NOTTINGHAM 25637
THE WEEK — March 17, 1965
HIS book by George Ross, who studied under Ralph Miliband, appears at a most opportune moment. It is a deep and thorough study of the nationalisation of steel by the 1945-51 Labour Government. The first nationalisation proposal occurred in 1934, when the T.U.C. proposed the ‘socialisation’ of the steel industry. Ross explains “.. . the T.U.C. proposed few daring experiments in worker-management relations, few steps in the direction of industrial democracy. Workers in the industry were to be given increased control over their own working conditions and some role in the appointment of the new boards, but nothing more spectacular was envisaged.” Not much more was heard of these plans until the 1944 revolt of the rank and file forced the Labour Party leadership to specify prospective nationalisations. A bitter struggle had to be waged before Morrison and Greenwood agreed to make any reference to iron and steel. There was no rush made by the new Labour Government to nationalise steel. Even although given an overwhelming mandate by the electarate, the gradualness of the encroachment on this particular bastion of capitalism was nearly imperceptible. Wilmot presented his first plans to a Cabinet sub-committee in March, 1946. Morrison opposed the report on the grounds that it would disrupt iron and steel production. In spite of this opposition, in April the plans were formally accepted and a Dr. H. J. van der Bijl of South Africa was brought over to explain how the South African nationalised industry worked and to “convince the British Industry that nationalisation was not such a bad thing after all, that it might bring positive advantages, and that, therefore, participation in the Iron and Steel Board to help plan for nationalisation would be a wise move.”
BOOKS
The British Iron and Steel Federation agreed to help on the Board and in fact took many of the leading positions on the Board. Owing to the lack of any firm Ministerial initiative, during the Winter of 1946-47 very little progress was made, but in April, 1947, plans were presented to the Cabinet and it was assumed that steel would be taken in the 1947-48 session of Parliament. Also in the Spring of 1947, Sir Andrew Duncan, chairman of the BISF, contacted Attlee with a compromise that would keep the Labour back benchers quiet without upsetting the status quo. The “compromise” included giving the Iron and Steel Board wider power in directing industry. and in suggesting the nationalisation of any particularly recalcitrant firms. Only strong pressure from the left led to the “compromise” being rejected, but the waste in time involved meant that the Steel Bill could only be tackled in the 1948-49 Parliamentary session. It was not until November, 1948, that the Steel Bill had its second reading. It turned out to be a modest affair: names, administrative structures, and personnel, including boards of directors, were to be preserved through the transfer of ownership. The Tories launched an immediate attack on the Bill and tabled no fewer than 480 amendments. The prospect of the 1950 election strengthened the resolve of Labour’s right wing to go carefully. It was only in the Spring of 1950 when the Minister of Supply was asked to prepare names for the board of the nationalised Corporation, The Minister approached the BISF for a list of suitably qualified people from whom he could pick members of the Corporation. He was refused! The steelmasters were fighting back and gave their reasons as being that the Government had not attained a “clear majority” at the polls. One
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