The State and the Transition
to Socialism
NICOS POULANTZAS interviewed by Henri Weber*
MARXISTS AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE
Henri Weber: In a recent book' you argue that what is needed is a complete break with the essentialist conceptions of the state. In other words, with those which define it as a
H.W.: You put forward a different conception of the state simple object-instrument, or as a subject with a will and a
to this essentialist one. You say that the 'state" is no more a rationality of its own to whom the ruling classes obediently defer. Would you say that this essentialist conception was
thing than "capital" is an object, that like capital it is above
all a social relation. It is, to quote you, also held by Marx and Lenin?
Nicos Poulantzas: Basically we must examine what we mean
condensation of the relation of forces between social clusses
as it is specifically expressed within the state itself. You by the Marxist theory of the state. Can we find in Marx or
argue that one of the advantages of your conception is thar it Engels a general theory of the state? In my opinion we can no more speak of a general theory of the state than we can of
helps to underline a strategically important fact: that the
state is not a solid monolithic bloc which the masses will have a general theory of the economy, because the concept,
to confront from without in a whole series of encounters, content, and terrain of the political and the economic change with the various modes of production. We can certainly find
and which they will have to destroy en bloc through an
insurrectional attack bringing about the collapse of the state. in Marx and Engeis the general principles of a theory of the state.
We can also find some guidelines concerning the
Rather, since the state is a material condensation of a capitalist state. But there is no fully worked out theory, not
relation of classes", it is riddled with class contradictions. It even of the capitalist state.
is an arena of internal contradictions, and this applies to all
its apparatuses - not only those where the masses are The problem is more complex when we come to Lenin. In
an
there
works
are no signs of
Marx and Engels'
present physically (school, army ...) but also where they are instrumentalist conception of the state — I'm thinking now
supposedly absent (police, judiciary, civil service). That is of their political texts on France, etc. - but this is less clear
your conception, summarised somewhat schematically. with Lenin. There can be little doubt that some of his
Now I want to ask you a number of questions. First, what
is really new in this approach? In other words, I have the analyses fall prey to the instrumentalist conception of the state, that is, as a monolithic bloc without divisions, with
impression that Lenin did not consider the state an intrinsic almost no internal contradictions, and which can only be
reality, independent of the class struggle and dominating it, attacked globally and frontally from without by establishing
any more than did Marx (which brings us back to your first
answer). Both of them definitely stress the fact that the the counter-state which would be the dual power, centralised
nature of the state reflects the relation of forces between the soviets, and so on.
Does this conception derive from the fact that Lenin was
classes (one need only mention the Marxist analysis of
Bonapartism). Therefore the state, its institutions and dealing with the Tsarist state (because even when Lenin speaks of the Western democracies he always has in mind the
personnel, its type of organisation and relationship to the Tsarist state)? Or from the fact that Lenin wrote State and
masses, is directly determined by the class structure, the
relations between the classes, and the sharpness of the class Revolution as a polemic against the social-democratic conceptions of the state-subject? Could it be that Lenin was
struggle. I think this is fundamental in determining how obliged, as he says himself, to bend the stick too far in the
Marxists pose the problem of the state.
opposite direction", and to say: no, the state is not an auto
Furthermore, I don't believe that either Marx or Lenin put nomous subject but an instrument, an exclusive tool for the
forward a theory of the monolithic state, without "contraruling classes.
dictions or divisions", of the kind that you are challenging. So I would put a question mark as far as Lenin is concerned, but it is clear all the same that an instrumentalist
Lenin, for exampic, completely incorporates in his strategy
the struggle inside the institutions, even the Tsarist conception of the state can be found in his texts. *This first appeared in Critique communiate No. 16 (June 1977).
1. La Crise de /'Erar (Paris: PUF, 1976).
3
*the material
state corresponds to the development of the productive institutions. He argues that communists must be active in the
forces; as a result it embodies
In the famous pamphlet
Duma, the schools, the army ...
functions of the state, because they correspond What is to be Done?, he denounces from the start the
socialisation of the productive forces. In other words, there economist reduction of Marxism and explains that the
are two states: a 'good" state, which ultimately corresponds revolutionary party has to send its militants into all
to the growth of popular forces within the state itself, and a
society. He sees these
institutions and all spheres of
'bad" state. Today the "bad" state dominates the 'good' state institutions not only as the stake but also as the terrain of
The super-state of the monopolies, which is the bad side, the class struggle.
must be destroyed; but the
The difference between these conceptions and those which
corresponds to the socialisation of the productive forces and are fashionable today — 1 am thinking essentially of the
the popular upsurge must be preserved
theorisations of the leaders of the Italian Communist Party
This is a complete false conception. I agree with you: the on the contradictory character of the state system today — is
whole of the present state and all its apparatuses — social that for Marx, Lenin, and revolutionary Marxists, social
security, health, education, administration, etc. — corres classes do not and cannot occupy equivalent positions in the state. The ruling classes control the strategic positions of the
pond by their very structure to the power of the bourgeoisie.
I do not believe that the masses can hold positions state. They hold the real power. The exploited classes occupy or can occupy minor positions as personnel in the various
autonomous power — even subordinate ones — within the state apparatuses, or as elected representatives in parliament,
capitalist state. They act as a means of resistance, elements but these are generally all positions with extremely limited
of corrosion, accentuating the internal contradictions of the
state.
powers. Thus the state which, to use your words, is the
This allows us to escape from the false dilemmas in which condensation of a relation of classes, 'riven by internal
'a terrain of the class struggle', still remains
we are presently stuck: either viewing the state as a the primary instrument of bourgeois domination. Therefore
monolithic bloc (1 am being schematie here), and thus the key strategic question of any transition to socialism
considering the internal struggle as a totally secondary remains: how do we deal with this state, how do we destroy
problem - with the main if not exclusive objective being the
task of centralising popular power, the construction of the
counter-state to replace the capitalist state; or else secing the In fact, Lenin's conception was not so much an instrumentalist one of a monolithic state as one based on the
state as contradictory and therefore considering that the
essential struggle has to be mounted within the state, within understanding that, whatever its contradictions (and they
its institutions — thus falling into the classical can be relatively great), the state remains an instrument of domination by one class over another. Lenin does not ignore
democratic conception of a struggle contained within the the Swiss, American and British states. He was perfectly
state apparatuses
aware of Marx's writings on the possible peaceful passage to
I believe, on the contrary, that it is necessary to develop
some coordination between them:
socialism in this type of state. I do not accept that his judgement was clouded by the Tsarist state so that he
— on the one hand, a struggle within the state. Not simply ignored all other reality.
in the sense of a struggle enclosed within the physical The second question is this: hasn't your constant emphasis
confines of the state, but a struggle situnted all the same on
the strategic terrain constituted by the state. A struggle, in on the contradictory character of the modern state had the effect — this is obviously the case with currents like the
other words, whose aim is not to substitute the workers state Italian CP, CERES', etc. — of blurring its class character
for the bourgeois state through a series of reforms designed
to take over one bourgeois state apparatus after another and and obscuring the key problem of any strategy for the
thus conquer power, but a struggle which is, if you like, a transition to socialism: the task of smashing the state as the instrument of bourgeois domination?
struggle of resistance, a struggle designed to sharpen the N.P.: To return first to the novelty of my conception: we
internal contradictions of the state, to carry out a deepseated transformation of the state.
always come up against the same problem. I think that in Marx and Engels, and also in Lenin, not to mention
— on the other hand, a parallel struggle, a struggle outside Gramsci, whose contribution is very important, there are
the institutions and apparatuses, giving rise to a whole series
of instruments, means of coordination, organs of popular certainly elements of what 1 am trying to develop. In Lenin I still maintain that more than an ambiguity remains, for
power at the base, structures of direct democracy at the base. Lenin was thinking not so much of an internal struggle
This form of struggle would not aim to centralise a dual
presence of
within the state apparatus
power type of counter-state, but would have to be linked revolutionaries within it. That is something quite different.
with the first struggle.
The main axis of Lenin's political struggle was for the
I think we have to go beyond the classical strategy of dual centralisation of the parallel powers outside the state, the
power without falling into the trap of the Italian CP's building of an alternative state apparatus which would
strategy, which is, in the last analysis, a strategy located replace the bourgeois state at a given moment. Therefore
solely within the physical confines of the state. Lenin, it is true, speaks of the presence of revolutionaries
THE STATE AND DUAL POWER
within the state, but rather in the sense of a presence that would help, when the time came, to replace this state with an
H.W.: Let us just concentrate on this aspect of the question, alternative state. You don't seem to appreciate the weight of
and then perhaps we can come back to the state via a detour. this intervention as such.
I am convinced that we have to lead a struggle within the
what is certain is that within the Third
institutions, to play as much as we can on the internal Internaticual. I think, there was a tendency to view the state
contradictions of the state, and that, in the present context. as an instrument that could be manipulated at will by the
every battle for the democratisation of the institutions and
the state is a decisive battle. Also that such a struggle within bourgeoisie. Even if they recognised that certain contradicthe institutions must link up with a struggle outside to tions existed within it, the idea always persisted that no proper revolutionary struggle could be led in the heart of the
develop mechanisms of popular control and to extend direct state on the basis of these contradictions.
democracy. But it scems to me that what is missing from
Now, on the other hand, we have the position of the Italian
your position, its blind spot, is the antagonism between these Icaders, illustrated by Luciano Gruppi's latest article in
external popular committees (in the factories, the neighDialectiques No. 17 on the contradictory nature of the state.
2. CERES (Cantre d'Etudes.
This is totally different from what 1 am saying. According to
Socialistes - Cantre for Socialist Studies, Research and Education) this theory of the contradictory nature of the state, which
Is the organised form taken by the left wing in the Soclalist Party.
has also been taken up in the French CP, one section of the
4
neutral, even positive section of the state that
of
socialet d'Education de Recherches.
bourhoods, etc.) and the state apparatus which, whatever struggle you lead within it, won't undergo any change in its nature as a result. Therefore the moment of truth will necessarily arrive when you have a test of strength with the state apparatus. And this state apparatus, however democratised it is, however much it is weakened by the action of the workers movement within its institutions, will nevertheless remain, as we can see in Italy today, the essential instrument of the bourgeoisie's domination over the popular masses. This test of strength seems unavoidable to me, and the proof of any strategy is the seriousness with which this moment of truth is taken into account. Those who say, a bit like you: there are struggles both inside and outside the institutions, and it is necessary to coordinate the two, and that's all; in reality, they don't take into account the test of strength, this decisive confrontation. This silence speaks for itself. It amounts to considering that the coordination of action outside and inside the institutions can, through a long, gradual process, finally alter the nature of the state and society without a test of strength.
You know, what worries me about your presentation is that you seem to be tilting at windmills, that is, against people who want to make the October Revolution all over again, when that is in no way the case with the far left today. We don't think that the state is a monolith which must be confronted and broken down exclusively from the outside. We are absolutely convinced of the need for a 'war of position", and we know that in the West there will be a whole period of reparation, of conquest of hegemony, etc. But the fundamental line of divide, where you have to take a stand, is that some people see this war of position as constituting in itself the transformation of capitalist society and the capitalist state into a socialist society and a workers state. Whereas, for us, this is only a starting point in establishing the preconditions for the test of strength which seems unavoidable to us whatever the circumstances. To ignore this test of strength is therefore to opt for one strategy over another.
N.P.: Well, now we are getting somewhere. I agree with you on the questions of the rupture, of thetest of strength; but 1 still think that the repetition of a revolutionary crisis leading to a situation of dual power is extremely unlikely in the West. However, on the question of the rupture, this test of strength which you talk about could only take place between the state and the totally exterior force of the centralised organisation of popular power at the base. That's the problem. I agree on the necessity of a break. But, ultimately, it is not clear that there can only be a truly revolutionary test of strength if it outside it (or identifying as such), that is, the movement, the organs of popular power, centralised at the base as an alternative power.
I can give you some very simple examples. For instance, let us look at what happened in Portugal. You say that nobody wants to repeat October, etc. But when I read what Bensaid has to say in his book on Portugal...
H.W.: La Révolution en marche)
N.P.: But it's exactly this conception that I am fighting. According to him, the crucial problem in Portugal was that the revolutionaries did not succeed in centralising all this experience of popular power at the base, cic., to establish dual power, an alternative centralised power which, as such, unavoidable confrontation, the rupture. I believe that there
but it's not clear to me that it will
necessarily be between the state en bloc and what lies outside it, the structures of popular power at the base. It can take place, for example, right inside the state apparatus: between one fraction of the armed forces which is entirely at the service of the bourgeoisie and another fraction of the regular army which, supported also by the popular power at the base, by the soldiers" unionisation struggles or soldiers committees, can break with its traditional role and pass over - a whole fraction of the state army — to the side
of the people. That's the kind of thing that happened in Portugal: there was no confrontation between the popular militias on one side and the bourgeois army on the other. If it didn't work out in Portugal, it wasn't because the revolutionaries failed to set up a parallel popular militia which could have totally replaced the state apparatus at a given moment, but for a whole series of other reasons ... To talk of coordinating the internal struggle with the external struggle does not mean at all that we necessarily avoid talking of the rupture. But it means recognising that the revolutionary break does not invitably occur in the form of a centralisation of a counter-state confronting the state itself en bloc. It can pass through the state, and I think this is the only way it will happen at present. There will be a rupture, there will be a moment of decisive confrontion, but it will pass through the state. The organs of popular power at the base, the structures of direct democracy, will be the elements which bring about a differentiation inside the state apparatuses, a polarisation by the popular movement of a large fraction of these apparatuses. This fraction, in alliance with the movement, will confront the reactionary, counterrevolutionary sectors of the state apparatus backed up by the ruling classes.
Fundamentally, 1 think that at the moment we cannot repeat the October Revolution under any form, The basis of the October Revolution was not only the opposition pointed our by Gramsci between a war of movement and a war of position. I think that Gramsci, too, basically retains thie schema and the model of the October Revolution ... H.W.: Absolutely!
N.P.: What does Gramsci mean by the war of positions? The war of positions is to surround the strong castle of the state from outside with the structures of popular power. But in the end it's always the same story. Il's a strong castle, right? So cither you launch an assault on it — war of moverent; or you besiege it — war of positions. In any case. there is no conception in Gramsci's work that a real revolutionary rupture, linked to an internal struggle, can occur at this or that point of the state apparatus. It doesn't exist in Gramsci. But 1 myself find it difficult to believe that a classical situation of dual power can occur aguin in Europe, precisely because of the development of the state, its power, its integration into social life, into all areas, etc. This development and power make it simultaneously very strong when confronted with a situation of dual power, and also very weak: for now the alternative power, if you like, can somehow also appear within the state; the ruptures can also take place from within the state, and that is its weakness. H.W.: The difficulty is in knowing what ruptures we are talking abour. What is their nature. their extent? However, we can be sure that breaches of this kind inside the state institutions involve positions that could have been conquered before or during the crisis, but are relatively secondary positions. The essence of the state apparatus, where the reality of power is really concentrated, will not pass to the side of the revolution. And if you think that a revolutionary mass movement can polarise key sectors of the state apparatus — can polarise, for instance, the majority of the officer caste - then in effect you hold that the state is potentially neutral. You are in effect blurring the conception of the class character of this apparatus, and of its leading I still think that the best example to take is that of Italy. That would be the
Here the development of the mass movement, in the factories and elsewhere, has created a democratic movement within the police, the judiciary, the civil service — in ail the state apparatuses - but these movements affect only the periphery, the fringe of these apparatuses, and not their core.
I will therefore freely admit that one of the essential functions of a popular movement and a revolutionary 3. Portugal: La Revolution en marche. Dy Daniel Bensaid, Carlos Rossi and Charles-Andre Udry (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1975). 5
strategy is to dislocate the state apparatus and throw it into crisis, to paralyse it, to turn it as much as possible against bourgeois society. This is relatively easy in the schools, some government services, etc., whose class character is more mediated. It is much more difficult when you come to the apparatuses of direct coercion such as the police, the army, the judiciary, the higher echelons of the civil service, or even the mass media, the television and press — though it's possible, and we have it as an objective. But we must have no illusions on what we can achieve from this angle. There will be no vertical split from top to bottom into two halves. We will not establish dual power inside the state, capturing half the state power from top to bottom and winning everyone from half the ministers to half the postmasters to the side of the popular movement! We will make some inroads, but that won't do away with the continuing existence of the state
of the state as instrument of domination and apparatus.
general staff of the counter-revolution. Hence the need to deal with it once and for all.
If I remain convinced of the reality of the concept of dual power, clearly under different forms from those in Tsarist Russia, and obviously linked to the growing crisis of the state apparatus, it is because I am convinced that the core of the Italy, we saw it in Chile and Portugal, and we can see it of its role.
DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY
N.P.: You are right on many points, but 1 think that we are in any case faced with a historical gamble. The new strategy that must be adopted in the concrete situation in the West, where my analyses prompt me to say that there cannot be a situation of dual power, contains in effect the risk, the obvious risk - and everyone is aware of it — that the great majority of the repressive state apparatuses will polarise to the right, and therefore crush the popular movement. Having said that, I think that we must first of all bear in mind that this is a long process. We have to understand the implications of that. We talked about the rupture. But it's not clear in fact that there will be one big rupture. On the
it's also clear that you risk falling into
about a series of ruptures
gradualism if you talk
Nevertheless, if we're talking about a long process, we have to come to terms with the fact that it can only mean a series of ruptures, whether you call them successive or not. What matters for me is the idea of a long process". What can you mean by. "long process" if you talk at the same time of the H.W.: It means, for example, what we are seeing in Italy. Since 1962, and very sharply since 1968, a relatively long process has been unfolding. It already amounts to ten or fifteen years of a rising popular movement, of the crosion of bourgeois hegemony, it has resulted in the development of forms of direct democracy at the base, a growing crisis of the state apparatuses, and it is ushering in a sharper and sharper crisis, and indeed the test of strength ....
N.P.: Yes, but hold on. The process is relatively differentiated all the same, because we've seen also what is happening in Portugal. Then I would say that the most probable hypothesis on which to work in France is the Common Programme. In other words, that the left will move into power, or rather into government, accompanied by a simultaneous huge mobilisation of the popular masses. For either there will be no popular mobilisation, in which case we will have at best a new social-democratic experience: or else there will be a massive mobilisation of the popular classes, coinciding with a left government, which implies already a number of important changes at the top of the state apparatus: in other words, the left, occupying the summit of
the state, will be led (willy nilly) to undertake a democratisation of the state, also from above. In Italy the PCI finds itself in the corridors of power and yet at the same time it lacks even the slightest means of mobilising the masses or altering the structure of the state apparatuses which a left government in France would have. There's your first Second problem. Let's take up the question of dual power and the rupture which must smash the state apparatus, because that's really the heart of the matter. Smashing the state apparatus meant something relatively simple for the Bolsheviks. It meant that che institutions of representative democracy, the so-called formal liberties, etc. are institutions which by their nature are totally under the sway of the bourgeoisie — not only the state, 1 say, but representative democracy. Smashing the state apparatus therefore meant overthrowing the whole institutional set-up and replacing it with something completely new, a new organisation of direct or so-called direct democracy, by means of soviets led by the vanguard party, etc
This raises the following question. I think that nowadays the perspective of smashing the state remains valid as a perspective for the deep-seated transformation of the state structure. But, in order to be very clear on this point and not treat it lightly, we can no longer speak of smashing the state in the same way, insofar as we are all more or less convinced -and I know your latest views on this question - that a democratic socialism must maintain formal and political liberties: transformed, to be sure, but maintained all the same in the sense that Rosa Luxemburg demanded of Lenin. We musn't forget that. To be honest, Lenin couldn't have cared less about political and formal liberties. And Rosa Luxemburg, a revolutionary who can hardly be accused of social democratic leanings, took him up on it It is easy to say that you have to muintain political and formal liberties. But for me it's clear that this also implies and here I'm going hack to the discussion you had with Jacques Julliard in Critique communiste No. 8-9 — the maintenance, although profoundly altered, of certain forms of representative democracy.
What is meant by representative democracy as opposed to direct democracy? There are certain criteria. Direct democracy means a compulsory mandate, for instance, with instant recall of the delegates, etc. If you want to preserve political and formal liberties, I think that Implies keping certain institutions which embody them, and also a representative element: that is, centres of power, assemblies which are not directly modelled on the pattern of direct democracy. In other words, national assemblies elected directly by universal suffrage in a secret ballot, and which are not solely ruled by the principles of compulsory mandate and instant recall. H. W.: What have you got against the compulsory mandate N.P.: Historically, every experience of direct democracy at the base which has not been tied to the maintenance of representative democracy for a certain period has failed. To
with the institutions of so-called
representative democracy during a transitional phase, and to think that you will have direct democracy, in the absence of specific institutions of representative democracy, political liberties as well (plurality of parties, among other things) — well, as far as I know, it's never worked. Direct democracy, by which I mean direct democracy in the soviet sense only, has always and everywhere been accompanied by the suppression of the plurality of parties, and then the suppression of political and formal liberties. Now, to say that that's merely Stalinism scems to me to be going a bit far. H.W.: But to say that it is fundamentally tied to the form of direct democracy is to go even further, Because in reality there was an international and national context which meant that it was difficult to conceive of any kind democratisation while the revolution remained isolated. To use the failure of the soviets in Russia in the 1920s to prove your argument is not convincing.
6
political liberties of the far left can only be guaranteed by N.P.: Pardon me, it's not only Russia, it happened again in China ....
maintaining forms of representative democracy. H.W.: Withevenmorercason....
Finally, you know that I don't claim to have complete N.P.: And also in Cuba, not to mention Cambodia; you
answers. There is a problem traditionally summarised in the can't deny all that. I'm quite happy to blame Stalinism or the
expression "smashing the state', but we're all aware that we objective conditions, but it does begin to add up to
have to maintain political liberties and pluralism, and hence something in such varied national and international
also to a certain extent the institutions of representative conditions.
democracy. I would not hesitate to say also that, precisely To go back to the Russian Revolution, we all know that for
because we talk of maintaining rather than purely and simply Lenin the abolition of other parties was linked to the civil
abolishing the so-called formal liberties, we can no longer war. That is how it happened concretely. Having said that, I
use the term "smashing" to define the problem, but rather wonder all the same if this abolition of other parties was not
that of radically "transforming" the state. Do you believe in already there potentially in Lenin's conception or in certain
pluralism?
of his texts. If one conceives that the truth of the proletariat
H.W.: Of course. We believe in it and we practise it. — its political class consciousness — comes from outside the
N.P.: But for your opponents as well?
workers movement, from the theory produced by the
H.W.: Certainly. Even for the bourgeois parties, it's there in intellectuals, then I wonder to what extent that, tied to a certain
N.P.: Aha, even for bourgeois parties. Now, not to be too directly to the abolition of all democracy in line with the
naive, there are things one has to say, because we fear for well-known scenario. First of all you say, as Lenin started to say, democracy only for the proletarian parties, the parties of the left. But then, what is a proletarian party? You know
N.P.: It's all very well to say so, but I want to know what what I mean, I don't have to spell it out: which is the real
forms of institutional guarantee there would be — they are proletarian party? Which is the real proletarian fraction of
always secondary, of course, but they matter. In what kind of the proletarian party? I know very well that you can't reduce
institutions would this pluralism and these liberties be Lenin's theory of organisation to What Is To Be Done?, but
inscribed, in what kind of material institutions would they be I believe all the same that a single party is potentially there in
sustained and guaranteed? If we're talking only of forms of the conceptions of What Is To Be Done?, which still
direct democracy at the base — in other words, structures remains the framework of the Leninist theory
still massively dominated by the traditional left parties Then, even in Soviet Russia, I wonder if what Rosa
that hardly cases my misgivings, 1 can conceive of direct Luxemburg said to Lenin ('Beware, isn't that going to lead
democracy at the base through general assemblies at to .), if even the first comments of Trotsky, the preRenault, or in Marseilles or Rheims... but unless we are in a
more relevant
than the
Bolshevik Trotsky, were not
really revolutionary situation where everyone feels totally explanations of the later Trotsky, the super-Bolshevik
involved, constantly in the streets, etc., which doesn't Trotsky.
happen every day, then I don't know if that is sufficient to But finally, leaving aside the whole historical debate, 1
guarantee that liberties will be maintained .... would ask whether today we can talk about political and
I certainly wouldn't like to find myself, as I have so often formal liberties over a long period, the period of transition
in my past political life, in general assemblies of direct to socialism, without also having the institutions that can
democracy which vote by a show of hands on command and give life to and guarantee this plurality and these liberties?
where, after a while, you see X, Y or Z prevented from Do you really believe that these liberties will continue to be maintained, simply by their own dynamic, under a soviet
H.W.: No, but your picture of workers democracy is very democracy at the base (supposing such a system is possible,
one-sided. Democracy is hard to practise in general, and the it's thought of as possible, but I think that dual power,
more democratic it is, the harder it is to practise it. The anyway, is a situation that can't recur as such), if there are
casiest regime to follow is enlightened despotism, but then no institutions that can guarantee these liberties — and, in
you can never be sure of the enlightenment particular, institutions of representative democracy? In the debate among Italian Marxists, you know that the
Still, on this question, I think first that this counterposition discussion was launched by Bobbio.' Of course, one clearly
between representative, delegated democracy and democracy can't agree with all Bobbio's social-democratic platitudes,
at the base is a fraud. There is no such thing as democracy at but he did highlight one point. He said: "If we want to
the base: there is always some delegation. There is a system maintain liberties, the plurality of expression, etc., then all I
which aims to resolve a fundamental problem, that of know is that throughour history these liberties have been
re-rooting politics in the real communities... coupled with a form of parliament.* Certainly he expressed it
N.P.: Henri, I'm sorry to interrupt you, but I think there's in a social-democratic form. But yet, I wonder if there isn't a
some confusion here which we won't get out of through any core of truth in that, if the maintenance of formal political
kind of trick. Take Critique communiste No. 8-9. On the one liberties doesn't require the maintenance of the institutional
hand you have Mandel, who clearly puts forward the soviet forms of power of representative democracy. Obviously they
system, revised and improved.' Then you have the question would be transformed; it's not a matter of keeping the
posed by Jacques Julliard': will we have to have a nationalbourgeois parliament as it is, etc
on universal suffrage and periodic
type assembly, based
Moreover,
elections, without compulsory mandates? Yes, says Julliard democracy in France since 1968. It's a bit too casy to use that
while for Mandel there is no such necessity, Julliard as an argument, but you saw how it worked then!
poses the question and I tend to agree with him on the H.W.: Youmean the university?
N.P.: Yes, I'm thinking mainly of the university, but not
4. Nobert Bobbio Is Professor of Political Sciences at the University just there. Because when I talk about the need for formal and
of Turin and editor of the Italian Socialist Party's theoretical journal, political liberties, it is not just the far left I have in mind, as
Mondopera/o. In September 1975 he published a special issue of the some people have thought from my article in Le Monde: I
Journal on Socialism and Democracy" which sparked off a huge and
continuing debate on this subject.
am thinking also of the CGT and the Communist Party, to
5. This interview, Revolutionary Strategy in Europe', han also bean say nothing of the leadership of the Socialist Party.
published in New Left Rewiew No. 100.
So you would have forms of direct democracy at the base,
6. Jacques Julliard is a former national executive member of the neighbourhood committees and the like, totally controlled
social-democratictrade union federation, the CFDT, and Joint author by the official left, without any institutional guarantee of
with its general secretary, Edmond Maire, ofa book entitled The CFOT formal liberties
well, come on. Even the formal and
7
You say: parliament must change, etc. But it is necessary to necessity for a national assembly, in the form of a
explain in what sense it must change. What must be done parliament — radically transformed, of course.
away with is the system whereby an MP is elected for five That wasn't Lenin's view, because Lenin was faced with
years from a vast geographical constituency, thus establishthe Constituent Assembly, if I may remind you! So, once the
ing the conditions for the greatest possible autonomy of the Constituent Assembly had been elected, well, it was
MPs from their electors. In effect, that means another dissolved and never functioned. The drawback was that the
institutional system.
majority was held by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, with all
N.P.: When we talk about coordinating forms of reprethe risks that that entailed. So for Lenin it was a simple
sentative democracy with forms of direct democracy, that matter.
obviously means that we don't want to continue with the
existing system but advance beyond it, that we want to
COORDINATE THE SOVIETS WITH PARLIAMENT?
caste of
divide between a
overcome the complete
professional politicians and the rest of the population. H.W.: On this question, 1 think first of all that this
This advance and coordination implies, at least for a long democracy can be codified perfectly easily. There is no
period, the existence of national assemblies as centres of reason why it should correspond to the kind of manipulatory
power. For ultimately, if all the power emanates from worksessions that have occurred in the student movement. Clearly
communities and their representatives, then the risk of a so-called direct democracy can be something very grotesque
The extension of
corporatist degeneration is obvious.
and anti-democratic — a sort of 'assemblyist" democracy, But
democracy, the proliferation of decision-taking bodies, it can also be something highly codified.
poses in fact the problem of centralisation, of leadership. What seems important to me, and it's not a trick, is to root
And then you have two alternatives.
political activity and political life in communities which are
revolutionary party — or the coalition of left parties
does the job. But we all agree that this
real communities
and not nominal aggregates of the
These real communities
party does not exist. The only party which could assume this geographical constituency type.
role today is the Communist Party, and we all know what must be work-communities (in the broadest sense: factories,
that would mean ...(to say nothing of the fact that to assign schools, barracks.. if any are left) and also neighbourhood
this role to the "party" is manifestly to open the way to the communities, in other words, real area units. But that can be
single party, and even an ideal' party which becomes a codified perfectly casily: the secret ballot can and must be
can only end up as Stalinist). The other included. The right of recall must exist too, but on a rational
secret, universal
alternative is a parliament clected by
basis: you can have immediate recall of factory delegates at
suffrage, That is the only alternative I can see. Without the any time in the case of problems of work; and you can have annual or biennial recall, as in Italy — because there are
party, the central council of soviets cannot play this role. It
has not played it anywhere, If things worked out to some already some experiences there — of delegates at a higher
extent in Russia, in China cte., that's because "the" level, who are dealing with different kinds of problems
communist purty centralised things, and we know what the which obviously cannot be followed on a day-to-day basis by
ultimate consequences were
the worker at the base. All this can be regulated at least as well as bourgeois-democratic procedure.
Furthermore, one day we will have to come to terms with
the following fact: the complexity of the present econoric The problem is not to say whether we are for or against
tasks of the state, a complexity which will not diminish but representative democracy: in modern societies, all democincrease under socialism.
racy is representative. It's a question of knowing whether the form of representation means giving up power or the real
What I'm afraid of is that behind your rooting of power in
the work-communities' there lurks in reality the restoration delegation of it with the possibility of control. I would say that the forms of democracy which carry on bourgeois
of the power of the experts; in other words, that you would traditions are actually equivalent to giving up power.
escape the dictatorship of the leadership of the single party What it boils down to then is handing over power to
only to fall captive to the discreet charm of technocratic
despotism. Don't you think it's strange that all the specialists for a long period and taking no further interest in
Therefore to struggle for democtechnocrats of the Socialist Party swear by selfmanagement! It means for them at most that there are a few ratisation is to try to struggle against this system, which rests
discussions, after which the experts take charge of the on a structure. And the most effective way to struggle
economic tasks of the state!
against this structure is precisely to root political activity in the real communities. This is what we have to develop. To
And then you have the concrete situation in France today.
What you and I are talking about is the ideal model of involve people in political life, they have to feel that they have control over the decisions which affect them: to have
democracy. We have completely forgotten that we are faced control over these decisions, they must form a community,
with a concrete situation in France: that of the Common
Programme and the likely victory of the Union of the Left. discuss together, be able to carry some weight, etc.
Faced with that, we can of course conclude that nothing If it is the atomised individual who comes face to face with
can be expected from the Common Programme, that the the political machinery — in other words, the individual as
united left in power will be devoutly social-democratic to the conceived by the bourgeoisie
- then they withdraw into the
point of pursuing a new authoritarianism which can only be sphere of private life; and every seven years they demonstrate
thwarted by centralised counter-powers at the base, and their dissatisfaction or their satisfaction. That is the problem
therefore our only hope is that it takes up office as soon as as we see it. That is why we want to change the political
possible so that the masses understand what reformism is system in order to base democracy on real communities — at
and turn away from it.
in an area — with duly codified forms of
My analysis is different: either there will be a tremendous
We think that
representation which prevent abuses, etc.
mobilisation at the base, or there won't be one. In the latter such a structural alteration would mark a qualitative
case, that's it: we are destined to go through a new socialprogress towards political democracy, because it would give
democratic experience, It'll be a bit like it was under people a real chance to run their own affairs. But
Allende, though that experience had a much more shaky precondition for this is that it must be one of a whole series
clectoral foundation than the Common Programme will of other measures, or else it will be deprived of all content.
have. After all, Popular Unity won with only 30 per cent of There must be a significant reduction of working hours, for
the vote!
instance. It is obviously very difficult for people to devote
However, if there is a massive mobilisation, then things will time to management, factory problems, and questions of
start to happen. But then we will all find ourselves in a very the economy and society if they have to work more than
specific situation. Everyone: both us and the left in power. 1 thirty hours a week.
don't say us against the left. For there will be two camps and we will be in the orbit of the left, whether we like it or not. We will then be in a situation characterised by a crisis of the state, but not a revolutionary crisis. The left will be in power, with a programme much more radical than has ever been the case in Italy; committed to implementing it, which will really process of democratisation
enormous popular mobilisation giving rise to forms of direct democracy at the base ... but at the same time limiting itself to the project of the Common Programme.
So the real problem is to know how we can intervene in this process in order to deepen it. In this context, what does seem clearly impossible is the perspective of centralising a workers' counter-power, factory council by factory council, soldiers committee by soldiers committee. Furthermore, 1 must say that this would seem to me to be an extremely dangerous way to proceed, Such a course is the surest road to the total recapture of power by the bourgeoisie, which — as we mustn't forget — remains throughout this period an active (and how!) protagonist in this process.
So what else can we do? How can we force the left to proceed effectively with the democratisation of the state, to link up its institutional power with the new forms of direct democracy? That's the problem. And if one thing's certain, it's that we aren't going to resolve the problem with metaphysically endowed by their very nature with all the virtues that used to be attributed at one time to the "Party".
WHAT REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY FOR FRANCE?
H.W.: The situation which it seems to me would definitely lead to the failure of these mobilisations and their defeat is that which would result from the application of the present strategy of the Union of the Left: one where, as you say, the left takes office, and where the mass movement 15 strong Because then it will attack
sufficiently to make it angry but not enough to put it out of action. And then we will be in the absolutely classical situation where the ruling class loses patience - both nationally and internationally — and where it still retains the key economic and political levers of control, and in particular the state apparatus; because although part of the state apparatus may break away in France, the bulk of it will on the contrary polarise to the right. The bourgeoisie will therefore have the reasons and the means to retaliate. The popular masses, on the other hand, will be relatively disarmed by decades of sermons on the peaceful road to socialism, the "contradictory nature' of the bourgeois-democratic state, etc. We risk finding ourselves in the classical situation of being defeated without a fight.
That's our analysis. Like you, though, we say that if there is no mass movement — something which seems inconceivable to me in the medium term...
N.P.: And to me too...
H.W.: Right, then ifthere is one, I think that the problem will be posed in terms of organising around objectives — not of immediately destroying the bourgeois state, that would be senseless - but around economic, political and international objectives, what we call transitional objectives, and which are effectively written into the logic of the emergence of dual power...
N.P.: There! You see...
H.W.: But hang on, let me tell you what I mean by that. It clearly means, at the economic level, struggling for the expropriation of big capital and establishing workers control of production at all levels, culminating in a workers plan to solve the economic crisis. This is the central axis, which aims not merely to defend the living standards and working conditions of the popular masses but also to oust the
already embarked on a
state, faced with an
work-communities
bourgeoisie from economic power, both in the factory and in the state, and to organise the working class to take control, to take power.
At the political level, we undoubtedly have to fight for the extension of democracy rather than shouting elections are for fools'. We have to fight for proportional representation, regional assemblies, a trade union for soldiers, etc., so as to expand political democracy as much as possible, because this is also the way in which the bourgeois state will be most weakened. At the international level (and I'm summarising here) we will have to counter the offensive of US imperialism and its allies by developing new relations with the Third World countries and, above all, by involving the popular masses of Southern Europe and beyond necessary condition of success, and it is also possible because a new situation is developing in Europe.
This axis can develop the organisation of the masses at the base, in the factories and the neighbourhoods, supporting these objectives and fighting to realise them. And the logic of these objectives is centralisation.
The logic of workers control in the factory is workers control over the economic policy of the state. The workers who take control in a factory run up against the problems of the market, credit and business practice. And the logic of their action is coordination and centralisation at the level of the industry, the region, the nation. Thus you have the emergence of an alternative workers power against that of the bourgcois state. And the confrontation seems inevitable to me.
I have no doubt that this confrontation will draw support from the internal divisions of the bourgeois state. 1 even think that the more the mass movement is organised as a powerful pole of attraction outside the state, with its own alternative project, the deeper and more important these divisions will be. But that there will be a confrontation hetween this mass movement, organising and centralising itself outside the state apparatus, backed up by representatives and allies within this apparatus, and the bulk of the bourgeois state apparatus, organising and centralising the resistance of the ruling classes — seems to me inevitable You can't finesse indefinitely in such a situation. Otherwise you have to say, like Amendola and his friends in the Italian Communist Party, that the transition to socialism is not immediately on the cards. declares that the transition to socialism is not a relevant question today, for reasons of international policy and chiefly for reasons of national policy. He says: most Italians don't want socialism. We have to get that into our heads in order to understand what can be done. We have just had thirty years of unprecedented economic expansion; the Italian people are the freest in the world, they have achieved the greatest gains over the last ten years, and so on. At bottom, most people are attached to the system, and that is why they vote for the right-wing coalition led by the Christian Democrats. They complain, but they are not ultimately prepared to go further and make the sacrifices which would be required by a revolutionary conquest of power. Consequently all talk about the transition must end, we must stop playing little games which consist in pushing people a little further than they want to go, and struggle to democratise and improve Italian society.
Now that's a line which hangs together, it's coherent. N.P.: Notice, however, that Ingrao doesn't say the same H.W.: No, he doesn't. But the politics of the Italian CP are the politics of Amendola using the language of Ingrao. Berlinguer's job is to do the translation... coherent policy which considers that for a certain period we are in a historical stalemate. I don't agree, I am ready to argue against it, but I recognise that it is not contradictory within its own terms. What irritates me is, cr... N.P.: What irritates you is what I'm saying •... H.W.: That's it! (Laughs) It's what CERES and the left of 9
That's a Well, it's a
the Italian CP say, because it is incoherent... N.P.: No, I don't think so, and I'll give you a concrete example. I think the disaster of the Portuguese Revolution occurred precisely because there was a confrontation between the Group of Nine and Otelo de Carvalho, the spokesperson of the workers", neighbourhood and soldiers" commissions. If we are to suppose that there will be a state apparatus essentially mobilised on the right, and Carvalhisttype movements of the base lined up against it, then I say: forget about it, you've lost in advance. So you have to go back to Amendola's position. Amendola's position certainly coherent, but it is reformist. Your position is very coherent, but totally unrealistic.
Because if you consider the essence of the state apparatus as it is in France, and then the forms of centralisation of popular power .... Well, it's obvious that it will be crushed before it's taken more than three jumps of a flea! You surely don't think that in the present situation they will let you centralise parallel powers to the state aiming to create a counter-power. Things would be settled before there were even the beginnings of a shadow of a suspicion of such an organisation.
So I make a contrary analysis. I think that in the present situation it is possible to undermine much more important fractions of the state apparatus; and I've given the example what interests me in this example is that, particularly in the army, there were much more important divisions than simply between the entire officer corps mobilised in the service of capital on one side and the soldiers committees mobilised alongside the workers movement on the other. structures of popular power, the Carvalhist-type movements, and the Group of Nine. And Carvalho himself recognised that the form taken by the centralisation of these popular counter-powers was in many ways responsible for the disastrous rupture which took place between this movement and the group led by Melo Antunes.
RUPTURES IN THE STATE APPARATUS
H.W.: I really think that that was a very secondary reason for this rupture. The basic reason was that Melo Antunes and the 'military social democracy", as they were called there, were engaged in the process of stabilising Portuguese capitalism. He was even one of the spearheads of the operation, the principal military ally of Mario Soares and his international supporters.
The basic reason for the split in the Armed Forces Movement had nothing to do with the SUV movement (Soldiers United Will Win"). The SUV appeared very late on in the day: after the Group of Nine, in fact, and in reality as a consequence of it. So there is a confusion of causes and effects in your example.
But that isn't the problem. I would like to see you develop your argument further. We don't scek difficulty for difficulty's sake, and the same applies to confrontation. If we were convinced that there could be a majority split in the French state apparatus in favour of the popular movement, then obviously we would be for playing that card for its full worth, even taking some risks in the course of it. But you know this state apparatus. By what miracle would it fall into the camp of the revolution? That's what I would Iike you to tell me concretely. What reasonable, even risky or daring. hypothesis can be made for a majority rupture in this state N.P.: I'll tell you. For example, let's look at the army, the police, the judiciary. Because 1 still base my perspective on the internal crisis of these apparatuses. Take the judiciary: a third of the magistrates are members of the magistrates"
that's very important. And there's a second element: the left in power, even in its own interests, will have to introduce important changes not only in the personnel but
also in the structures of the state. After twenty years of Gaullism there is so much patronage, so much institutionalisation of the Gaullists or Independent Republicans in the state. Even on the simple basis of ensuring the dominance of its own political elite, the left government will be forced to make changes in the institutional forms as well as the people In the judiciary, for instance, if they don't want to end up very quickly in an Allende-type situation, they will be forced - I repeat, even from the viewpoint of continuing the elite system — to break the power of the Council of Magistrates, to change the normal rotation of judges, etc. And then that, linked to the mass movements at the base, will allow you to weigh up the possibilities of a split. Take Admiral Sanguinetti. Just two years ago he was the head of the French Navy, and an important current of officers share his views. Read his statement in PolitiqueHebdo: he's in favour of delegates from the ranks, a defence policy independent of the US, etc. ... In other words, we're talking about an army which is prepared to respect a certain legality, which would not be plotting against the regime from the start.
My hypothesis may be wrong, but I think yours is totally unrealistic...
H.W.: Every revolutionary hypothesis seems unrealistic. N.P.: More or less, and everything depends precisely on that nuance.
H.W.: There was nothing more unrealistic than the Bolshevik hypothesis in 1917, the Maoist hypothesis in 1949, the Castroist hypothesis in 1956! To be realistic is always to be on the side of maintaining the status quo ... N.P.: Don't forget that being unrealistic has frequently led also to disasters and bloody defeats. But you can also make a more realistic hypothesis of the revolutionary possibilities, presented in a different way ...
To deal also with the problem of the police. After what has happened in the police in the last few years, we can justifiably suppose that a left government will have no alternative but to take significant measures to democratise the police...
Then, given that you have the crisis of the state, of which there are indications; given that the left is obliged - again in its own elementary interests - to initiate changes; given that it can proceed to do that because of its powers under the Constitution and the strength it derives from the mass movements at the base; given all that, I think this is the only It's all the more so because we cannot ignore the actual forces on the ground. In reality, your hypothesis is not based solely on an evaluation of the objective possibilities of a revolutionary crisis in France, Itisalso based, implicitly, on the possibility of the extremely rapid and powerful development of a revolutionary party of the Leninist type, to the left of the French Communist Party. Your whole hypothesis is based on that. It's there in black and white in Mandel's interview on revolutionary strategy in Europe.
But I don't think that this is at all likely. First, because of what I said before about the new reality of the state, the economy, the international context, etc. And then, because of the weight of the political forces of the traditional left, particularly in a country like France.
Your hypothesis implies, for instance, that the LCR' will grow from 7,000 militants to ten or twenty times that number in a few months! That's never happened anywhere! H. W.: In Portugal, and still more in Spain, we've seen something not so far off it.
N.P.: You're joking! Compared with the Communist Party, especially in Spain, these forces are insignificant. But it's not just that. If you analyse the Communist Party as a simple social democratic party, organisationally as well as politically, then you can certainly reckon on a rapid and massive 7. The LCR (Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire → Revolutionary Communist League) is the Franch section of the Fourth Intemational.
recomposition of the workers movement, as you say. But the fact is that they are not social-democratic parties. While there remains a mass Communist Party, a rapid and structured growth of the independent revolutionary left is out of the question. We saw that with the MIR in Chile. So, if we stick with your hypothesis, perhaps it is coherent and realistic, but it's fifty or sixty years ahead of its time. We must not blind ourselves to the failure of the far left (from this point of view) over the last few years in Europe. H.W.: You are right to underline that our perspective is based on the hypothesis of a profound recomposition of the workers movement. But it seems to me that you look too statically at the movement as it exists. It's a movement which has already evolved a great deal in the space of five or ten years from the point of view of its restructuring. I agree with you that the CPs are not social democratic parties, but they have entered a phase of crises and flux, differentiations, of which only the first signs are apparent Of course, if you start from a static hypothesis, by saying: that is the relation of forces for a whole historical period, then obviously you can only be right. Because the reformists are largely hegemonic, and the revolutionaries — apart from their lack of preparedness, their disunity, ete. — do not have a sufficient implantation in any case. Then only a reformist perspective has any credibility. The only hope, in these conditions, would be to act to push the reformists as far left as possible, and eventually to straighten them out. This is the perspective adopted by CERES. But as I see it, this depends on a fixed conception of the workers movement, something which is largely belied by its recent evolution in Italy as well as France, not to mention Portugal and Spain. Take the results of the far left in the French municipal clections in March 1977: they were a surprise, but a surprise
which should make us think. What does it mean when the far left wins eight or ten per cent of the vote in the most working class areas of certain cities? It is a vote of no confidence in the policies of the main left parties. The relation of forces inside the workers movement isn't just a question of parties and organisations. You must also take into account the attitudes of tens of thousands of worker militants, politically unorganised, or organised in the CP or SP, who have developed a sound distrust of the existing through a series of experiences since 1968. In the event of a victory of the Union of the Left, and the worsening of the crisis of the system, these militants and many others might well refuse to take a 'pause', and scek a socialist solution If the far left manages to link up with these militants, to present them with a serious anti-capitalist alternative, then there could be a drastic change in the relation of forces with This is all the more true since, 1 repeat, the entry of the CP and the SP into government, the implementation of the Common Programme, will bring their internal contradictions to boiling point. There is in fact no chance of achieving the transition to socialism in France if a large number of CP and SP militants are not polarised to the left and don't opt at the crucial moment for a leap forward' rather than a But for them to do that, you must precisely have a credible anti-capitalist alternative to the left of the CP. Otherwise, critical as they are, they will follow their Iradership. It is this alternative pole, based in the mass movement, equipped with a strategy and programme for a socialist solution, working to recompose the whole workers movement, that we are fighting to build
In reality, we're probably getting to the bottom of our 11
disagreement. Perhaps it's not so much to do with the need to break up the bourgeois state apparatus - including from within, through the internal rupture of its apparatuses — as with the means of achieving it. Some people think that to reach this goal it is necessary to avoid doing anything which could cement the social cohesion of the state and polarise it to the right. For them it is moderation and "responsibility" which is most likely to expose the internal contradictions. In reality, what they have in mind here is the top level of the state apparatus.
For us, on the contrary, it is the development of a vast anti-capitalist movement, its independent organisation and
— outside the state apparatuses, though also within activity
- which creates the conditions for a rupture. them
N.P.: For me, a significant movement of the far left, critical and autonomous, is essential to influence the very course of the experience of the Union of the Left. But not for the same reasons as you. Not because the far left could constitute a real alternative political and organisational pole, as you say: on the one hand, it's incapable of it, and on the other hand because I no longer think that there is a real anti-capitalist alternative outside or alongside the road of the Common Programme. There is currently no other way possible. So the
question is not of acting in such a way that the left abandons its reformist road and opts for the good and pure revolutionary road, a road for which the far left would act as a signpost. The question is to extend and deepen the road of the Common Programme and to prevent social-democratic stagnation, which is not necessarily written into it like original sin.
The far left can thus play a role not as a pole of attraction leading somewhere else but as a stimulus, a force opening up the perspectives of the Common Programme and raising its horizons. Then, because the far left is not limited to its organisational aspect (which ultimately is the least important), it can takeupa series of new problems that the united and institutional left is quite incapable of dealing with. There is a final reason why the far left is absolutely essential: as an active reminder at all times of the need for direct democracy at the base — in short, as a safeguard, let us say, against any eventual temptation by the left government to seek an authoritarian solution. In other words, a role more of criticising than of outflanking.
May 1977
12
The Soviet
Economy
Today
TOWARDS CAPITALISM OR SOCIALISM?
ERNEST MANDEL
(This article was first published in the June 1972
issue of International Socialist Review, New York) Those who are acquainted with the history of the Trotskyist
historical place in the social evolution of humanity, It is movement cannot but note with a certain amusement that
neither a capitalist nor a socialist society but a society of
transition from capitalism to socialism combining features the debates on the class nature of the Soviet Union which
of the socialist future with those of the capitalist past and developed within the Trotskyist movement thirty or forty
surroundings. Without doubt, the essential achievement of years ago are now resounding in the public arena. That
Leon Trotsky's analysis of the nature of the USSR is that of which a short time ago was considered an esoteric debate is
having formulated the fundamental question in this way. For now the object of "big power" politics. Maoists and Khrushchevist leaders hurl at one another the accusation of
a long time the exclusive possession of the Trotskyist
movement, the concept "transitional society" is beginning having 'restored capitalism', or even having established a
little by little to break into the broader currents of the left 'reactionary bloody dictatorship'.
vanguard.
Amusement should not give way to surprise. The destiny of
Two methodological questions merit clarification, howthe USSR, from its beginnings, has been intimately tied to
ever, before approaching Soviet society in this manner. that of the world socialist revolution. The ebb of the world
Marx insisted that it would have proved impossible to socialist revolution caused a historically unforeseen detour
deduce the fundamental nature of the capitalist mode of for Soviet society, a detour which the Trotskyist movement
even of the nature of commodities
production, or
alone has grasped theoretically in all of its internal dialectic.
productive labour before capitalism
Otherwise there have only been disillusioned discussions of
themselves, or of
arrived at maturity. Before the industrial revolution, in the the depth of the defeat of the revolution, or even on the more
era of manufacturing, commercial, and banking capital, it than problematical future of all socialist revolution. But the
to formulate
the laws of capitalist
was impossible
new leaps forward, the new rise of the international
aS
why minds
notably
which explains
development,
revolution create not only better material, social, and
profound as those of the Physiocrats could blithely declare political possibilities for the regeneration of the USSR, they
that only agricultural labour was productive also nourish a renaissance of Marxism, which makes the
The same thing is true for the transitional society from question of the class nature of the USSR' once again the
capitalism to socialism. Attempting to deduce the general subject of impassioned debate.
laws of evolution of this society from the Soviet example Since there were no living Marxist tendencies other than
alone, not to mention the Chinese example — that is, from Trotskyism during the years 1933-1953, the present-day
specific cases clearly lacking maturity resulting from discussion inevitably feeds off the products and by-products of the discussion among Trotskyists.
Twe methodological questions
some of the
1. For example, Paul M. Sweazy, Charlen Battaineim
oppositionist Czechoslovak communiats auch as Karel Bartosek (see
Les Temps Modernes, December 1909), etc.
Soviet society (and a fortiori the societies of Eastern
2. Kari Marx, 'Introduction a la critique de l'economie politique. in
Editions
Europe more or less patterned after it) is not a definitive
Contribution a la critique de l'economie polifique (Pariat
Sociales, pp. 149-175).
social formation having stable contours, occupying a precise
13