EDITORIAL
The Portuguese revolution passed through another important turning point on 25 November with the so-called 'attempted coup' by various leftist military units. 25 November has allowed the Portuguese ruling class, via the Azevedo Government (and the Amadora commandos, under the leadership of the notorious right-winger Colonel Jaime Neves) to seize the initiative. Today Republica is closed. Radio Renascensa is back in the hands of the Catholic Church, and the soldiers of the 'red regiment' RALIS (the Lisbon field artillery) are either on permanent leave or in prison with at least 100 other leftist political prisoners. But the defeat suffered by the working class and its [illegible] as a result of the events of 25 November does not bring to an end the Portuguese revolution. It has allowed the ruling class a greater room for manoeuvre. The gains of the revolution face a grave threat. The workers vanguard is under attack. Within the army the left has suffered a severe setback. However, overall, the working class has not been decisively defeated. There has been no qualitative break in the developing revolutionary situation. The workers [organs] still exist. The workers and peasants are still [illegible]. With the catastrophic crisis faced by the Portuguese economy, major class confrontations are on the agenda. It is through such a process that the 'organs of popular power', notably the workers commissions, can be further developed and centralised — in that way they will be able to challenge the bourgeois state and open up a situation of dual power. Today the bourgeoisie has the stable, repressive strike force it lacked over the summer months. After November, the question of workers self-defence is posed with greater clarity. Likewise the Socialist Party leaders continue to play a major role in the offensive of the ruling class against the gains of the revolution. More than ever, as tensions increase within the SP the united front tactic must be understood and applied by revolutionaries if they are to break the working class from their reformist leadership. The events prior to and since November have confirmed the correctness of the line of the Fourth International. It was only the Fourth International that, correctly, understood the 'democratic' counter-revolutionary role of the SP leaders. It was only the Fourth International, following in the great traditions of Lenin and Trotsky, that recognised and fought for the united front of the whole working class, and through that the emergence of organs of dual power. The Portuguese events are the living proof of the correctness of Trotskyist politics. The lessons and future of the Portuguese revolution are of importance to revolutionaries throughout Europe.
THE LONG HOT SUMMER
In order to understand what happened on 25-26 November, it is necessary to trace the course of events during the previous summer months. It was then that the seeds were sown which later bore such bitter fruits. No history is inevitable. But during the previous weeks the failure of the left to understand the significance of the development of the organs of popular power (the workers commissions, the neighbourhood commissions, the village councils, the soldiers commissions, and the popular assemblies) and the need to extend, co-ordinate and centralise their activities, or to apply correctly what for the Third International had been ABC — the united front tactic — began to flash warning signals for all to see. The defeat of the right-wing coup of 11 March at the hands of the mass mobilisation of the soldiers and workers had shifted the balance of class forces firmly in favour of the working class. Under mass pressure the Government had been forced to nationalise the banks and, as a result of the close association between the banks and industry, another 200 firms as well. In April the first elections to the Constituent Assembly gave the working class parties over 60 per cent of the vote, clearly reflecting the political sentiments of the workers and peasants. During this period — despite the important boost received by the Communist Party in countering the March putsch, and the 'victory' of the Socialist Party in the April elections — the relationship of forces between the reformists and revolutionaries had been modified in favour of the latter. The elections also indicated — in a distorted form — the growth of the revolutionary vanguard, and with the broader mobilisations of the masses the audience for the political ideas of the far left widened considerably. However, these mobilisations also began to open up cracks within the reformist organisations, between the base and the leadership. To take account of this situation, and to respond to the desire exhibited in the working class for the broadest possible unity in the struggle against capitalism, required the most flexible and audacious use of the united front tactic. As the resolution of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International on 6 June said of the united front, 'it is decisive for the revolutionary vanguard both in responding immediately to any reactionary offensive, to any challenging of the democratic rights of the workers movement, and in expanding the influence of the revolutionaries and cutting down on the duration of the reformists' grip on the working class.' One of the characteristics of this period was the failure of the revolutionary left and the centrist organisations, such as the Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat (PRP) and the Left Socialist Movement (MES), to adopt a united front perspective towards the Communist Party and Socialist Party. At the same time both the SP and CP maintained the divisions within the working class by their sectarian politics. For most of the groups in the Revolutionary United Front (FUR), the united front was of no consequence. As the MES stated in the 5-11 November issue of their paper, Poder Popular: 'thus, the social democratic forces serve the advance of the fascist forces: consequently we [cannot] separate our slogan "Death to the ELP" and those who support it from the slogan "Down with social democracy".' Thus no concrete initiatives were made towards the workers influenced by the Socialist Party. The attitude of the Communist Party was equally indefensible. Even after the SP had won 38 per cent of the votes in the 25 April elections, the CP leaders of Intersindical refused to allow it a speaker on the May Day platform. On 18 July the CP called its militants to the barricades around Lisbon to block a so-called 'march on Lisbon' led by the SP. Tactics such as these could only consolidate the influence of the SP leadership over the more backward sections of the working class, and consequently did nothing either to unify the working class or establish the basic norms of workers democracy within the workers movement. For the CP the all-important goal became the MFA-people alliance, for which such sectarian tactics were a logical part. The aim of the CP has been to establish a base for itself within the bourgeois state apparatus in alliance with the MFA. To convince the MFA of its usefulness, the CP had to show it really did represent and control the 'people'. The MFA-people alliance was to become the MFA-CP alliance. To maintain its credibility and hegemony within the working class, the CP was prepared to go to any sectarian lengths.
FROM UNITED FRONT TO SOVIETS
As Trotsky said, the soviet is the highest form of united front. With the bulk of the Portuguese left unable to understand the question of the united front tactic correctly, it was not surprising that the question of the construction of the Portuguese equivalent of soviets also posed them with serious political difficulties. In the transitional programme, Trotsky defined the soviet as follows: 'Soviets are not limited to any a priori party programme. They throw open their doors to all the exploited. Through these doors pass representatives of all strata, drawn into the general current of the struggle. The organisation, broadening out together with the movement, is renewed again and again in its womb. All political currents of the proletariat can struggle for leadership of the soviets on the basis of the widest democracy.' In the period March-November 1975 bodies such as these began to emerge in Portugal, albeit in a very limited way. In the popular assemblies the local workers, neighbourhood and soldiers commissions began to coordinate their activities. One of the major problems the revolution then faced — as it still does — was the lack of centralisation on a local, regional or national level of the various commissions. One of the few examples of the embryos of such a development was that of the Pontinha popular assembly. This popular assembly grouped together delegates from the 'assembly of unit delegates' (ADU) of the local regiment, fourteen workers commissions, and twenty-five neighbourhood commissions in regular general assemblies. All the forces of the left, as well as the MFA, understood the importance of the various commissions — that is, they realised that they could not afford to ignore them. The Trotskyists of the LCI and PRT campaigned for coordination and centralisation in local and national popular assemblies. The reformists and the MFA obviously did not accept the assemblies as the basis of socialism, of a workers state, while the centrists merely posed such organisations in a sectarian manner, as appendages of their own brand of ultraleft and opportunist politics. The Socialist Party, meanwhile, issued a document on 28 July stating that: 'The neighbourhood commissions and workers commissions are forms of popular power that must be developed so long as they do not claim to become a "parallel power" to the state apparatus.' Thus the SP agreed to tolerate the self-organisation of the working class provided they played according to the laws of the bourgeois game, thus nullifying the main purpose of such bodies — which is to challenge this bourgeois state apparatus. Other sections of the MFA, via the 20 June 'guide document' and the 13 August Copcon document, attempted to integrate the organs of popular power into the functioning of the bourgeois state apparatus. For the CP, the commissions were fine so long as they helped the CP to maintain its influence with the MFA, acting as a springboard from which the Stalinists could launch their initiatives to exert a little pressure at the governmental level. A resolution from the CP central committee of 16 December said that in recent months the workers commissions had taken on a new dimension, the 'coordinating and conducting of mass demonstrations'. The CP also considered that the popular assemblies could 'acquire an extraordinary importance' by becoming 'complementary organs of local administration, as well as of the municipal councils'. However, the central committee felt it necessary to sound a note of warning, the danger of 'idealistic illusions that lead some sections to see these forms of popular organisations as the future and next organs of state power'. Perhaps somebody should have warned Lenin and Trotsky. But then somebody did — Karl Kautsky. Lenin attacked him mercilessly: 'Imitating the wisdom of the Mensheviks, who have happily sided with the bourgeoisie against the proletariat, Kautsky "deduces" that the soviets are all right as "battle organisations", but not as "state organisations". Marvellous! Form up in soviets, you proletarians and poor peasants! But for God's sake, don't you dare win! Don't even think of winning! The moment you win and vanquish the bourgeoisie, that will be the end of you: for you must not be the state organisations in a proletarian state'. (The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky). The other common misconception, supported at different times by such diverse forces as Vasco Goncalves, Copcon and the PRP, was the idea of 'organs of popular power without political parties'. While such a position was partially a response to mass pressure against the continual in-fighting between the various political organisations, it negated a fundamental point of proletarian democracy — that the assemblies' political currents must have a right to form political tendencies (one has only to look at the functioning of the soviets in 1917 to see that). Finally the other mistake made by the sectarians was to counterpose their own, politically pure bodies to any other. The classic case was that of the PRP, who set up their own 'revolutionary councils'. Point 10 of their platform of objectives stated: 'Whereas the revolutionary councils are neither opposed to nor a substitute for the workers commissions, which have an economic role, the revolutionary councils are a more directly political form for the seizure of power.' Not only did this relegate the workers commissions to purely economic issues, making the classic social democratic confusion between economics and politics, it failed to understand how such soviet type organisations would be built in reality, rather than in the heads of certain political groups. It is precisely from the immediate issues that such organs can be built, and with the severe [problems] faced then and now by Portugal, the only result of such a false counterposition can be the isolation of sections of the vanguard from the masses. We do not fetishise any one organisational form. Soviet type bodies have emerged in very different forms in the past. The crucial question is the political role they play in the sense that through them the struggle of the working class can be centralised and coordinated against the bourgeois state. In examining the Portuguese situation, the depth of the economic crisis is clearly the issue over which the balance of class forces must be resolved. In that sense the workers commissions are likely to be the bodies which will increasingly take on the [role] of organs of dual power — through, for example, the development of centralised workers control and the emergence of a workers plan to solve the crisis in favour of the workers and peasants. The conception of the PRP councils, spelt out in point three of their objectives, is totally different, however: 'The revolutionary workers council could begin to be the embryo of the true revolutionary party.' But the party does not equal the soviet. The party strives for the united leadership of the soviets, and through that the leadership of the working class and its allies. The confusion of the PRP is reflected in the fact that they have eliminated in a single sentence the need for the masses to be organised in bodies of a soviet type. Embryos of real organs of dual power were emerging last summer in Portugal, however. At the same time, events within the armed forces were moving at a faster and more favourable rate. In fact, not since 1917 has the revolutionary movement had a more favourable opportunity in terms of the paralysis that existed within the repressive apparatus of the state. However, the overall situation remained one [in which] the [working class] was unable to [develop] its organisation sufficiently to mount an effective challenge to the bourgeois state, and the ruling class lacking the [strength to inflict a] decisive defeat on the workers and peasants. Such a situation, it was clear, could not last.
SOLDIERS UNITED WILL WIN
During July, reaction began to lift its ugly head yet again. In the north the local offices of the Intersindical, CP and the revolutionary left were attacked. Rumours were rife about the activity of the ELP (Portuguese Liberation Army — a fascist military organisation). It was in the midst of all this that a new headache for the ruling class began to emerge. For the first time since April 1974 soldiers and sailors were on the streets, fists clenched, with the workers and peasants. A demonstration called by the workers and neighbourhood commissions of Lisbon on 6 July found in its ranks the tanks and armoured carriers, adorned with red flags, of RALIS — and they were joined by soldiers from the Military Police, the RIOQ, and other Lisbon regiments. The presence of the soldiers reflected the growing penetration of the workers movement into the barracks. The soldiers, tired of not being allowed to take part in the political discussions in which their officers continually engaged, began to organise. On the evening of Saturday 19 July the tank regiment of Oporto held a plenary assembly of soldiers and demanded the removal of the commanders. Similar events took place at the RALIS and EPAM barracks. These meetings bore witness to the growing radicalisation and politicalisation of the soldiers, and revealed a deep split between the officers and the soldiers. Furthermore, it also began to polarise the officers themselves. During July and August the right-wing parties, the CDS and the PPD, openly paraded on the streets of Oporto. The working class organisations were continually harassed and intimidated by rightists. Initially they even had some success within the military, especially as Portuguese army units are recruited on a regional basis. For example, local soldiers in Braga took part in an attack on the CP offices. Similarly the commander of the northern region, Brigadier Corvacho, who had generally supported the working class, found himself under attack from the rest of the officers. In this atmosphere the left inside the barracks began to coordinate its activities. Despite the general gains of the Portuguese revolution, the life of the soldiers changed little. Their pay was still less than £5 a month, all of which could easily go on one visit home; military discipline was still imposed; the officers still ate and lived in far better quarters than the soldiers. Following the example of the working class, the soldiers too began to struggle to improve their conditions. But in so doing they immediately ran into the officers — many of whom were members of the MFA — who saw the soldiers' role merely as one of accepting military discipline. Through their own struggles the soldiers were forced to organise independently of the MFA. The myth of the MFA was being broken. 'Soldiers United Will Win' (SUV) first emerged in the open, in Oporto, on 10 September, when 1,500 soldiers marched at the head of 30,000 workers. From then on the slogan of the 'MFA-people alliance' was replaced by 'workers and peasants, soldiers and sailors, united we will win'. The success of the SUV within the army lay in the fact that not only did it take up the immediate demands of the soldiers and link them into the struggle against reaction, but it combined this with the broadest workers democracy — the sovereignty of general assemblies, the election subject to recall of soldiers commissions, and the free circulation of the workers' and peoples' press. The SUV manifesto stated its function in the following terms: 'To stimulate and deepen the liaison with organs of popular power ... strengthening the power of the exploited through the popular assemblies.' It was for this reason that the SUV, despite being initially [attacked?] by the far left (indeed the CP at first tried to counterpose to it its front organisation the ARPE — the Revolutionary Association of Infantry Soldiers), could build a mass base within the barracks. In fact, by posing itself the task of building a mass united front, the SUV won the support of SP/worker militants on its demonstrations. Yet again the presence of these militants showed the tensions that existed in the party — hardly surprising, considering the reactionary campaign that the SP leadership was mounting at the time.
THE 'DEMOCRATIC' COUNTER-REVOLUTION
The upsurge of the working class after 11 March, allied to the crisis within the state apparatus, resulted in a situation where the bourgeoisie was unable to deal a decisive blow to the workers movement. The only alternative for the ruling class lay with the reformist misleaders of the Socialist Party. Quite obviously the role of the Soares leadership was counter-revolutionary. However, the counter-revolution can take various forms, and revolutionary marxists must understand the way that this can affect their strategy and tactics. The important point about the SP in Portugal was that it launched what we can call a 'democratic' counter-revolution. It was, and still is, 'democratic' in the sense that the distinguishing factor of social democracy is still its allegiance to the bourgeois democratic state. Social democrats realise that fascism will mean their destruction — just as they also understand that the impending socialist revolution will equally bring about their end. They thus have a vested interest in the maintenance of bourgeois democracy and of the inviolability of parliamentary institutions. But the role of the SP can also be characterised as counter-revolutionary because their aim has been to stifle the emergence of workers democracy, of the self-organisation and self-defence of the working class, and the breakdown of discipline. Instead they have consistently fought for the maintenance of bourgeois democratic 'freedoms' and the supremacy of the Constituent Assembly. Hence Soares and the SP leadership became the spearhead of the counter-offensive launched by Portuguese and international capital to halt the socialist revolution. The most notable historical example where social democracy has previously played such a role occurred in Germany during December-January 1918-19. Here the violence of a social democratic government knew no bounds against the Spartakus uprising. But such violence was intended to defend the bourgeois democratic state against its overthrow, and as such preserve the social democrats. To fail to understand the distinction between the differing role of social democracy and fascism, in terms of precisely the level at which they attack the working class, is to make a dangerous confusion. It was such a failure that led the centrists of the MES and PRP to throw social democracy and fascism into the same bag, as the CP's sectarianism towards the SP in July. The democratic counter-revolutionary role of the social democrats was understood by Trotsky in 1921, in an article he wrote for Pravda: 'By employing the social democratic shield, the bourgeoisie was able to take the best possible advantage of the breathing spell. It recovered from its panic, stabilised its state organs, supplemented them with counter-revolutionary armed gangs, and started hand-picking politicians who are specialists in applying combined methods in the struggle against open revolutionary movements and who operate through intimidation, bribery, provocation, segregation, division, etc. The basic task of these specialists is to engage isolated detachments of the proletarian vanguard in a series of battles, bleed them white, and thus undermine the faith of the working class in the possibility of success.' The campaign launched by the SP for 'law and order' and 'discipline' involved it in making highly demagogic attacks on the CP and the revolutionary left, which acted as an effective cover for the physical attacks of the right against offices and headquarters of the CP and the far left. At a rally on 18 June Soares called the CP 'social-reactionary and murderous', 'wanting to transform Portugal into an immense concentration camp'. Following the resignation of the [SP minis]ters from the Fourth Provisional Government on 10 July, their national secretary called for a 'government of national salvation' whose aim 'should be to create a climate of confidence, labour and discipline in the country'. Obviously it was the Portuguese and international capitalists who desperately wanted such a healthy climate. While not demanding the banning of the workers commissions, the SP insisted that they must take second place to 'the dignity of the Constituent Assembly'. However, any structure in possession of arms 'should be liquidated within one month', and their members 'severely punished'. On the other hand, the SP reaffirmed that 'the civil power needs the strength of the military arm if it is to impose respect for revolutionary authority'. The attitude of the SP over the Republica affair was part and parcel of this offensive. It was not, as Soares made out, that the SP's freedom of the press was threatened. There were already other papers reflecting the SP's views. Rather it was part of the struggle to re-establish 'law and order' in the factories and the media — to give the idea of occupations, workers control, a sharp rap across the knuckles. As the Fourth International stated at the time, we consider that the Republica workers made mistakes in [allow]ing the SP to take the initiative over 'freedom of the press'. The only clear way to undercut this manoeuvre by Soares would have been to counterpose, in the clearest manner, the broadest workers democracy. On this basis the Republica workers could have replied: 'We are perfectly willing to publish Republica under the old social democratic editors, provided: 1. You give us the right to print our own opinions and the opinions of the various political groups to which we belong as well, either in the columns of your newspaper or in another newspaper printed on presses you own. 2. You give us veto power over any layoffs in the plant' (see Mandel, Maitan, Frank 'In Defence of the Portuguese Revolution' in Intercontinental Press, vol 13, no 31, p. 1169). Such a position would have allowed the workers not only to defend themselves against the attacks of Soares and the bourgeois state, but to do it within the context of workers democracy. Nevertheless, despite such criticisms, it is vital to place the Republica affair within the context of the general offensive of the bourgeoisie, via the SP, that was underway against the working class. We therefore, critically, defend the workers of Republica. This political offensive, led by Soares, allowed the bourgeoisie to regroup. For the first time for some months the ruling class could take the initiatives without immediately facing a united working class response. These demagogic attacks by the SP leadership against the gains of the revolution, such as Republica, served in the same way to split and divide the working class. At the same time a political offensive was begun within the MFA by Major Melo Antunes, who headed the 'moderates' in the 'Group of Nine'. They wanted to 'energetically repulse the anarchism and populism that inevitably lead to the catastrophic dissolution of the state ...'. Both the Antunes grouping and the SP had a twofold aim: to strengthen the institutions of the bourgeois state apparatus against the organs of working class self-organisation, and to recompose the army — cracking down on all those breaking discipline — so that it could play the role of guarantor in the transition to a bourgeois democracy. Political tensions continued to mount. Within society as a whole the right was still growing. Soares had stirred up a hornets' nest, with the Bishop of Braga adding fuel to the fires of the Catholic, northern peasantry. Inside [the] army the publication of the Antunes document of 7 August and the reply by members of Copcon, only provoked further political debates among the soldiers. [Some] sections of the SP base became disillusioned in the [wooing] of Soares — for example, 50 SP members in Evora left the party at this time. In early September the Fifth Government, led by Goncalves with the political backing of the CP, was replaced by the Sixth Government headed by Azevedo.
THE SIXTH GOVERNMENT
Perhaps, the bourgeoisie hoped, this new government could restore order. The composition of the Azevedo Government, reflecting its intentions, was four SP ministers, two from the PPD, [two] representatives of the Antunes grouping, and a solitary member of the CP — described by the party as the 'furthest outpost of the working class'. Azevedo did not mince his [words]. He needed 'a strong and firm democratic authority, for peace, order, tranquillity and respect for [law]. The cohesion of the MFA and the discipline of the armed forces are the basic factors that will determine [the success or] failure of the revolution.' The politics of the Sixth Government were plain to all, even the PCP. However, for them it became a little more difficult, as at all costs they wanted to maintain the foothold they had in the door of the bourgeois state. When Avante, the CP weekly paper, reckoned that 'the activity of the members of the PCP in the Sixth Government will be especially complex' they were not joking. The central committee decided to allow its members to serve in the Government (there are CP under-secretaries of state, as well as its single minister), but not as 'official members of the Communist Party'. We can only assume that they are there in a personal capacity! However the CP was feeling the hot breath of its membership and the broad workers vanguard down its neck. So it became necessary also to draw some lines of divide between the CP and the Government. Thus in September the CP helped to organise general strikes of the [metal] workers and of the Alentejo agricultural workers, while also talking of unity in action with 'the parties and groups of the left orientated towards revolutionary action' (article by Cunhal in Avante, 18 September). The Stalinists were balancing on a knife edge. The correct application of the united front tactic could have left them totally outflanked. The orientation decided upon by the Government and its main backers meant that confrontations were inevitable. They did not have to wait long. As part of Azevedo's aim of re-establishing the 'discipline and cohesion of the armed forces', the Government attempted to break the resistance of the [radical] units, [purge] the [most radicalised] soldiers, while at the same time reconstituting a repressive strike force, the AMI (Military Intervention Group). In both these limited projects it suffered sharp setbacks. Two members of the SUV from Mafra who were arrested for distributing leaflets were rapidly liberated by a demonstration of 40,000 workers and 4,000 sailors, who in the middle of the night commandeered trucks and buses to take them to the Trafaria fort, whereupon Carvalho signed the release order. Meanwhile the AMI never really got off the ground — the majority of the units assigned to it refused point blank to join such a force, whose [purpose] was obvious. Three days later, on 29 September, the Government suffered another serious blow. Troops were sent in to take over the radio stations, but in almost every case they did an about-turn and joined the workers defending this important gain of the revolution. The reason why the Government had become so worried about the radio stations was not just that some of them were running under workers control — and thus generalising the struggles that were taking place — but because of the dangerous precedent that had been set when a group of disabled war veterans took over Emissora Nacional with the workers' support. Those in struggle were speaking for themselves, with the assistance of the radio workers. It had to be stopped. But the Government failed. The events of the last few days of September increased the political tensions. The bourgeoisie had tried and failed, basically because they had no control over the soldiers — they had no repressive apparatus on which they could rely. But they quickly learnt from that. It became crucial for the ruling class to weld together some strike force — perhaps few in numbers, but upon which they could definitely count. In retrospect it is interesting that one of the few gains the Government did make in those hectic days was the temporary closure of the worker-controlled Radio Renascensa. The unit that carried out the orders — the Amadora commandos led by Jaime Neves. For the workers and soldiers the events of September deepened their radicalisation, self-organisation and co-ordination. But already the seeds of November were ripening. The overall balance of forces within the workers movement was out of step with that amongst the soldiers. An uneven situation was developing. The result was that certain groups, notably the PRP and the MES, mis-read the crisis. For them the seizure of state power became a military, technical question. As Poder Popular, the MES paper, stated (issue of 19-25 November): 'We must create the conditions for the formation of a government of our revolutionary unity that holds power until the creation of the National Popular Assembly.' For them the coordination and centralisation of the organs of popular power — and in reality in many places their birth — could be sorted out after the seizure of power. The PRP had already made its position abundantly clear: 'It is now time for the revolutionary forces and the workers to pose the question of an insurrection', (declaration of PRP, 30 September). On the other hand, the Goncalvist and CP-backed sections of the army saw the struggle against reaction as being solely determined within the armed forces. The [logic] of both these positions led to the playing down of the importance of the workers themselves developing their self-defence via the organs of popular power. As Trotsky always used to say, ultraleftism and right-wing opportunism are but two sides of the same coin! The events of September showed yet again the bankruptcy of the reformist leaderships of the SP and CP. In the [aftermath] of the attack on the radio and TV stations, after the government had withdrawn the occupation orders, an [editorial] in A Luta, the paper edited by SP leader Raul [Rego], commented: 'The soldiers are paid by the people, [by] the people, both conservative and revolutionary, to give [a] feeling of security. If they are to carry out their [duties] as citizens, and if they are not simply to demand [revolutionary] rights, then they must carry out the mission [that has] been assigned them, which is to maintain security' (2 October). The following day the same paper stated: 'The commandos are not reactionary, they are with the people and the revolution. It needs disciplined armed [comrades] like the commandos.' Throughout this period the SP had been organising demonstrations of support for the Sixth Government and the commandos, jointly with the CDS, the PPD, and a small Maoist current, the PCP(m-l). The counter-revolutionary politics of Maoism know no bounds in a situation like Portugal! The SP even went so far as to call for barricades around Lisbon on the night of 1-2 October against [a] mythical coup by farmworkers from the Alentejo. Not even the SP workers in Lisbon responded. The CP's response to the radio occupations will go down in history: 'Measures of such gravity and repercussions on the present complex and dangerous political [situation] have been taken without any consultation of the CP'. What did they expect! To the working class the CP made its position quite clear. Sections of Intersindical had called for strike action [but] the CP blocked it. For the Stalinists the crucial thing was to maintain the unity of the MFA, including the Goncalves/CP wing, and through the crisis extend its own influence within the Government. In this situation there existed a clear possibility for the revolutionary left to break the hold of the reformists over sections of the SP and CP membership via a series of united front tactics. But the FUR brushed the opportunity aside, and instead responded in a totally alarmist manner: 'Let us mobilise to crush the counter-revolution! The counter-revolution shall not pass!'
NOVEMBER
The months prior to the November 'coup' had been characterised by a lack of correspondence between the disintegration of the state apparatus (and linked to that the radicalisation of the soldiers) and the relatively low level of development of the organs of popular power. Basically this consisted of a failure to extend and coordinate the self-organisation of the class regionally and nationally — which was the only way of overcoming the uneven level of consciousness between the south, the industrial workers, and the northern peasantry — and a failure to understand the necessity to develop workers' self-defence out of the struggles in which the class was engaged. In some respects, perhaps, the victories of September and October came too easily — they fostered dangerous illusions. The phase of the revolution was a transitional one, between a pre-revolutionary stage and an open revolutionary crisis. But such a transition could not last forever. It [had to] be resolved one way or the other, and quickly. Either the bourgeoisie would stabilise sections of the army, and develop a repressive strike force, or the working class [went] forward and a situation of dual power would emerge. The economic crisis, meanwhile, was steadily [deepening,] partly because of the economic sabotage of European capitalism and the multinationals, and partly as a result [of] the weak position of Portugal in the face of a general world recession, meant that the only viable solution for the working class lay in generalising the measures of workers control and elaborating a workers plan. That obviously required the coordination of the workers commissions, which in fact began to occur. For example, the commissions in the CUF monopoly met and decided to supply the agricultural workers directly with the fertiliser they needed to maintain the agricultural reform. The Lisnave and Setenave shipyard workers passed a resolution which called for 'effective workers control over production and the planning of the economy at a national level, for [only] in this way can one have a correct notion of the forms of productive reconversion of the various sectors without leading them to a collision' (English version of Republica, 17 November). The Government announced 'an emergency plan to establish basic economic mechanisms', including wage restraint, and refused the building workers' demand for a 40 per cent pay rise. The workers then surrounded the Sao Bento palace for two days and two nights, thus 'capturing' the Government, until Azevedo and his ministers granted the wage increase. The emergency plan did not last long. On 16 November a demonstration called by the CP-controlled secretariat of workers commissions of the Lisbon industrial belt rallied 100,000 people against the Government's policies. The Government also contributed further to the crisis in the army by using the PSP (Public Service Police) and some paratroopers from the Tancos airbase to blow up the Radio Renascensa broadcasting tower. The paratroopers were told that they were acting against the right; when they found that they had been deceived they held a special plenary assembly and passed a resolution stating that, 'this action was aimed essentially at the destruction of an information instrument in the service of the exploited class and the toilers. We demand the immediate dissolution of the AMI and repudiate its actions'. This desperate Government action only underlined the fact that it did not possess the repressive resources to deal a decisive blow to the masses. On the other hand it did not mean that the bourgeoisie lacked the resources necessary to take limited centralised offensives. The scene was now set for the tragic events of 25-26 November. We do not intend to go into them in detail, but rather consider why they could occur as they did. We have said that the ruling class did possess the necessary military resources to launch limited, centralised initiatives. The issue which precipitated the events, the replacement of Carvalho by Vasco Lourenco as commander of the Lisbon military region, had been posed by both the CP and the ultra-lefts as a military matter. Thus when the Tancos paratroopers, the soldiers of the EPAM, RALIS and the military police made their move, they did so without any clear centralised plan or coordination, and with no perspective of following it through to its logical end — that of civil war with involvement of the masses. And the issue over which they had chosen to make a stand was much more favourable to the ruling class — the working class simply did not understand its relevance to them. It is therefore not surprising, even taking into account the lack of action by the CP, that the workers for the most part, stood and waited. As we have argued, the events leading up to 25 November prepared the ground for ultraleft shoots to [flourish]. The ultra-left politics of the PRP and the MES must bear a heavy responsibility for the November events. Throughout the crisis at the end of September their dangerous logic could be seen. The over-estimation by the PRP and MES of the strength of the revolutionary left against the reformists, their failure to put forward any notion of a flexible and audacious united front policy towards either the CP or more importantly the SP militants — which logically stemmed from their characterization of social democracy as being akin to fascism, their underestimation of the capacity of the bourgeoisie to launch military initiatives, and finally their conception of the seizure of power as a military and technical operation, which the working class would applaud from the sidelines — all these positions which were shared by sections of the left-wing officers, pointed in the direction of an armed insurrection. This wrong estimate of the relationship of class forces had tragic, but fortunately not decisive results.
THE AFTERMATH OF NOVEMBER
The events of 25 November clearly open up a new phase of the Portuguese revolution. They have shifted the balance of class forces in favour of the bourgeoisie, who now find themselves with far wider room for manoeuvre at the political level. This is primarily because the crisis within the army has been temporarily resolved. The ruling class now has a section of the armed forces upon which it can rely, and is rapidly attempting to reorganise the army to cleanse it totally. In fact it is within the armed forces that the left has suffered a decisive, qualitative setback. Leftist units like RALIS have been disolved or disbanded, with soldiers put on permanent leave or imprisoned. On 24 January General Ramalho Eanes, brought back as army chief-of-staff after being purged in the wake of the 11 March abortive Spinola coup, announced that the size of the land army is to be reduced by 40 per cent. More importantly, he intends to construct an operational 'intervention force' of 10,800 men whose role will be not only to defend Portugal against external aggression, but also to 'maintain internal security'. Future class confrontation will thus take place under modified terms. The working class can no longer rely upon a favourable response from the soldiers. The question of self-defence becomes an urgent task in all struggles. In that sense, one of the fundamental flaws of the pre-November struggles will have to be overcome. However, the changed relationship of forces within the military does not automatically represent a qualitative change within society as a whole. Because the confrontations of 25 November did not involve the working class directly, not only that the Amadora commandos could seize control, but that the class as such did not suffer a defeat. Quite clearly the vanguard of the class has undergone a period of demoralisation and political crisis, and has also been subjected to a series of attacks — the closure of Republica and O Setubalense; the return of Radio Renascensa to the Catholic Church; the deaths of a number of demonstrators and pickets at the hands of the reactionary Republican National Guard; and the imprisonment of leftists, culminating in January with the jailing of Carvalho. Nevertheless, the organisations of the working class remain intact. The workers commissions still exist and function, although the neighbourhood commissions have gone into a severe decline essentially due to their spontaneist nature prior to November. However within these bodies the revolutionary left has lost its ground to the reformists, notably to the [CP]. For example, in an election at the Setenave shipyards the CP list won 850 votes: that of the far left (UDP, PRP and LCI) 410, and the SP 250. Prior to November the far left was the dominant political force in Setenave. However, an even more important aspect of the Setenave election was the fact that 402 voters abstained and 2,093 didn't even bother to take part! The working class remains cautious, but not defeated. During January the first signs of a response to the capitalist offensive could be seen. The Azevedo Government, presiding over a catastrophic economic crisis, launched an austerity plan to make the workers shoulder the cost. It also renegotiated the agrarian law reform with the support of the CP, so as to stop illegal occupations and prevent any land seizures north of the river Tagus. The Government is forced to take such austerity measures, of which these were only the first dose, because, as the Financial Times noted on 18 December, the Portuguese economy is 'on the brink of a genuine economic collapse'. In 1975 it is expected that the Gross National Product will fall by 15 per cent — a European record for one year; the balance of payments is in the red to the tune of £500 million; foreign exchange reserves have dried up; inflation is currently running at 25 per cent, and likely to reach 50 per cent by the end of this year; unemployment stands at 17 per cent of the active population and is still rising. Statistics such as these can be reproduced endlessly! The ruling class has to inflict a decisive blow to the workers and peasants if capitalism is to survive. Already during January a number of strikes have broken out; the metal workers of the Lisbon industrial belt have stated categorically that they reject the austerity plan; and 40,000 people supported the Intersindical demonstration in Lisbon on 17 January against the Government's proposals. Despite the gains made by the ruling class out of 25 November, they have in no way solved their own internal problems. They still lack a cohesive political leadership. Clear differences over the participation of the CP in the Government have emerged between the SP, the Antunes group and a minority of the PPD on one hand, and the CDS and the majority of the PPD on the other. The debate still rages over the future role of the armed forces in Portuguese politics. Prior to the elections of 25 April it is unlikely that the ruling class in Portugal will launch a decisive offensive; it does not yet possess the authority it requires within the army — for example, in January it still preferred not to use soldiers against demonstrators — nor the coherent operational intervention unit, nor a unified political leadership. The elections may give the latter, when it can then claim to have the authority of the 'people'. But prior to April it will continue to regroup its forces for the confrontation to come. In that period the working class has to prepare itself by the launching of struggles against the present austerity measures and all the attacks of the Sixth Government. A failure to do so will leave the workers commissions bereft of any clear perspective and the class with no leadership. Learning from the errors of the previous period, the key task of the revolutionary left has to be the application of a united front tactic that can encompass the widest possible forces to counter the political and economic proposals of the Azevedo Government. Of necessity that must entail a clear orientation to the militants in the SP and CP. It is through the unity in action of the class, through the building of workers commissions and popular assemblies, through their coordination and centralisation, and through their own self-defence, that the working class can learn the lessons of last autumn and go forward from the present pre-revolutionary situation. The economic, political and social crisis remains. The next period still holds the potential for that to become a revolutionary crisis — not merely because of events in Portugal itself, but above all because of the simultaneously emerging upsurge of the Spanish workers and peasants. The next months in Portugal and Spain can herald the emergence of the Iberian Socialist Revolution. Long live the Portuguese and Spanish sections of the Fourth International! Forward to the Iberian Socialist Revolution!
30 January 1976