On September 26, the civilian team headed by Siles Salinas was ousted from the Palacio de Gobierno [Government Palace] by the armed forces and replaced by a military-civilian government headed by the supreme commander of the armed forces, General Alfredo Ovando Candia.
This changing of the guard was carried out peacefully, without a shot being fired or even a knife being stuck into anybody. It was only for propagandist purposes and in an attempt to confuse the people, or at least to create expectations of political change, that a big theatrical performance was staged with a display of military equipment, statements of support, etc., and with the protagonists of the action as a finale terming it a "revolution".
We consider it our responsibility to expose the reasons that motivated the armed forces to take this step and the concrete aims they sought, and, at the same time, to alert the people to the dangers they threaten, concealed by demagogic poses.
Fulfilling this revolutionary obligation two days after the event, we must say categorically that what we are faced with is a change of personnel in the Palacio de Gobierno and not a social revolution. We must, therefore, contradict the official apologists, the naive souls, and the utopians.
There is no revolution, whether with regard to the forces involved, which are the same as have monopolised political power since 1964; or with regard to the sprinkling of opportunistic intellectuals in the new cabinet who have no fixed party affiliation or ideology. Still less is a revolution to be found in the projected programme, the "Mandato Revolucionario", which does not propose a single fundamental change, which lacks coherence, and which is nothing more than a salad of ambiguities and contradictions.
The "Mandato" is inferior to any trade-union minimum programme of struggle these days. These features are quite in accordance with the spirit of the middle petty bourgeoisie from which they come.
The changing of the team in the Palacio de Gobierno was not an attempt to make the revolution but rather an attempt to block the revolution of a proletarian and popular nature—socialist in essence—which is on the march.
Such a move was an intelligent response under the circumstances. It was the product of the impotence of the capitalist system in face of the present unstable and threatening situation—an extremely serious attempt of the bourgeoisie and imperialism to contain a revolution arising from below by offering to carry out the revolution from above, but ... within the bounds of law, order, tranquillity, and with respect for the private property of the monopolies.
This conclusion is based on the following considerations:
1. The guerrilla movement and the rise of the workers' movement have forced the generals to take defensive measures.
Our judgement is confirmed by the contradictions in what the military commanders themselves say and by what can be read in the introduction to the "Mandato Revolucionario". In fact, this introduction says that the attitude of the armed forces was provoked by the danger threatening the "institutions of the nation", due to the advance of the forces of the extreme left and the growing activities of the guerrillas, a situation which the Siles government showed itself impotent to contend with. The Siles government was especially incompetent in containing terrorist, that is, armed struggle.
These "sincere" or "precipitate" statements—inadvertently, naturally—expose the new cabinet's insistent asseverations as to their revolutionary objectives. At the same time these statements show the clear aims of the officers, which are still the same as they were in November 1964, when a developing popular insurrection was also shaking the country and endangering the institutions of capitalist society.
Today, as yesterday, the generals have come out of their staff headquarters to confront—with the methods they find most appropriate—a new ascent and mobilisation of the people, of the worker, peasant, and student masses, an ascent whose most energetic and dynamic expression is the guerrilla movement.
Shortly before the ouster of Siles Salinas, the military chiefs were forced by the evidence to admit that guerrilla activities in Bolivia had not been destroyed by the blows dealt to the ELN [Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional—Army of National Liberation, the guerrilla force created by Che Guevara and Inti Peredo] or by the murder of Inti Peredo. This was equivalent to a confession that the military's plans had failed. The repression had been unable to smash the revolutionists.
The destruction of the unions and their radio stations, the gag laws, the concentration camps, and the military encirclement of the mines had produced very precarious results. The contradictions and exhaustion of the regime had not been overcome. To the contrary, they were growing more acute, provoking the ex-chancellor Medeiros to say that it was nonsense to talk about development of the country because the per capita income was continuing to fall. The annual income per inhabitant fell from $130 in 1950 to $80 at the present time (according to a Parliamentary report).
This objective situation stirred up the mass struggle, which is now simmering more vigorously than before, drawing in broad sectors of intellectuals and of the Catholic church, whose priests have become leaders of discontented popular masses. And this struggle has attracted the well-off university and college students, who are rising up against the capitulation to imperialism and the anti-democratic, antinational and anti-labour policy of the army. In this context, the guerrillas were nothing more than the continuation of the revolutionary mass movement whose development was cut off and truncated by the massacres and repression of the military circles.
It was for this reason that the military command decided to adopt an apparently leftist social and economic programme; it decided to liberalise its regime, to give a few concessions, to give the impression of a confrontation with the imperialist concerns. It pushed for an increase in the state share in the monopolies, and even, why not?, a little statisation. That is, the military wanted to appear to be the defender of the national and popular sovereignty and the national interests. The rape and the murderer's machine gun were henceforth to be used in the name of a revolution!
Siles Salinas was not ousted because he was an obstacle to carrying forward a revolutionary policy of national and social liberation but because he was considered incompetent to contain the guerrillas and the advance of the left and because it was urgently necessary to perfect a new tactic or method the better to deal with the masses.
The anti-popular essence of the Ovando regime thus shows up very clearly. The rest, the pseudo-revolutionary language, the promises of trade-union and political democracy, new civilian faces in the cabinet are incidental, secondary questions which will be forgotten or altered when it suits the military command.
2. The armed forces holding power have been converted into a political party.
The armed forces took power in Bolivia in 1964. The traditional political parties had lost their historical validity. They had shown themselves incapable of comprehending the international and national situation and the new relationship of forces then developing. Worn-out and ossified, they became useless for defending the order established by imperialism and native capitalism against a popular, working-class revolution.
This political vacuum, as Ovando once called it, was filled by the army, which began to operate like a political party.
While in Che's time in 1967 the guerrilla movement had broad popular support, its reappearance in 1969 with Inti Peredo occurred in a much riper situation, when the students, priests, workers and radicalised sectors of the middle class no longer hesitated but accepted armed struggle as the only way.
This popular judgement, which accepts and endorses the road of guerrilla warfare, is what sustains and bolsters the guerrillas. Otherwise, it could not be explained how, after the defeat at Vado del Yeso, the death of Che, and the brutal blows of this July, fighters [illegible] in the field and a pro-guerrilla spirit is sweeping the country.
This spirit is expressed in the homage of students, writers, priests, and unions to the figures of Che and Inti. The people have not been scared off, no terror gnaws at their vitals. The guerrillas seem like the early Christians, who were exterminated and devoured by the beasts in the Roman circuses but who raised up new fighters in their place, inspired by their faith and the certainty of victory.
The purely military repressive measures proved insufficient, and to continue along this road, under the conditions described, would have led to a revolutionary explosion and an extraordinary upsurge in the strength of the guerrillas. The military high command understood this. It had to let some of the air out of the balloon before it exploded; it had to isolate the people's guerrilla fighters.
According to Ovando's main adviser, the sociology professor Rolon Anaya, the violence had exhausted itself without provoking any changes. I would add that it ended by releasing potentially greater revolutionary forces and that it was only a question of time to organise them and propel them into the struggle.
In fact, the entire military establishment assumed the distinctive characteristics of a political organisation. All the officers, from generals to sergeants, received special political training, besides the anti-guerrilla and urban counter-insurgency training they received from Yankee technicians. And this training was tied to advantages and privileges of all kinds, well-paid administrative posts, and a 300% salary increase.
The general staff of the armed forces was converted into a political committee or central committee of the army-party. There was an important qualitative change in the armed forces: they were no longer the old armed forces and the old army. This special phenomenon consisted of a politicalisation of the officers corps and the institutionalisation of its political character. This in turn engendered a militarisation of political activity.
The party-army, or armed political party, has monopolised political power uninterruptedly since November 1964. It has governed the country in various forms—a military junta (Barrientos-Ovando), a constitutional government (Barrientos-Siles), and now a civilian-military junta (Ovando).
These various forms have been purely a matter of appearance and have been dictated by the tactical needs of the military's domestic and international relations. Whatever the form, the same military dictatorship propped up by armed force was still behind it. Never has the capitalist state looked so much like a simple armed body than now, covered at best by a pseudo-democratic basis.
Having absorbed all powers, the military commanders can boast that "We are the state!"
At no point did the Siles Salinas government break the continuity of the military dictatorship. In practice Siles did not govern. He was a fictitious president lacking the power to name even subordinate officials in the local administrations (e.g. Valenzuela in Cochabamba). His unusual talent for playing a front man's role led him to tolerate such situation. The ruling force was always the army-party, which, with its regional divisions, its air and naval forces, controlled the country and carried out its decisions behind Siles' back.
Depending on its needs, the army-party has created and dissolved civilian political groups or hitched old mini-parties to its chariot, trying to give the impression that it had a base of support. They could not fool anybody this way.
The new civilian faces now in the cabinet, like Rolon Anaya, Quiroga Santa Cruz, Bailey and Ortiz, differ in no way from Fernando Diez de Medina, Ricardo Anaya, Walter Guevara, and the like. The fact is that, like the decadent Spanish monarchs, the army-party is surrounding itself with a class of "arbitristas", as certain old royal counsellors in the Middle Ages were called who substituted necromancy for social analysis.
I do not deny the possibility of change in sectors of the army, primarily among its young officers who are not compromised by its oligarchic past and are influenced by the technical, scientific and military triumphs of the socialist camp. The class struggle does not spare any organization, however monolithic, and the army will not be an exception.
3. The history and social character of the army-party.
By our works we shall be known, General Ovando said. That is gospel truth. To be sure, we already know them by their works and we know what the Bolivian armed forces are capable of.
The statements of the generals would be enough to reveal what is behind the reorganisation of the government. In jurisprudence "the confession of the accused is full proof". But in politics this criterion is insufficient.
In the tradition of Lenin, I do not believe that the army and its commanders will make an about-face as the result of simple persuasion by "arbitristas" of the stripe of Rolon Anaya or Quiroga Santa Cruz. Nor do I think that it will make such a shift as the result of any awakening of "its conscience".
What is decisive here in understanding the essence of a state, or measuring a revolutionary process and gauging the potential of its leaders, is determining its social or class nature. Such an analysis prevents errors of judgement in face of at times contradictory and confused passing situations.
The force that will divide this army, demoralise it, and win for the people any progressive sector that might exist within it will be revolutionary struggle. That is the historic lesson of all revolutions.
The armed forces are a component of the state. In our country they represent the ruling classes, which are tightly bound to imperialism. In this period of world war between socialism and imperialism, the Bolivian armed forces are actually part of the international army of imperialism, whose head is in the Pentagon. This truth is so elementary that even the children know it. After it was routed by the armed people in 1952, the Bolivian army was rebuilt by imperialism. Its top military commanders as well as its middle-ranking officers have gone through special courses in Panama, where the Pentagon has its general headquarters for Latin America. In the Miraflores fortress, alongside the Bolivian general staff offices, the American military commission carries on its work. Yankee advisers train the special anti-guerrilla and urban counter insurgency units. The armed forces of Bolivia have been built up, trained militarily, technically and politically, and armed by the Pentagon. This is why the people say that the Bolivian army is "Made in the USA". Because of its education and training, and its overbearing attitude deriving from its privileges, the Bolivian military caste has been conservative and a defender of the "established order", an enemy of all reforms, however minimal. Bolivian military history is a history of massacres of workers and peasants and of coups d'etat to block the advances of the masses. Just in the period since 1964, we have to note the two massacres in the Catavi-Siglo Veinte mine in 1965, the massacre in Milluni and Alto La Paz in the same year, the Saint John's Day massacre in the Siglo Veinte in 1967, the occupations of the trade union headquarters, the destruction of the labour-owned radio stations, as well as other such incidents. All of these actions were carried out under the command of General Ovando, who exercised the supreme authority over the army and the present team of military rulers. If this is the History of the armed forces, which today are the ruling party-army, it would be strange that in the twinkling of an eye, without debates or serious internal crises, this entire institutionalised body changed its mind, cast off its past, and became progressive, revolutionary and anti-imperialist.
The populist declarations and innumerable promises that have already been made in the last few hours represent manoeuvres to confuse and deceive the masses, and above all, they represent attempts to limit radicalisation of the masses so as to stop their generous support to armed struggle and the guerrillas. An instrument such as the army-party is not qualified to head a revolution leading to the national and social liberation of Bolivia. In the present period in world history of transition between two systems and modes of production, revolution means a direct struggle for socialism. The road of civilisation and progress for the peoples leads through the overthrow of the capitalist classes holding power and the defeat of imperialism which is their underpinning. In their "Mandato Revolucionario", the Bolivian armed forces do not propose putting another class in power or altering the existing structures to bring them closer to socialism. What they propose is to preserve the system of exploitation and defend it from a better tactical position. The policy of massacres and the hangman's rope failed. This has obliged the armed forces to take up some popular slogans and present themselves as "left nationalists".
[illegible] the triumph of the Cuban revolution forced [illegible] to pose as a friend of development in the [illegible] with its Alliance for Progress. As a result [illegible] let go its grip on a few more dollars but it [illegible] its imperialist, exploitive, and anti-popular [illegible] circumstances, in order to defend their interests more [illegible] the oppressor classes find themselves forced to grant [illegible] which are more formal than substantive. But [illegible] power in their hands precisely because of this flexibility, [illegible] oppressor classes quickly recoup these concessions and even their profits once the moment of difficulty is past.
4. The "Mandato Revolucionario" is a farce.
The sole significance of the programme launched by the armed forces under the name "Mandato Revolucionario" was to offer a few concessions from above to save the present situation. Using the brains of its current civilian employees, the party-army made an effort at political theory. However, this endeavour has produced only vulgar, threadbare theorising. The traditional and social character of the armed forces are reflected in this document despite its trashy populist phrasemongering.
In fact, the document begins by proposing a "system that would be neither exclusively capitalist nor exclusively socialist, in which various kinds of ownership would persist". It advocates a "social alliance", that is, a front of classes and, finally, it presents an assortment of highly contradictory slogans, all of which have been mouthed many times over the last twenty years.
We find an eagerness to show opposition to foreign domination followed immediately by the declaration of broad guarantees to foreign investment, which was conceded a role in social development.
The document stresses national sovereignty, but nothing is said about the network of Yankee missions and commissions that undermine this sovereignty and the right of the peoples to self-determination. The air-naval base of El Alto, known as "Little Guantanamo", is forgotten.
Finally, the "Mandato Revolucionario" offers nothing not trotted out before by Barrientos or proposed with greater verve by other bourgeois movements, with the already known results of defeat for the people and a greater colonialisation of the country.
In these past two decades, the Bolivian people have seen how the class struggle in its inexorable development has settled accounts with similar programmes, cruelly exposing the reformist false prophets. Under the pressure and manoeuvres of the monopolistic interests, soon nothing was left to these reformists but their anti-socialism. They rapidly forgot their fantasies about making capitalism and imperialism kind and benevolent.
Ovando's first two decrees, which were issued together with the "Mandato Revolucionario", and later complemented by broad declarations, illustrated the real range and potential of the military-civilian government. The first decree repealed the Petroleum Code of 1955. But the principle adopted in regard to the one-sided and traitorous concessions was to negotiate an increase in royalties. It is possible that if an agreement is reached, the military rulers will find themselves forced to a nationalisation, paying full compensation for all of Gulf Oil's investments as well as damages—that is, what they propose is a kind of commercial transaction. But this step, leaving intact the structure of imperialism, and still worse, opening the door to new foreign investment which they promise to respect, will be emasculated and truncated. When it was raised to power by the masses in 1952, the MNR nationalised the mines. But shortly afterwards it opened the oil fields for imperialist penetration. Who is to say whether or not this time, in return for the petroleum, they will not give radioactive materials or the iron of Mutun?
The other decree, which concerns the freedom of the trade unions, also has a deceptive character. In the new upsurge now occurring, the trade unions had begun in practice to ignore the corporative regulations decreed by Barrientos. The repeal of this law was aimed at arousing expectations among the workers. But in time, measures will appear, limiting trade union operations in the meantime, a new regulation banning politics in the unions and partisan activity in the labour movement is already being mentioned. Moreover, the trade union headquarters, independent radio stations, and union funds remain in government trusteeship.
A taste is enough to tell, according to popular wisdom. And these two decrees are the taste that enables us already to predict the Ovando government's future course. As for democratic and political freedoms, the jails will stay filled and any revolutionist who ventures to take the official promises seriously will end up behind bars as "a guerrilla contact" or "subversive". The state security law may be repealed; but the courts, with their judges and prosecutors converted to police agents, will still deprive citizens of their liberties on the basis of the antiquated penal code. The tactical encirclement of the mines will be changed into a strategic encirclement, with the withdrawal of troops a few kilometres from where they are now. There will be no reopening of the wage question and at most the miners will be given minor wage increases amounting to far less than the wage cuts imposed on them in May 1965. The private concerns will not be expelled from the low-grade ore deposits and margins of the nationalised mines, etc. And if any companies leave, others will come in under the protection of the respect and guarantees for private foreign investment embodied in the "Mandato Revolucionario".
Thus, the programme of the armed forces is a force and an attempt to mislead the masses and to sow illusions among the more backward sectors of the middle class. It is motivated by the anxiety of the military to isolate the guerrillas. The guerrillas are fighting for good things, the military concede; they are not rebels without a cause. But they sow violence and death, and besides, they follow foreign commands. We will struggle for as good or better programme but without deaths and with liberty and social justice. Abandon the guerrillas and support the "Mandato Revolucionario" of the armed forces. This is the tactical shift represented by the September 24 manoeuvre. This is the thinking behind it.
5. Alert the Bolivian people!
The revolutionary Marxists, the Marxists-Leninists, have the historic mission of making the revolution in order to build socialism. We do not fall into cunningly-laid snares like the present one nor do we encourage anyone's reformist illusions.
We are actors in the revolution and not simply spectators who criticise. Still less are we petitioners appealing for someone else to make a revolution that is ours by right and duty. Therefore, we draw a line of [illegible] between ourselves and careerist opportunism and we do not abdicate our role of leading the people towards the socialist victory.
Furthermore, it is necessary to make very clear that socialism is not built with patches and crumbs begged from the imperialist oppressor. We tell any naive elements, who, dazzled by the official verbiage, might think they see an alternative road to liberation in Ovando's path, that the system of imperialist oppression, the power of the bourgeoisie, will never be destroyed by small conquests. In order to break this power, a real revolution is needed, a violent and brutal upheaval. Armed violence is indispensable to destroy the bases or pillars on which the capitalist system rests.
If capitalist power is not broken and if the bourgeoisie is maintained, capitalism will always find ways and means to absorb reforms or small gains, integrating them into its workings in order later to pervert them, emasculate them, and liquidate them. Bolivian history is rich in examples that teach this lesson. I repeat. What the present government is trying to do by ostentatiously mouthing the word "revolution" is to defuse the economic, social and political contradictions of the system in order to halt the revolutionary action of the masses.
The dismissal of parliament and the dissolution of political parties has left only one institution in place, the army-party-state, which holds an absolute monopoly of power. This development has pushed the militarisation of political activity to its ultimate extremes. In these conditions, class struggle and mass mobilisations can only take the road of armed struggle.
Against the army-party-government, which towers omnipotent, it is the duty of the revolutionists to erect a people's army, the concrete expression of the popular forces. We must not deceive ourselves. In order to overthrow the present regime and take power, we must forge an adequate instrument, which is the Revolutionary Army of the People.
Mobilisations of the workers, strikes, democratic action by the people, require such an instrument, which will be built in armed struggle, which is already being built in the guerrilla movement today. The first task of revolutionists is to rally around this developing people's army, to sustain it and defend it.
Stop this deception! Behind the pseudo-left verbiage and the civilian-military cabinet is the same "Made in the USA" army that massacred the workers and took power in 1964.
29 September 1969