If anyone in Czechoslovakia on the night of Aug. 21/22 thought the Russians were just paying a courtesy call, they had only to listen to the continual noise of the invaders' aircraft to know they meant business. On that eventful night, if nothing else did, those aeroplanes flying low over Prague (partly to land troops and tanks, and partly, I'm sure, to intimidate the population), brought home the reality that Czechoslovakia was being occupied.
The reaction of the people was mixed. Some tried to stop the soldiers, physically with their bodies, while others attempted to reason with the soldiers by talking to them; still others would deliberately ignore them, walking through the streets of Prague as though the tanks and troops just did not exist. In the first few days this seemed to affect the Russian soldiers the most, completely demoralising some who thought that they had come at the request of the Czech people; these same people who now went out of their way to ignore them. Other soldiers were under the impression that they were manoeuvres, while others had thought they had landed in Hungary or East Germany for military exercises. All seemed bewildered to find themselves in a hostile situation. (One soldier in fact committed suicide when he realised the role that was expected of him). These incredibly young-looking soldiers were forced to find their own food, often seizing vans by force and taking food that was for general distribution. Yet despite all this, the Czechs were careful to level their criticisms and condemnations at the Soviet Government and not at the soldiers, who all the time I was there they regarded as their brothers - misguided brothers but brothers, nevertheless.
Many wild rumours circulated throughout the time I was there including the "news" that China had invaded Russia during her army's absence; that 1,000 inhabitants had been killed in one town [in] Slovakia by the troops when they attempted [to] resist the invaders; that Kosygin had committed suicide. With so many such stories being [illegible] and not all later being denied, it was sometimes difficult to know exactly what was [illegible].
The invasion occurred one week after I had [arrived] in Prague. In that week I had talked to many people, in particular students. I was struck by [the] difference in attitude to the Government from previous times. Last year, for example, students I knew talked of leaving their homeland and going to Britain, U.S.A., etc. Yet at that time they also spoke of the fact that it had been impossible to criticise the Government before, in any degree, even among friends, for fear of reprisals. Even last year, then, the situation was changing, hesitantly and slowly maybe, but changing all the same. Yet having tasted some freedom the Czechs naturally wanted more, and when they did obtain more the Russians naturally "objected". Czechoslovakia, the most vulnerable of the Soviet bloc countries, could not possibly set a precedent in this way - at least not if the Russians had any say in the matter.
But were the easing of censorship and the granting of a few liberalisations the only reasons behind the invasion? Certainly most socialists, East or West, reject the idea of a counter-revolution taking place and the Czechs themselves knew the difference between destalinisation and the advent of capitalism (which they most definitely did not want). Was there in fact something deeper behind the Russians' "anxiety"? It is well-known that excerpts from a manifesto "For a Government of Workers' Councils in Czechoslovakia" issued by the Fourth International, the world party of socialist revolution, founded by Leon Trotsky, appeared in [the] June 24 edition of a new magazine, "Informational Materials"; and that Deutscher's "The Unfinished Revolution" was in the process of being serialised in a student-orientated paper.
Before the Russians came I asked students if they felt opposition to Dubcek came only from the right, from the Novotnyites. When they replied in the affirmative, I put the idea that there may well be some opposition from the left. I say "idea" because the concept of opposition that was left of the C.P. was alien to their way of thinking. This is only to be expected in a generation that has learnt to equate communism with marxism-leninism Soviet-style. The youth I talked to consider themselves to be socialists and realise their idea of socialism differs from that of the C.P.; yet their political level is very low because what they would like to read (e.g. Trotsky, Guevara) is not readily available, and what they should read (i.e. Lenin and Marx) are barely glanced at since these are the official "bibles" of the C.P.
The students were very critical of their counterparts in France during the month of May, but, again their arguments were at a very low level politically. Their criticisms basically boil down to the fact that students cannot bring about a revolution (which is perfectly true but indicates a complete misunderstanding of the role the French students played; which is probably due more to lack of any real information than [anything] else); and the criticism that revolutionaries do not take a holiday in the middle of the revolution. Yet when the Russians came those who resisted actively were the students. A week after I heard Czech students dismiss those in France as a lot of adventurists who could never hope to achieve anything, they themselves were acting in much the same way (although admittedly in entirely different circumstances). Considered tactically those in Czechoslovakia could be considered more adventurist than the French students who did not try to resist tanks and troops armed with machine guns. But I think generally there has been a greater understanding of the part students can play in the struggle.
Since I have left Czechoslovakia, I have learnt of students who have left the country and are hoping to study in Western Europe or North America. They no longer have any faith in what their universities can offer them. It would be easy to say that they should stay and fight, easy enough if you are not directly engaged in the struggle and facing the penalties involved.
What we can and must say is that now the situation is no longer considered front page news in the bourgeois press, we on the left must continue to give full support to the Czech people and complete condemnation of the Russians. We must do this until the last Russian soldier has left the Czech soil; (as somebody said: "It was bad seeing the tanks on every street, but it is worse now they have 'withdrawn' knowing they are here but not seeing them"); and beyond this we must support the people of Czechoslovakia in any attempt they make - be it the setting up of workers' councils, the formation of an opposition socialist party outside the National Front, the continuation of less censorship, more free speech, the attempts at anti-bureaucratisation and destalinisation, etc., - anything, in fact, that will bring about the political revolution in Czechoslovakia and establish workers democracy.
This is something more than a lessening of censorship. These were the writings about a man whose existence had been wiped from the history books of Russia. Of course, this is not the fundamental reason for the Russians' invasion but I think it gives a good indication that the Russians were afraid of a left-wing revolution; as opposed to a right-wing counter-revolution. (This is not to say that such a revolution was taking place but only to suggest that perhaps it was a very real fear on the Russians' part that it might.)
The students I talked to, although supporting Dubcek to the hilt, knew that he was still a bureaucrat, that something of stalinism must have rubbed off on to him - after all he had managed to survive (and more than survive) some of the worst years of Stalin's regime whilst living in Moscow.
All this the Czechs knew but they supported Dubcek as the best alternative available. The students I came into contact with knew there was no counter-revolution but they were under the impression the Russian Government was naive enough to think there was. They equated the talk of the Russian soldiers (who thought Russia had complete freedom of speech and that Czechoslovakia had become capitalist) with the views held in the Kremlin.
CASTRO ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA
It is greatly to be regretted that Fidel Castro saw fit to support the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia... At first it was felt that this might have been due to Russian pressure. However, the speech in which Castro put his position indicates otherwise. It was an attack on Russian policy. It is very clear that the Cuban leadership does not understand the nature of bureaucracy and stalinism and that it has a very simplistic view of the danger of the restoration of capitalism. However, while criticising this position, no socialist should stop supporting the revolutionary policies of the Cuban Government because of this incident; any more than they should stop supporting the Vietnamese revolution, whose leaders also supported the Russians.