The election of Francois Mitterrand as President of France and the massive victory of the Socialist Party in the subsequent general election marked a historic watershed at the end of five years of electoral setbacks for Communist and Social Democratic parties throughout Western Europe. In this timely article Jacques Kergoat examines, in detail, the record of the Mitterrand-Mauroy government after its first four months of office.
Various French newspapers have recently started to ask if the new government's 'period of grace' has come to an end. The answer is probably not yet, but certainly four months after Mitterrand's election — four months during which the government has done a lot — its policies to solve the crisis, to ensure full employment and to beat inflation are met with a certain scepticism, inside the working class as well as outside.
The economic programme which the Socialists advanced prior to their arrival in office was very simple; a selective boost to public consumption to act as a catalyst to industrial investment which would slowly resolve unemployment, This dodged the very nature of the crisis: a growth in consumption could partially soak up overproduction in particular sectors like household consumer durables. But to go further and create new investment requires that the bosses are confident that the rate of profit will be restored. The policy of a selective boost in consumption is not enough to reassure them on this score.
Although they did not say so, the French Socialists probably expected a boost in the economy from the end of 1981 which, de facto, would have relegated their policies to a series of secondary measures. But, at best, there will be no growth before 1982. Thus the very poor salary increases which the government agreed in June and July, for the minimum wage and within the public sector, do not even aim to boost public consumption. Instead, the government has sought help from outside the country.
The Mitterrand government remembered that its natural partner, American imperialism, has several times in the past financed social democratic and Keynesian management of the capitalist system; for example the 1924 Dawes plan and the 1947 Marshall Plan. It was with hopes of a repeat performance that Mitterrand went to Ottawa in July. But the position of American imperialism has changed. The crisis of the international monetary system and the open economic crisis of 1974 have affected the position of the dollar. Hence the so called high interest rates policy, which aims to draw floating capital to the USA and to breathe new life into the dollar, In short American imperialism has changed from being a 'protector', ready to finance and harmonise the restructuring of capital, into a cruel and greedy competitor.
A second option existed: a very substantial devaluation of the franc would have made French products competitive on the world markets. But with the participation of the franc in the European monetary system, such a devaluation could only be carried through the agreement of the other European states. The least that can be said is that they do not look ready to agree. When Jacques Delors, the Finance Minister, proposed at the Franco-German summit in July and again in Copenhagen in August, a concerted fall in European rates, German Chancellor Schmidt made it known that, in his opinion, this was a 'utopia'. As for the 'new world order' and 'Keynesianism on a world scale', so dear to the heart of Claude Cheysson, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the present state of things, it is a subject of children's books and fairy tales. In a context where each bourgeois state and the multinationals based in each state know perfectly well how to organise beyond their own borders to pursue their own interests, and where the leading classes of the colonial countries aspire to a redistribution of world wealth, we must expect the world markets to resemble a battlefield rather than a 'new international order'.
The road to real solutions of France's economic and social problems seemed littered with obstacles. This is why the government has so quickly adopted the policies of the Rocard minority in the Socialist Party: the pursuit of cheap and quick 'qualitative reforms', Within a few months a series of measures of differing importance have been taken.
Many of them are undoubtedly progressive. However limited, they contribute to undoing the spider's web which has steadily been woven by the strong state to restrict civil rights. The amnesty law has been very generous — 6212 prisoners were released — but it has also been extended to include sanctions taken against trade union representatives, even in the private sector. The 'Cour de Sureté de L'Etat', a court totally controlled by whoever is in government, has been abolished. No political refugees have been extradited. The expulsion of immigrant workers has been suspended and the renewal of work permits simplified. Union rights have been steadily enlarged.
The Larzac will not be transferred to the Army but will remain in the hands of the peasants. A certain measure of devolution has been introduced as a 'concession' to movements of national minorities, And it is likely that in the near future, there will be other reforms removing repressive restrictions in the armed forces, On immigrant workers and on broader democratic rights.
All these are good measures. However, while they may have kept the press busy during the summer, when they are examined with a critical eye they are at best very limited and at worst, fraudulent.
The most limited reform pertains to immigrant workers, While the government has stopped expulsions, it has also reaffirmed its intention to halt immigration. The 9 August circular from Gaston Defferre, Minsiter of Home Affairs, advocates 'not allowing entry on French soil of foreigners who use the benefits of a short stay to seck a job.' Furthermore, the government has already gone back on one of Mitterrand's promises: to give immigrants the right to vote in local council elections. While Cheysson considered it good policy to repeat this promise when he went to Algiers to court the Algerian government he was immediately contradicted by the government in France who declared that this measure would not be applied in 1983 and as the next local council elections will not take place until 1989...
The law on decentralisation must be labelled a pretence. It is not the result of any titanic struggle between 'decentralisers' and 'Jacobins'. What is more, it contains very little progress on democratic rights and remains confused on a range of issues. The method of election of the regional councils it proposes is unclear; the division of power between the departments (the French equivalent of counties) and the regions remains vague; the problem of the distribution of resources is not dealt with....
It is easy to understand why almost all the 'national' movements have kept their distance from this project. Nothing or almost nothing responds to their aspirations. As Rocard has clearly explained the central objective is to encourage private investment. The aim is not to reverse the tendency towards unequal regional development but to allow the regional councils to provide capital in the name of regional development as a means of lending funds to private firms. Furthermore the new regional authorities will provide a "buffer" between the government and [illegible] regional [illegible]. [illegible] other fields that [illegible] reversals of electoral promises can be seen. For example — abortion. The government has announced three decrees: abortion will be reimbursed via the national insurance scheme; every hospital will have to perform abortions; and the required period of residence for foreign women prior to having an abortion will be reduced. But these were not the only points in the Socialist Party programme, That document proposed that the period within which an abortion could be performed would be increased from 10 to 16 weeks; that parental consent would be abolished for minors; and that get-out clauses for doctors related to conscience would be tightened. None of these are mentioned today.
The same applies to nuclear energy. The government has stopped the construction of the Plogoff site which had become an international symbol of popular opposition to nuclear energy. But in the Socialist Party programme it was stated that 12 nuclear sites would be 'suspended' and Mitterrand repeated these promises to ensure that he won the ecology vote in the second round of the Presidential elections, To date, only five have actually been stopped and it can be safely assumed that after the debate announced for October work will recommence. With the expansion of the reprocessing plant at La Hague and the opening of the fast-breeder reactor at Malville the Socialist Party seems set to complete the nuclear programme begun by Pompidou.
Even more spectacular is the attitude of the French government to the pillars of bourgeois order — the police and the army. The Independent Federation of Police Unions, which includes 75 per cent of the police, asked for the removal of several police officials and notably the 'ten key figures in the top hierarchy', Defferre replied: 'The unions have asked for heads. I refuse to chop any.'
As for the army, the Socialist Minister of Defence, Charles Hernu, began his term in office by stating that Mitterrand's promise to reduce military service to six months could not be implemented. He went on to say that he would 'try and ensure that the soldiers' committees (democratic organisations of rank and file soldiers) are dissolved.' Information inside the barracks is still censored — nine papers, including the French Trotskyist weekly, Rouge, are forbidden, Finally the government has carefully avoided intervening against the bosses' private police.
With the summer over, the government is now faced with a worsening economic and social situation. Prices have risen considerably, some as a direct consequence of government decisions: 14 per cent on Parisian transport; 10 per cent on the railways; 17 per cent on electricity; and 15 per cent on gas before the government announcement of a limited prize freeze in September faced with the threat of inflation passing 15 per cent by the end of the year compared to 13.6 per cent in 1980.
In July there were 1,849,000 unemployed. The present rate of increase of unemployment is 26 per cent per annum as compared to 20 per cent in the last months of Giscard. By the end of the year unemployment will top 2 million. No serious policy has been applied to deal with unemployment and once again electoral promises have been forgotten. Mitterrand has promised the creation of 210,000 new jobs per year, of which 150,000 would be in the public sector. But in 1982 the latter figure has already been reduced to 65,000, At least the government could have forbidden lay offs and closures. In fact since 10 May redundancies, liquidations and closures have occurred in quick succession. Mitterrand's '110 proposals' promised the right of velo to factory committees on issues of 'employment, redundancy, work organisation, education schemes, and new technology'. But on 6 September Mauroy declared: 'The government does not intend to question the right of the owners to make decisions. There is no question of instituting a right of veto over redundancies.'
The government invited the unions and owners to negotiate. The result was an agreement on 17 July in which the reduction of the working week by one hour to 39 hours was accompanied by a whole series of question marks against previous gains of [illegible] in the working class. It is clear that unless the workers intensify their pressure on the government there will be no advance on this agreement.
The Socialist programme included the nationalisation of nine industrial groups, steel, nuclear armaments, space technology, banks and insurance. The government has adopted a nationalisation bill dealing with only five groups and then only the parent companies. The economic experts of the Socialist Party write: 'The bank and finance sector is probably the only one in which it is not possible to allow any private industry' and even here 136 foreign and 35 regional banks escape nationalisation. The business interests of the banks will be ceded to the private sector. Mauroy continually repeats that compensation will be fair. This news has been so well received that industrial and financial groups are purchasing large amounts of shares in potentially nationalisable firms. For example between 20 and 27 August share values in PUK rose by 12.8 per cent and by 38 per cent in CGE.
In this context it should come as no surprise to find that the government's foreign policy remains largely dependent on the American alliance. The Franco-Mexican declaration on El Salvador which recognised the FMLN and FDR liberation organisations as 'political and representative forces' must not blind us. Far from representing a first step on the path of an authentic anti-imperialist policy it is firmly anchored in the constant preoccupation of the Socialist Party and the Socialist International lest the inflexibility of Reaganism should lead to a mass radicalisation and the extension of the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions.
In all other respects we see France's foreign policy more and more aligned with Washington. Felipe Gonzalez, the Spanish Social Democrat, declared that: 'French foreign policy as regards East-West relations is harder than that of West Germany and closer to that of Reagan.' The Americans confirm this. France may now use more diplomacy and less military interventions, especially in Africa, but deep down little has changed. On 21 August Jean-Pierre Cot stated: 'France will maintain its troops on the territory of its African allies until they are capable of ensuring their own security'. Did the government give a green light to the intervention of Senegal in Gambia? Did it back General Kolingba's removal of David Dacko in the Central African Republic? There are 1200 French soldiers in Central Africa equiped with anti-tank weapons and heavy mortars. And like the other 12,000 French soldiers in Africa they are there to represent French 'African diplomacy' which, as before, mostly consists of creating and destroying governments. France remains an imperialist and colonial power. The government persists in regarding the French East and West Indies as Overseas Provinces and no steps have been taken in the direction of democratisation. French troops are still stationed there ready to break strikes while the media and press remain in the hands of the worst reactionaries.
So far neither its pro-American foreign policy nor 'gifts' in the class struggle have been enough to change the attitude of the ruling class to the government; investment will decline 12 per cent this year and 4 per cent next. The bourgeoisie does not consider the Mauroy government as its own nor as one it could use for its own benefit, It is a government born in the defeat of the bourgeois coalition and a victory of the workers' parties, Its origins mean that it will have to make some concessions to the workers. This is not what the ruling class wanted in its attempt to restructure the economy. Its own project is clear: to make the working class pay for the crisis by increasing unemployment, lowering the standard of living of the masses and to reconstruct a more competitive economy at their expense, To do that a decisive defeat has to be inflicted on the working class. Obviously the Mauroy government is not a good instrument for this sort of venture.
A premature confrontation with the government, however, would be fatal for the ruling class: it is not a question of paralysing the government but rather of making life difficult. Rather than a test of strength the bourgeoisie is trying to show how the government is incompetent.
As far as the unions are concerned there has seemed to be a competition between them as to who could applaud loudest in the face of successive government capitulations, The CFDT (originally a Catholic union and now generally aligned with the Socialist Party) seemed to have seized the advantage by signing the agrement for the 39 hour week. Since then the CGT (the union dominated by the Communist Party) has made up lost ground and in the background of general praise for the Mauroy government it is difficult to see any differences between the unions.
In this context it is easy to understand the lack of new recruits. The rank and file are not happy. In the CPFDT, many branches disapprove of the 39-hour week agreement, while in Force Ouvriere (a right-wing, class-collaborationist union) many branches have voiced their opposition to the national position against inclusion of Communists in the government.
Government policies have also provoked a response within the mass working class parties. The Communist Party leadership, never one to do things by half, having been given four minor ministries in the government, now supports the party's complete integration within governmental structures. On 26 August Communist journalists received an internal memo stating that Socialist Party policies must be considered as 'globally positive', that it has now become a question of 'enriching government policy' and that they must abandon 'the tone of the past, that of an opposition party'. Obviously these about-faces can make the membership sea-sick especially when it was only recently that they were being told that the Socialist Party Programme was 'globally negative' and that 'Mitterrand would perhaps be worse than Giscard.'
The Socialists themselves have not been spared the consequences of the Mauroy government. The party's strengths lie in its tens of thosuands of new members and its large number of new deputies but they also represent its fragility. The new members want change. The young deputies feel a responsibility to their electorate for the promsies that were made during the electoral campaign, More and more often Mitterrand is being forced to use the authority given him by the bonapartist institutions of the Fifth Republic both to smooth over the difficulties arising from the differing opinions of various Socialist ministers and to avoid the spontaneous amendments being put forward by the young Socialist deputies.
The major problem facing the Socialist Party is the relationship between the party and the government, If the party became a simple transmission belt for government decisions it could lose its fundamental identity as a mass workers' party, But many Ministers are fearful of the 'subversive idea' that the party might determine governmental decisions. The Socialist leaders have attempted to set up commissions to harmonise the trio: party, parliament and government. The leaders of the party are all ministers and they never lose an opportunity to explain to their troops the necessity of solidarity with the government. Party conferences are normally presented with a range of counterposed resolutions representing the positions of the various long-standing political currents/tendencies within the party, This year the leaders of all currents have agreed to the production of one common text for the forthcoming congress in Valence with the aim of limiting the scope of discussion, The rank and file, who are unlikely to get the chance to speak at the congress, do not share these views.
For the most part the workers believe in the Mauroy government which they elected. They see the government as an ally against the bosses and obviously demand much more from this government than they ever did from Giscard. As a consequence the traditional forms of militancy have been put in abeyance. Apart from an increase in membership of the Socialist Party there have not been any major shifts or movements within the working class. But the level of class consciousness remains quite high and it would be wrong to say that the class is passive — they are just waiting.
The workers still believe in the government — even more so since the Unions keep repeating that 'the inheritance is heavy' and that they must 'wait'. Examining the most recent opinion polls it is clear that working class confidence is slightly shaken. There has been a 6-12 per cent fall in the popularity of the government but this has not been accompanied by a similar rise in the support for the bourgeois leaders. In all, 94 per cent of respondents were in favour of attacks on large personal fortunes 74 per cent were for price controls. 2] per cent felt that the government was going too far; but 33 per cent considered it did not go far enough, It is clear that Mauroy would not lack public support if his government took more radical measures.
This is an abridged translation of an article which first appeared in the French edition of Inprecor/Intercontinental Press. No. 109, 28 September 1981.