BOUT Africa one hears it said a good deal these days well, doesn’t one? — that “after all they’re making a pretty fearful mess of their own affairs . . .” With the implication, consciously colonialist or not, that “they” don’t really know how to manage those affairs. “I mean, look at the Congo... .” Let’s look at the Congo. No space to examine the past. Briefly, though, this can be reliably summarised in a few basic propositions and conclusions: 1. Until the tail end of 1958 the Congolese had no . freedom to organise. Until 1960 such freedom as they gained was a very narrow one. Results: the Congolese had about six months to build national parties from nothing. On independence day, these were many and muddled. Even the best were unstructured movements rather than organised parties. 2. After independence, July 1960, the Belgians went on interfering. Soon they were joined by the Americans. This Belgo-American influence became paramount in September 1960. Results: Lumumba, more and more neutralist in reaction against foreign intrigue, was ousted (and later murdered in Katanga). Movements continued to fail to become parties, began failing even to be movements. A handful of careerists reached the top in Leopoldville. 3. From about Oct., 1960, until now the official politics of the Congo, still under powerful Belgo-American manipulation, consist of mere struggles for power between these opportunists. Results: no nationallybased government has emerged. On the contrary, under the fissiparous strains of a new constitution breaking down the Congo into 21 autonomous provinces, all effective administration has been grinding to a stop. Roads go back to bush. Schools stay empty. Hospitals have no staff. Ministries increasingly occupied by incompetents. Hunger spreads. Starvation threatens. But the spirit of national emancipation does not die. Last year it
flared up once again — sometimes as to be expected in such a situation in very strange guise -— when attempts are made to build a new grass-roots movement loyal to Lumumba-ism: to the idea, basically, that the Congolese should and can run their own country. Against the crowd at Leopoldville a rebel government is formed under Christophe Gbenye. This is smashed by Tshombe’s fascist-minded white mercenaries. The final blow comes when Belgian paratroops land at Stanleyville from American planes using a British base. Bloodshed. Murder. and by whom?
But whose
By the Tshombe mercenaries, as we know. Also, though less so, by the Belgian paratroops; this we likewise know. But by the rebels? This, in fact, we do not know nearly so well. And it matters greatly, for the answer may show how far these rebel leaders and their followers are any different from the Leopoldville politicians and their mercenaries. The other day Gbenye was called to Uganda and asked questions like these by three African leaders: Kenyatta of Kenya, Nyerere of Tanzania, Obote of Uganda. Someone present at that meeting (though not one of those mentioned) has told me these things: 1. “Gbenye impressed us as a serious man. Not a careerist, we thought.” 2. “Gbenye insisted that he was sure no European had been shot before the Belgian paratroops landed Even Europeans shot afterwards, he told us, were not shot by people under his command or control.” 3. “Gbenye and his men_ still have firm contro! of all but the towns of the Eastern Congo and Kasai. Gbenye even reached us in Uganda from his far-off HQ near by motor car through the Congo. The rebels are still very much a force to be reckoned with.” 4. “Gbenye gave us solid evidence against the view that his government had been just a hopeless
muddle. He showed us proof that
. even the Belgians had begun to take
him seriously.”
Bringing all this evidence into
account, what conclusions? I would
suggest three:
t. Only a political nitwit will
think that the Congolese have as yet
had any genuine opportunity to run
their own affairs.
2. Only such an opportunity can
lead to peace and reconstruction.
3. Only a compromise between
the various forces now in play (and
this is not necessarily the same thing
as the various personalities now on
stage), presided over by the Organ-
isation of African Unity and not by
any non-African Power or combin-
ation of Powers, can provide this
opportunity.
If so, what about British policy?
Our new man at the UN, Lord
Caradon, made a good start by
declaring that Britain would support
the OAU in trying to set the Congo
on the road to peace.
But a good start is not enough.
One has to continue, All the more
because, aS we now see, neither the
Belgians nor the Americans seem
ready to relinquish their absolutely
firm though partially concealed grip
on official Congolese affairs.
Britain should persevere. Two
kinds of pressure are required. The
first is a much stronger demonstra-
tion of support for the OAU than we
have yet given. Secondly, a. parallel
effort to reassure the American (and
the Belgians, though they’re second-
ary) that withdrawal of their inter-
vention will not lead to a hostile
Congo.
Today, in fact, the choice is
between an African Congo deter-
mined to make its own way in alli-
ance with its neighbours, and a
foreign-dominated Congo which will
continue in mess and misery — out
of which mess and misery there must
surely come, soon or late, that
hostile Congo which the Americans
say they fear.
Jan. 28th, 1965