The Israeli invasion of the Lebanon and the subsequent spate of 'political' solutions to solve the Palestinian 'problem' have brought the Middle East back into the centre of world attention. Ros Kaplan and Pam Singer argue that this tragic defeat for the Palestinian liberation movement and the victory of Israel will have lasting consequences throughout the Arab East.
No one should underestimate the terrible devastation wrought by the Israelis on the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples in the last three months. Thousands of lives have been lost, tens of thousands of refugees created and a major Arab city all but destroyed. These facts as well as the obvious use of the invasion as a practice ground for the latest Israeli/US cluster and phosphor bombs highlights the politics and aims of the Zionist Israeli state and its alliances with imperialism. The war is far from over. A fascist government is being set up in Lebanon; the Reagan settlement plan and the subsequent proposals from the Arab leaders and the PLO at the Fez Summit as the basis for discussion with imperialism on the future of the Occupied Territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip), leading to some form of autonomy for the Palestinians, all heralds a new era for the Palestinian liberation movement and indeed the political map of the Middle East.
The aims of the invasion
On 6 June the Israeli army crossed the Lebanese border watched by the UN 'peace-keeping' forces. Sweeping through the south they destroyed villages, Palestinian camps and the coastal cities of Tyre and Sidon. The massacre continued with the seige of Beirut backed up by air and sea bombardment and the advantage of superior military hardware to that of the Palestinians, the Lebanese Left and the Moslem groups. Despite their military inferiority, the Palestinian and Lebanese people fought back heroically amid the deafening silence in the Arab world and the faint protests in the international labour movement, in the longest war Israel has had to fight.
The Israeli Zionist government stated the aims of the invasion clearly: to destroy the PLO, its leadership, armed units and infrastructure, to rid Lebanon of this 'terrorist force' and to make Israel's northern border safe from guerrilla attacks. Hence the name 'Operation Peace for Galilee'. But why was the presence of the PLO in Lebanon so threatening? And why attack now?
After the Israeli bombings of Beirut in July 1981, the US imposed a ceasefire agreement between Israel and the PLO. For the first time in the history of the PLO, chairperson Yasser Arafat, leader of the largest faction Fatah, was able to unite the numerous opposing political factions which make up the liberation movement into keeping this ceasefire. The PLO began to be seen as a serious political force, a legitimate negotiator with the US and the West on the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These areas had been under Israeli military occupation since the 1967 June War, (and civil administration since November 1981) which brought under Israeli rule the remaining areas of pre-1948 Palestine. For 15 years the Palestinians in these areas have led a long and bitter struggle against the Zionist occupation, the majority openly stating that the PLO is the 'sole legitimate representative' of the Palestinian people.
They refused to knuckle under to the intimidation and violence of the collaborators in the Israeli sponsored 'village leagues' — an Israeli alternative to the local pro-PLO leaders.
The failure of the 'village leagues', together with the most militant uprising yet of the local Palestinian population which gathered strength from December 1981 to this spring, alongside the general strike of the Syrian Druze Arabs in the Golan Heights, prompted the Israelis to take drastic measures. In the thinking of the Zionist leaders, if the PLO could be destroyed in their base in Lebanon, then Palestinian resistance in the Occupied Territories would be demoralised and leaderless (for the Israelis attribute every strike, demonstration and stone thrown by a five year-old to the directions of the PLO), thereby paving the way for total defeat of the struggle.
The invasion was also motivated by plans for the future of Lebanon itself. Expulsion of the Palestinians would leave the Lebanese left, the National Movement and the Muslim population in a position of weakness. The setting up of a Maronite Christian government, financed by Israel and friendly to the West, under the new President Bashir Gemayel, signifies the Israelis' success. One need only recall that Gemayel commands a 30,000 strong right-wing Christian militia. This puts the renewal of the civil war of 1976 on the agenda — only this time with a balance of forces overwhelmingly in favour of reaction, following the removal of the PLO armed forces from West Beirut. This is the scale of the Israeli victory.
'The Big Thing'
The elimination of the PLO and the securing of a puppet state in Lebanon were Israel's immediate objectives. But it is important to see certain longer term aims in this operation, aims which relate directly to the Zionist enterprise. Zionism is the ruling ideology and policy of the state of Israel. The Zionist movement arose in the 19th century as a nationalist and essentially colonialist movement which sought to build an independent exclusive Jewish state. It achieved this with the help of imperialism in Palestine in 1948, at the expense of the indigenous Arab population, the majority of whom were to be expelled or eliminated. Marxists have explained that terrible though Jewish oppression has been — especially under the Nazis — nevertheless acceptance of anti-semitism as unique and inevitable, and therefore the building of an exclusive Jewish state, would provide no solution. Rather it would prove a trap for the Jewish people and do nothing to counter anti-semitism, which is a product of specific economic, historical and social circumstances. The Zionist movement never put any boundaries on what 'should' constitute Eretz Israel (Greater Israel) and has since the 1950s looked towards southern Lebanon (geographically a continuation of the Galilee) for future territorial aggrandisement. The notion of 'secure borders free from terrorists' is merely a mask to hide this. It should be noted that already Arab workers from the southern Lebanon are being brought into Israel as cheap labour. Further, control of the Litani river will give Israel the water supplies it desperately needs.
Beyond the expansion into southern Lebanon, Israel has other plans, referred to and debated publicly in the Israeli press, as 'the Big Thing'. This plan involves the expansion of Israel towards some form of domination of all countries of the Arab East (namely Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq) along with the expulsion of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories (currently nearly 1½ million people) into Jordan and the official annexation of their land by Israel. General Sharon is the main proponent for this plan, and the Israelis' ability to do this should not be underestimated. It has been made a great deal easier with the elimination of Syria's missile bases in Lebanon and the lack of international opposition to the war in Lebanon.
Imperialism and The Middle East
The timing and the ferocity of the assault are not due to the obscenely bloodthirsty nature of the Begin/Sharon team but a logical extension of Zionist expansionist policies in the area. In fact, the Israelis had been preparing this for some time. The 1978 bombings of Lebanon (Operation Litani) — where they installed and financed their stooge in the south, Major Haddad and his right wing militia, proclaiming a 'free Lebanon' (Haddad land) ie free from the PLO — the 1981 bombings of the Iraqi reactor and Beirut, the annexation of the Golan, the setting up of the Milson civil administration in the Occupied Territories all helped set the stage. And just as Israel annexed the Golan the day after martial law was imposed in Poland, it struck Lebanon when imperialism was preoccupied in the South Atlantic.
But Israel did not simply sneak up on imperialism when its eyes were averted. It has been testing the response (and the patience!) of its chief backer, the United States since the 1973 war, and has been able to get away with behaviour that is clearly unpalatable to the US. This is not because the US is timelessly and blindly behind Israel. US-Israeli relations are more complex and contradictory. To understand this, we must examine Israel's strategic role for US imperialism. Although Israel has always had a pro-Western orientation, it was not until its stunning victory in the Six Day War (1967) that it was able to secure a privileged relationship with the United States. The defeat of Syria, Egypt and Jordan dealt a blow to Arab nationalism and its Soviet backers that transformed the balance of forces in the region. Israel proved its ability to serve the US as a reliable, stable military ally. This marked a distinct turn in US policy towards giving Israel unequivocal military as well as political support. There was a dramatic increase in military sales to Israel (before 1967, France was Israel's major supplier of weapons). And in the early 1970s, the US provided Israel with the technical expertise to produce advanced weaponry, which has since found its way to South Africa, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala and other right wing or fascist regimes round the world. So it comes as no surprise that they support the fascist camp in Lebanon.
But 1967 also saw another development in the Middle East which produced problems for the US — the emergence of the oil-rich Gulf states as a major influence in the Arab camp, and as potentially important US allies. So in the 1970s, and particularly after the 1973 war, the US tried to build alliances with conservative Arab regimes, and to balance it against support for Israel and its other key ally, the Shah of Iran. Carter even extended this 'even-handedness' to raising the question of the Palestinians, who were enjoying a certain international prominence after Arafat's dramatic visit to the UN in 1974. Indeed, in the mid-70s, it looked as if resolving the Palestinian refugee problem was key to imperialism securing its interests in the Arab East. It looked as if the PLO was a force to be reckoned with in negotiations on the future of the Occupied Territories. But two events occurred which overshadowed the Palestinian question in the eyes of imperialism. The first was Sadat's declared intention to visit Jerusalem with a separate peace in mind. The prospect of the most powerful Arab army climbing down in return for a direct line to Uncle Sam made Carter drop the Palestinian issue except in very distant, vague terms, in order to accommodate Sadat's concerns. The terms of the Camp David agreement in 1978 saw the Sinai withdrawal as first priority, and the problem of Palestinian autonomy was deliberately shelved although only temporarily. The second was much more crucial to the political contours of the Middle East: the fall of the Shah of Iran. The revolution in Iran in 1979 that demolished the most powerful and important pro-Western power in the Gulf caught everyone, even the US, off guard. It exposed clearly the vulnerability of these regimes, and the risks for imperialism. The US, with no other consolidated allies, was desperate to find a short term resolution to the instability of the region. The fall of the Shah put a premium on surviving, reliable local allies. The renewal of the Cold War meant that for the US, the Middle East was to be turned into a fortified bastion against 'Soviet expansionism' through the mechanism of the 'Rapid Deployment Force' — US direct military intervention via friendly bases in the Middle East. As long as Israel plays this key role, it has a certain room to manoeuvre. It can be as outrageous as it likes as long as it doesn't upset US moves towards Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the most likely new allies to be cultivated.
So while Begin and Sharon may have taken some risky gambles in Lebanon, they were able to assess correctly that the US was not yet in a position to ditch Israel. Unfortunately for Israel, the paradox is glaringly obvious. While Israel may be the most obvious short-term military solution for the US, it is also one of its most serious political problems. It is potentially the biggest obstacle to the United States consolidating relations with conservative Arab states — through its intransigence over negotiating with the PLO and its long term war with the Palestinian and Arab peoples. Although it is still too early to tell, it is just possible that with 'Operation Peace for Galilee', Israel has gone too far. The replacement of Secretary of State Alexander Haig, always lauded in pro-Israeli circles, with George Schultz, who has a more pro-Arab bias (not to mention huge interests in Saudi Arabia!) was the first indication of a significant shift in US policy on Israel. But this will partially depend on how the present crisis is resolved.
What Begin refuses to believe, is that imperialism can and will dispose of any ally that becomes more or a hindrance than a help. However, in the short term the US will continue to back Israel to the hilt.
The USSR and the Arab regimes
Israel also chose to invade Lebanon when Soviet influence in the Middle East was at its lowest point for 25 years, and Arab disarray at its highest.
While the Soviet News Agency TASS had the temerity to chide the Arab nations for not coming to the aid of the Palestinians, the USSR's strongest language against imperialism was expressed when it looked as if its embassy might be damaged by bombing. While major groupings within the PLO might be horrified at the lack of Soviet aid, and the pathetic showing of the USSR's only official ally, Syria, one only has to examine where the Palestinians fit into Soviet priorities to understand the nature of their 'commitment'.
The USSR's main concern is that there not be all-out confrontation with imperialism where it might be forced to intervene. Indeed, with its hands military and politically tied in Afghanistan, it is not in a strong position to play much of a role in the Middle East. In line with this, it keeps a tight rein on its Syrian ally not to provoke such a confrontation. Moscow is fearful for the shaky Assad regime, and cannot afford to lose its only official ally in the region.
Soviet involvement in the Middle East has always been purely tactical. It has never particularly given any principled backing to the Palestinian cause. (We mustn't forget that in the 1948 Zionist War of Attrition in Palestine, the Zionist army fought the British with Czech arms!) With its immediate support for the 1947 UN Declaration splitting Palestine into two states (one Jewish, one Arab), it effectively cut itself off from having much influence in the Arab world. It was not until Nasser decided to purchase Czech arms that the Soviet Union gained any foothold in the Middle East. And it was not until Egypt began placing the Palestinian question at the centre of its conflict with Israel that the Soviet Union became interested in the issue.
When Egypt expelled the Soviet presence in 1972, the USSR began direct arms supplies to the PLO as its unofficial allies. Even so, the Soviet attitude consists of reactions and counter-manoeuvres provoked by whatever the US happens to be doing in the region. For example, it was not until the US secured Camp David, that the USSR decided to proclaim the PLO as the 'sole legitimate representative' of the Palestinian people. The position of the Soviet Union is clearly for a negotiated settlement (ie negotiated sell-out) of the Palestinian national question. It has nothing to do with the promotion of a class struggle, or self-determination for the Palestinian people.
What some may have found even more surprising than the Soviet silence was the feebleness of the protests of the Arab regimes, 'conservative' and 'progressive' alike, who could not even muster impressive rhetoric against the Israeli invasion.
All the Arab states have their own problems. There is growing instability in Syria, with anti-regime feeling and uprisings that may extend beyond the Muslim Brotherhood. Iraq, already unstable, is now being attacked by a determined Iran, in a war whose consequences may be just as great for the region as the present one in Lebanon. Saudi Arabia, although rich, has never been politically or military strong. Its call for a one day general strike in solidarity with the uprisings on the West Bank came and went, and its attempt to get even minimal recognition for the eight-point Fahd plan has not met any success (although this should not be completely ruled out).
It is not simply their own internal weakness, or even their petty rivalries, that prevent these regimes from coming to the aid of the Palestinians. It is because of the degree to which the Palestinian question is a destablising factor and a radicalising influence, therefore a direct threat to their own positions, that they do not seriously aid the struggle. When it comes down to it, Hussein's throne is more important to him than the 4½ million Palestinians scattered around the Middle East (including the 1 million in his kingdom). The immobility of the Arab regimes in the past three months is the latest in a long series of betrayals of the Palestinian revolution.
But even more sickening is what has just occured at the 1982 Fez Summit. After years of confusion, after shamelessly allowing the PLO defeat in Lebanon, the Arab leaders have finally united on the corpses of the Palestinian and Lebanese people to cheer Reagan's proposal that they recognise the Israeli state and to revive the old theme of an autonomous 'capitalist' mini-state in the West Bank.
This should dispel any illusions of the existence now of progressive pan-Arab nationalism. Their rapprochement with imperialism could signify growing co-operation between the Arab regimes (including Egypt) and consolidation of the Arab bourgoisies.
The PLO
After the shock of the Israeli victory in 1967, a new radical, Palestinian movement arose. Its mass base was the refugee camps, its theoreticians were intellectuals living throughout the Palestinian dispersion. It is in no way surprising that the leadership of this movement was overwhelmingly petty bourgeois and nationalist. Its tactics, elevated to a strategy, were commando/guerrilla actions — the military struggle against Israel assumed dominance.
The PLO organised masses, exclusively refugees, into an army. This army was unique in the Arab East in that it was a non-denominational army, based on a national struggle. But while it organised military activity it did not, for example, see its role as organising collective protests such as strikes, occupations, or even particularly demonstrations. It has put a very low priority on organising the activities of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories or those inside the 1948 borders, who play a significant role in the Israeli economy and who have suffered direct Israeli oppression for years.
Although parts of the Palestinian movement (the main groups being the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, PFLP and the Democratic Popular Front, DPFLP) realised the class nature of the struggle and the need to link up with the Arab masses against their own rulers, the bulk of the movement did not. Fatah, the largest group, assured the Arab world that it would not interfere in the 'internal affairs' of the host countries. Most Palestinians, conditioned by a nationalist outlook, looked to the Arab countries to support them, and did not develop any concept of helping their own struggle through helping the general Arab revolution. In Lebanon, for example, where they initially had tremendous support among Moslem workers and peasants, they lost a lot by failing to develop a programme to unite Lebanese workers and peasants with their cause. Ultimately, they had nothing to say other than 'support our cause', which, if you're a Lebanese peasant, eventually runs out of steam.
This direction of non-interference in the class struggle in host countries has not saved the movement from repression throughout the Middle East and expulsion by Hussein in Jordan 1970 (Black September) when its base was forced to move to Syria and then to Lebanon.
However, it is well to remember that ideologies have a material base; that it is practically difficult to exist without a homeland or single secure base and to accept no patronage from any non-socialist state, or to resist making compromises to obtain the aid needed to carry on the liberation struggle. In Lebanon, the PLO after liberating the camps from the control and repression of the Lebanese right wing government in the early 1970s, built up an enormous organisation of armed units, a professional army, a bureaucracy — a state within a state developed, with the PLO running Palestinian hospitals, schools, training centres, social security, etc. In this way it never constituted itself as a guerrilla movement proper and neither was it a movement indigenous to Lebanon.
In the mid-70s, the moderate PLO decided to convince imperialism that it was a sufficiently respectable force to negotiate with. Its new strategy aimed to gain diplomatic recognition and international support, and to secure a mini-state on the West Bank — as opposed to the rejectionist current which refused any negotiated settlement for part of Palestine but wanted to continue the guerrilla struggle for the liberation of the whole of pre-1948 Palestine. To a degree Arafat and the moderate wing were able to make a name for themselves in the international diplomatic community, particularly with the EEC countries.
But this strategy is obviously fragile, as diplomatic recognition is in the eyes of the beholder. It lasts as long as the exigencies of imperialism sees fit, it plays the Palestinian card; when other things are at stake, it drops it. Because imperialism is not the ally of the Palestinians; the workers and peasants of the Middle East are, and that is whom the PLO should appeal to.
Clearly, whatever criticisms we may have of the PLO's practice or strategy, we give it unconditional support in its struggle against Zionism. It is also important to remember that the PLO has never been a homogenous organisation. It spans many political positions and strategies. As yet, no current has emerged which could provide revolutionary socialist leadership needed to tackle the complex problems of the Middle East. But it is unlikely that the present crisis could pass without reviving the debate between the dominant Fatah wing and the current that has always rejected acceptance of a negotiated settlement for a mini-state. Although the different groupings within the PLO have recently been united and disciplined, the political differences remain. We can expect that important debates are going on, which may prove positive.
The final solution?
Whatever the final outcome, Israel does not emerge totally unscathed. It has done serious damage to an already tarnished reputation. It has effectively committed itself to prolonged military occupation in the south of Lebanon, yet another strain on the over-stretched, ailing economy. It has conducted this war without the consensus of the Jewish population who, for the first time in its short history, are organising against war in war time.
But above all, each partial Israeli victory, while creating a new refugee problem, does not destroy the Palestinian nation. Short of complete genocide no number of victorious battles can secure that for the Israelis. And this is increasingly apparent to the Israeli Jewish population, a large minority of whom now recognise that the 'problem' is not defence of Israel from warlike Arab states but the creation of a state for the Palestinians.
What next for the Palestinians?
We have reached the end of a period where the PLO constituted a large-scale fighting force with any independence of action from the Arab states. This is not a sudden degeneration, but the defeat of a political strategy — a defeat that became obvious as early as 1970. But even if the PLO is rendered ineffective, or transformed back into its pre-67 existence as a puppet organisation of this or that Arab regime, this does not solve the Palestinian 'problem'.
In many ways, the war in Lebanon has been fought, and won, by Israel on a false premise: that to solve the problems of the West Bank and Gaza Strip it is necessary to defeat the PLO in Beirut. In fact the centre of gravity of the Palestinian struggle will now shift to where it is much more of a threat to Zionism, to within the present borders of Israel where there now lives nearly half the Palestinian people and by far the largest single concentration.
The contradiction of Zionism is that it increasingly depends on this population which by the logic of Israel's permanent expansion has more and more become an Arab proletariat, a foundation-stone of the Zionist economy. The future of the Palestinian revolution and the PLO depends on the struggle of these people.
And what of the future for the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian and Lebanese people now made refugees in Lebanon. The PLO's expulsion from West Beirut is a tragic blow for them. The majority of the Palestinian community remains there to face a possible future onslaught by the new fascist regime and occupation in part of the country by the Zionist army.
Finally, it is no coincidence that the PLO's withdrawal from Beirut was followed by the Reagan letter. The cynical proposals in the settlement for the future of the Palestinians, Reagan's facade of 'peace-keeper' while backing Israel's genocidal campaign [illegible] hypocritical intentions of the US. The proposals for some form of Palestinian autonomy in the Occupied Territories in association with Jordan, a freeze on Israeli settlement-building and no Israeli annexations of the area, in return for Arab recognition of the state of Israel and guarantees for its security, is no solution for the self-determination of the Palestinians. Its main purpose is to secure the long term existence of Israel as imperialism's police force and to persuade the Arab states and the PLO that this deal is better than nothing from the ruins of Beirut, while at the same time appearing friendly to the Arab states. The PLO may decide to opt for an autonomous mini-state. The Reagan plan was certainly greeted with enthusiasm by the Arab leaders at the Fez Summit. Their own proposals, although differing in detail, agree with the basic premise of a West Bank state.
Such a state will not give the Palestinians independence, will not be the basis for a just peace. Rather its aim is to disarm the potentially revolutionary struggle to liberate Palestine; the mini-state will be squashed between Israel and Jordan, dependent on Israel economically (as the West Bank is today), and will become Israel's 'bantustan' under the military eye of the Zionists.
We should remember that the national liberation struggle of the Palestinian refugees has been the revolutionary heart of the permanent revolution in the Arab East. But this must be part of an unfolding process in the region, not an end in itself — for what does it mean to speak solely in nationalist terms in a region where existing 'nations' were the creation of imperialism? The Palestinians must look to the workers and peasants in the rest of the Middle East for a united revolutionary struggle against not only Zionism and imperialism, but their reactionary Arab leaders.
ROS KAPLAN & PAM SINGER are members of the Socialist Challenge Middle East group, who collaborated in production of this article, written in the first week of September.