, F have been given to Vietnam (a few MIG 21D appeared a little time ago in the Vietnamese sky.)

(2) The USSR has given a very small number of air-to-air infra-red Atoll machines. Even when the sky is clear, the Vietnamese pilots must attack from the rear with canon, This [illegible] tactic can usually be used against sub-sonic aircraft (flying less than the speed of sound) but it is suicidal against faster aircraft, particularly the F4.

(3) Moreover, the majority of the Vietnamese forces remain equipped with MIG 15 and MIG 17, [illegible] aircraft [illegible]

[illegible] to specify that the USSR has fighters far superior to the MIG 21. The MIG 23, all-weather fighter, derived from the MIG 21, mach 2.6 to 2.7, that is to say more powerful than the F4,

The Yakovlev Fiddler, all-weather fighter, very heavy, a wide field of action, armed with air-to-air rockets with [illegible] electronic [illegible] Both have been operational [illegible] (Tuchino parade), [illegible]

And there is a new class of [illegible] - the new [illegible] superior to the American F4. [illegible] - the Yakovlev all-weather fighter, ultra-rapid mach 3 and above, - the vertical take-off fighter [illegible]

All these machines were exhibited - with much publicity in July 1967 at Domodoviedo: and they are already in use (TASS AGENCY [illegible] statements and [illegible])

EXAMPLE 2: GROUND-AIR MISSILES AGAINST [illegible] ATTACK

The SAM-2 missiles date back to 1951! They are useful against aircraft flying at mach 1 and above 1,000 metres altitude (e.g., the B52s shot down at Vinh Linh),

Table of comparison between the MIG and the F-4A

MIG 21 / F-4A

Prototype: 1955 / 1958

Series: 1959 / 1960

Speed: Mach 2 to Mach 2.1 / Mach 2.5 to Mach 2.6

Reactor: 1 "Kuznetzev", 6,500kg thrust (with post-combustion) / 2 "General Electric", with 8,500kg thrust, with post combustion

Range of action: 1,250 miles / 2,300 miles

Maximum armament: 1 to 2 30mm cannon, 750 litre tank, 4 air to air Atoll infra red missiles / 4 air to air Sparrow III missiles guided by radar, 4 air to air Sidewinder infra red, 2,000kg of bombs

But the slightest electronic jamming makes them swerve, In a like manner, during October 1967, the B52s exploded the SAM rockets at 100 metres from them, But again you must fire about 50 SAM to have a chance of knocking out a supersonic aircraft, The weakness of the SAM at low altitude is such, that an American F4B pilot (an aircraft which climbs quicker and turns more sharply than the aforementioned rocket) could say: "I saw it climb, like a long pencil, and turn round to find me. I didn't wait for the rest..I climbed, The SAM only knocks down the less perfected American machines, and rarely, "by surprise" the F4. Moreover, the SAM (some progress has been made since) needs a range of acceleration which dro[ps] near the area of penetration, The result is that [illegible] above all the classical DcA. The trouble is that in 1967 aircraft flew even 2,000 km per hour, not at 600. The rate of losses is now 1 to 2 per cent. per mission, and the Vietnamese fight with against the F4C, (They shoot some down - see Premium COURIER,)

If Soviet aid is increasing in quantity: - it has doubled in a very short time - it stays the same in quality (SAM 2 rockets and MIG 21). This increase will lift the rate of American losses from 1 to 2 per cent. These have increased, until now only because the number of missions carried out rose. (2,408 US aircraft have been shot down - a very small number if compared with the means that Russians have at their disposal.)

THE MATERIAL GIVEN IS INSUFFICIENT IN QUANTITY

The "Seven Days War" (Middle East) allows us to ascertain that the United Arab Republic has received more MIG 21s than North Vietnam, Two thirds of the Egyptian losses were replaced within three months, by an airlift using A-N 16 cargo planes, (supplied, in the main, by China), Soviet harpoon-rocket destroyers anchor in the port of Alexandria.... but no-one has ever seen a single one in Haiphong, Continued next issue.

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