In 1956, the retiring director of the London School of Economics published his biography under the title of "Portrait of an Imperialist". A little research rapidly dispels the myth of radicalism associated with this institution; and as an area of critical social enquiry upholding academic freedom, objectivity and the pursuit of knowledge, LSE has never existed.
Justifying the hopes of its Fabian founders, the school has always been deeply involved in politics and industry in two ways:
(1) the legitimation of bourgeois social theory, e.g., departments act as pressure groups on the Government (Townsend and Abel Smith; social welfare, the Economics Department, etc.);
(2) the production of skilled manpower for industry and government necessitated by the long term planning needs of monopoly capitalism.
The central position held by the school is reflected in its control by a Board of Governors who between them hold directorship of 80 companies, assorted official and semi-official government posts, and other such eminent positions (such as the Archbishop of Canterbury). The financial interests of the school and of the board members range from South Africa to Vietnam. In this situation any struggle for control of their education by the students is a challenge to the subordination of the school to the needs of British capitalism and is essentially a political struggle.
More than this: the previous struggles of the LSE students by their successful example had provoked spontaneous imitation in other universities and colleges: Hornsey, Essex, Birmingham and others took up the ideas of direct action and the sit-in pioneered in this country by comrades at LSE. The school became the most advanced area of struggle, and in a very real sense the heart of the student movement.
British university authorities were not slow to learn the lessons of France, May, 1968. The national and international interests of the universities and in particular of LSE were to be protected from student subversion by a national strategy. The Vice Chancellors met in September at Cambridge, deciding to nip the movement in the bud through a policy of repression. Their decision to use the legal machinery of the state - writs at Bristol - marks on the one hand an escalation, and on the other hand, that they are the victims of their own ideology, namely, the idea that the movement can be contained by eliminating "troublemakers".
The events in France also gave impetus to the development of a nationally co-ordinated student movement, the Revolutionary Socialist Student Federation. Unlike such movements in other countries, RSSF appeared sufficiently late to avoid the organisation/non-organisation debate which hampered the development of the Students for a Democratic Society in America. From the start it faced the need for a national counter strategy.
[The p.15 continuation of this article is heavily scrambled in the OCR; the passages below are salvaged sentence cores, with lost spans marked. This page is flagged for re-OCR.]
The RSSF had anticipated the closure of the school and had sent a leaflet to its bases warning them to prepare for action in the event of the closure of the school. It had also prepared to launch an offensive mobilisation through the university system. This was more than simply a [call] for solidarity action, the instruction to bases explicitly called for an escalation of the [struggle], through the raising of internal demands.
[illegible] Robin Blackburn has called the right wing and the [illegible] for the symbolic action [illegible].
It was written in [illegible] of [a] major confrontation [illegible]. [illegible] the gates were to prevent certain areas in the school being occupied. Given that Adams expected a confrontation [illegible] worsened relations and made such a confrontation inevitable.
In this situation two [positions emerged] among members of the Socialist Society at LSE. Certain groups wished to avoid a [confrontation], arguing for a de-escalation [illegible]. Given that Adams [pursued a] policy [in which] a confrontation could be avoided by sustaining long term defeats, [illegible] accepting gates, codes of conduct, etc.
What emerged from this conflict was a strategy which was neither offensive nor defensive. The Socialist Society conducted a campaign against [the gates and] for negotiations [illegible]. [illegible] prior to the Union meeting [illegible] decided on direct action. As a result of their agitations, however, the Union meeting went against the Socialist Society's previous decision and decided to remove the gates. Because there was no clear determination to provoke a confrontation over the issue of gates, it was stumbled into rather than [illegible] into a coherent political framework. Even at [this] level no thought [had] been given to the [illegible].
[illegible] two lines clearly emerged, each based upon [an analysis] of the situation. The first [line was] the concern [among some] students, that the movement [had no] intrinsic merit apart from its relation to LSE; it followed that strategic decisions [should be taken] with minimal [consultation]. In reality, the [gates were seen] as an embarrassment and diversion from the "real" struggle which was an internal one of rallying the support of the uncommitted students in LSE.
For example, LSE students called a demonstration for the first Tuesday after the struggle [began] and the RSSF called one for the following Monday. The Tuesday demonstration was to be an expression of solidarity; no thought was given to its political [illegible]. [By] early [Mon]day morning [illegible] the time [illegible] held the initiative had passed from RSSF.
"to be concluded next [issue]"