The 31st Congress of the Communist Party of Great (sic) Britain met after considerable press speculation about the possibility of a split in its ranks over Czechoslovakia. Both the leadership faction and the pro-Russian minority had sought to get the maximum number of delegates supporting their respective lines. The pre-congress discussion in COMMENT and the MORNING STAR had been dominated by this question. Thus this appeared to be the central issue before the Congress.
In many ways this particular situation suited the party leadership: it enabled it to avoid the major issue which really faced the Congress - why is it that a time when social-democracy has been exposed to millions of workers, when in nearly every industry workers are going into action, and when thousands of young people have been radicalised, that the Communist Party, its youth organisation and press are all in decline. Since the last Congress two years ago the party has lost 6% of its members, the YCL 34% of its, and the circulation of the MORNING STAR has declined by over 5,000. Moreover, practically every left group in the country - with the probable exception of the SLL - has experienced considerable growth.
The pro-Russian minority tried to explain this in terms of the party's lack of "internationalism", i.e., refusal to support the invasion of Czechoslovakia and fully align the party with Moscow. The bankruptcy of the Gollan leadership is clearly demonstrated by the fact that this patently absurd "explanation" got such wide support.
Although this policy means acting against the interests of world revolution and the building of socialism whenever this conflicts with the aims of the Russian bureaucracy (and this is most of the time!) it also means that the CPGB does not behave entirely like an ordinary social democratic party.
[illegible] "the left", i.e., consolidating its ranks with the [illegible] and "left" MPs, etc. To achieve this they need to demonstrate that they are "independent" of Moscow. However they cannot go too far along this path because to do so would call into question their entire history. In addition, the CPGB obtains considerable material benefit from its connection with the workers states (an analysis of the advertising revenue of the MORNING STAR would reveal this very concretely). Thus the King Street clique are walking a tight-rope - to lean too far either way would be disastrous for them.
From a long-term point of view, there is an even greater danger to the Gollan leadership from this policy. In many ways they have the worst of both worlds: they do not have the benefit of the clear-cut relationship with Moscow that Sid French wants (which has some compensations from a bureaucratic point of view) nor can they escape political responsibility for the Russian leadership's crimes. On the contrary, the next incident like the invasion of Czechoslovakia will hit the CPGB even harder precisely because of their "independent" line.
From a more general point of view one can say that the CPGB stands at a crossroads: is it to continue being a party which reflects the interests of the Moscow bureaucracy in this country or is it going to evolve into what amounts to a small social-democratic party?
Because the Soviet bureaucracy rests upon the nationalised property relations created by the October revolution and has to defend those property relations - in its own manner - the fact that the CPGB reflects the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy means it retains a vestige of a link with the October revolution.
In the event of the interests of the Russian bureaucracy clashing with those of the ruling class in Britain there is a tendency for the CPGB to oppose the capitalist class. This [illegible] "revolutionary" [illegible] Communist [illegible] and the effects [illegible].
Of course, the CPGB - together with all other parties supporting Moscow - is following a reformist policy, but this reformism is always distorted by its reliance on the Russian bureaucracy. This is also the basic reason why it is possible for the CPGB to make "left" - even ultra left - turns.
Whilst it retains this character and whilst the nationalised property relations exist in the Soviet Union, thus making the latter an objective revolutionary factor, the CPGB will always tend to draw to it working class militants and leftward moving youth, thus "regenerating" it. Owing to the crisis of Stalinism, especially the Sino-Soviet conflict, this has been less of a factor in recent years - however it remains the most important political capital the CPGB has.
Hence those people in the CPGB who think their problems will be over by getting rid of this embarrassing relationship are absolutely mistaken. On the contrary, the achievement of complete "independence" from Moscow, unless accompanied by a complete change in policy - in fact its transformation into a revolutionary group - would merely convert the CPGB into a small reformist party. Such a party could have very little influence and most likely would have a short life. Why should people support a small reformist party with no electoral prospects when they can join a big one which has the possibility of being the government party?
As a matter of fact, it is possible for the link to be retained with the gains of the October revolution without subordination to the Russian bureaucracy. This is done by having a policy of unconditional defence of the Soviet Union and other workers states and by supporting the struggles of the workers, intellectuals and youth of the workers states in their fight for socialist democracy. This Trotskyist policy, which includes full support for political revolution against the bureaucracy, is diametrically opposed to the Gollan policy of supporting whichever group of bureaucrats happens to be in power in the Soviet Union at any particular time. Because of their Stalinist training it is virtually impossible for the leadership of the CPGB to adopt the former position.
This, then, is the background to the current crisis in the CPGB. This basic dilemma was the unspoken contradiction underpinning all the discussions in the Congress.
Congress started off with an acrimonious dispute over the refusal of the resolutions committee to allow discussion on the numerous resolutions and amendments from branches on Czechoslovakia (no less than 99!). This had the effect of making the whole discussion pivot around the executive committee's resolution, which merely endorsed the party's stand in opposing the invasion. Nearly one-third of the delegates supported the reference back of this proposal after hearing Jack Dunman denounce the decision "as grave interference with the rights of this Congress."
Several of the resolutions and amendments had included demands for a deeper examination of the reasons for the state of affairs which led up to the invasion.
After a discussion in which both sides mobilised well-known speakers (especially industrial militants), the executive committee's resolution was passed by 295 votes to 118. In addition there were presumably about 30 abstentions because the number of delegates over the week end was 435. This vote shows the strength of the grip of the Gollan bureaucracy: in the discussion at district leadership level, about 9 months ago, no less than 40% of the votes had been cast against or abstained on the leadership's policy. Since then the opposition has gained ground: for instance, one former member of the executive committee, Ida Hackett from Mansfield, explained to the Congress how she had come to change her mind to support the invasion (she was not elected to the executive committee!)
Other attempts by the pro-Moscow opposition to change party policy were even more soundly defeated; receiving votes of only 40 to 60-odd. Clearly there was little support for them outside the two district organisations the opposition control: Hants and Dorset, and Surrey.
Apart from the Czechoslovakian vote, the biggest opposition to the leadership came on the question of nationalism. As is well-known the CPGB has never had a principled position on the question - not even in the days of Lenin's and Trotsky's leadership of the Third International. Now it is trying to "hop on the nationalist bandwagon" by including the demand for separate Welsh and Scottish parliaments in its programme.
This is an important question from the point of view of King Street: it is not generally realised that the biggest sufferers from the recent upsurge of nationalism have been Communist Party candidates. In Scotland it seems reasonably certain that in certain areas up to 50% of the traditional Communist Party vote has been lost to the nationalists.
Feeling this pressure, the Scottish district committee of the CP proposed an amendment that would include an English parliament in the programme. The logic behind this proposal is that this would entail a full commitment to the idea that Britain is a federation of nations. This proposal received 98 votes with 21 abstentions (there were 214 votes against; adding these votes up one gets a total of 333, which presumably means that up to 100 of the delegates had gone home when the vote was taken on Tuesday).
Two of the most prominent Scottish members of the executive committee, Hugh Wyper, of the Glasgow trades council, and Jimmy Reid, supported the Gollan leadership against their own district committee. This may be the explanation of Jimmy Reid's resignation recently as Scottish district secretary.
There was another small opposition on the question of nationalism: 17 votes (plus 16 abstentions) for the South Kensington amendment to delete references to Scottish and Welsh parliaments. It was interesting to note that the supporters of this amendment used the very same arguments that the CPGB leadership had used in the past when its line was to oppose nationalism as a diversion.
When it came to the discussion on "Left Unity and the Fight against Monopolies", apart from the Surrey and Hants and Dorset propositions two other critical positions emerged. Barnet Letsky of Edgware, moved that the party should call for abstention in the coming general election where there was no CP candidate and the Labour candidate did not support left policies.
There were also two resolutions from the Manchester graduates' branch calling for the CPGB to support "united left" candidates instead of right-wing Labour candidates. Both these propositions were defeated with only a handful of votes in favour. Whilst they were confused and had both sectarian and opportunist undertones, in the given context, one can say the supporters of these propositions represented a left tendency, which was reacting against the opportunism of the leadership, especially the latter's attitude towards so-called Labour lefts.
One of the clearest expressions of the Kautskyite opportunism of the British Road to Socialism was the speech of one John Peck, East Midlands district secretary and parliamentary candidate for Nottingham North. Mr. Peck, who used to go on demonstrations wearing his DFC (received for his exploits in bombing German workers' homes during the second world war) said the party strategy "involves transforming Parliament into a real instrument of the people." He added, hopefully, "In a socialist Parliament, Communist MPs will be vital - if we are serious about socialism, we have to be serious about elections."
One other interesting contribution is worth noting: Peter Slade, a London delegate, criticised the resolution on foreign affairs for not posing a positive alternative to the Common Market. He argued that the party should raise the slogan of the United Federation of Socialist States of Europe. He was probably unaware as to how heretical this "Trotskyist" slogan is regarded by King Street.
Summing up, one can say that the differences at the conference were the biggest that have been expressed in recent years (almost certainly the most profound since the takeover by the Dutt/Pollitt group). However, there was no rounded out left current, only the hint of one to come. There were very contradictory trends: some of those supporting the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia thought they were making a "left" criticism of the leadership's opportunism. Many of those who wished to have a more thorough-going critique of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia combined this with an even more right-wing version of the British Road to Socialism approach. Such confusion should be expected: the CPGB has a low political level and has no tradition of internal discussion of fundamental issues.
In addition, the main motor force of the crisis in the CPGB has been the impact of the international crisis of Stalinism; this explains the dichotomy between the way it pushes people on foreign and domestic issues. However, in a period of intensified class struggle and the appearance of large forces to the left of the CPGB, the crisis will combine the effects of international and domestic pressures. When this occurs the death-knell of the Stalinist-trained leadership of the CPGB will be at hand.