ea . as How “far bis tit Sthen rede siistic for trade unierns rin stecl to belicve that under inctidndlisation they;will be openating within - frcmework which ollows then real power to tee thenselves in mancgement fron “daccisions end pelicics: in -th., st of the sconony thet go “egeinst the intdrests ‘of their tothe wd -? lt “2: eadivion 6f stecl to the' list -of-nhtionalised industric rertcinis-inereasosthe'sPze°cnd infkucnesd ‘of piste public comeae = Shc “ete nots? put stili-loaves aAtvlécst two-thirds of the rgonouy is privete: hands, Moreover, ‘as Prof. Meede“has ‘recently
J scinted. pit, the Nitisnat- Pebty, isc. the & nOncy- Owed by-the = tlic cS the’ private séetor {~preatly dxededs the total ce >> 711 the assets of the public: Sector. Séeo nai?, the influcnhe "i the govtrnmentoover the: privite:sector -2 thee@¢omomy/Istmuth grectersthen-itowas end with inerecscd snonic planning, ineluding some control over prices and inconcs, cunts alnost to ountcy. But is this cnough ? The third ctor is the a ical pew ston of the goy2rnnent., Mean:
Workers Control in « Nationalised Stecl Industry ccntinucd trode unicnists might be prepercd to risk participeticn in the monegtnent of-e-nrtlonclised, industry, so long as a Labour ccvermment.wos-in power, but.would:- wish to pull out if the O-nservoatives. were returned tc office,. The right to withdrew is not however a very satisfactory forn of instrence policy,
It is the general conclusion of this peper that some forn of workers‘ control: thet fells short of sclf-managenent,. but uivelves powers of scrutiny cnd veto, is the most appropriate ia the present situation. This should nevertheless. be regarded «© on cxtension of workers' influence on managencnt beyond the limitations of collective bargaining.
Expcrience in the existing ncetionclised inustrics can be drawn on to dccidu how best the knowledges cnd influenec of trade unions on managencnt in 2 nationaliscd industry nay be brought to bsor
(a) by introducing consultative machincry ct cach level of menegement in cddition to the conciliction machinery; this is what was done in the Nationcliscd Coal Industry;
(bo) by combining consultative and conciliation functions in the machinery ot cach level as in the El¢ctric Powcr tndustry;
(c) by developing < new system of cctucl participation by workers in management at cvery level in addition to the conciliation machincrys
Onc of the first-léssons, not only of netionslised industrics but of joint consultation in private industry is thet, at least in the present situation of a mixed economy, Trede Unions c7nnot be expectcd to tolcrate a rival system of rziprcesentation of workers to thcir own. In the Corl-Industry the NUM insisted on consultative cemmittecs boing made up fror NUM nominees. Where Wor! Councils have been sct,up;in the Stcel industry xs rivals to tradc unions for: workers' loyalty, they have tended tobe boycotted or thcir powers, greatly eirecuiiscribed, unless the trode unions eculd’ in cficet.capturc: de. facto contre] over. nominctions.
Cbjcetions to & rival systim of representation of workers to the fradc Unions does not imply objection to the Unions thcnselves choosin: two sets cf repn:sentatives -— onc to negotiate wagcs ond conditions and the other to participste in manpgencns. n the fully developed examples of workcrs' sclf-namagemcnt in Yugoslcvic cleetions undor nanagemcnts, i.c. trade unionists ‘ulfilling their treditional function, "have becn found to lead to Hy fruitful, rather chon -barren contradiction, This ,implics —— onc pert, and poresys the major port, of ‘the reld of Tradc Unions lics in effect, in Cloge's terms, in pormancnt oppositions This nee
: to exclude the importcnt politicel role of uniors in the trans ition of Sociclism. \nast-is impossible is that ‘bh Shine Nan ahoale at one ond the sane tine be both repmscntthive of the workcors in MONAe4nicnt »
In the pcxiod of the transition to Sociclism | thc Unions however as oS Organisation of Labour are Bcund. t the central part in ineugurcting workers’ seclfencnacocncnt.
ers Contrel in a, Nationalised Stcel Industry centinucs/ The secon: lesson. of nation...ised industries. is thot there must be seme: real power in monggomcent at each lovel to be shared with workers representctives.' the reason why consultation in the cocl industry is regarded as.an chorticn has been thet, cxcept on purely technical mettcrs. pit’ montgers have to refer alnost everything to Area Officials. This leeds to the third lesson, which is! that’ therc must be official procedure for referring differences up and down the line: of consultation between managenent and men, with the right of lower representatives, of both sides to be represented at hicher lovel meetings. The question for Workers in thse Steel Industry to answer remains whether the dual functions of collective birgnining and participation in managenent can be cenbinsd by trade unicns ina necesserily ¢éntraliscd steel industry ? The alternative suggestead here is toestablish *- measure of werkers! control in the industry lec. Of scrutiny and veto without prejudicing the present rights of trade.unions in -callective bargaining over wages and conditions. PROPOSALS. 1) At fitional board level, the trade unions andthe stecl industry should nect topother to drow up a ponel of nenes from which the-Minister should cheose one hal the ordinary Boar menbers (including, the.vice-Chaircan but not the Gheirman)\ his would give to the Minister the ultimate cuthcrity he -mustthave: to.answer to Par Ger te
f re s of the industry, but follows the TUC 1944: Intérin Report Fern. 104, which provose "nomination by workurs!!organisatious ef candidrtes whonr the Minister shell select.a numbcr of Board .mnerbers!, should retire’ in’ rotc after a maximum tern,;of five years b elirible for reappointhent: if they ore efidorsed:on th. Tra Unicon ponel of nomes. 2) At, combine or Group lcvel, the Chairmen, or Meneging Tivector., whichever he may oe called, of the operating board should be appointcd by the central board, subject to ratification by 2 Workers’ Ccuncil clectcd as is-shown. below. If control is to be extended to self-nanagerient then the, Workers' Council could als: eppoint' half the monbcers of the operating board, excluding the Chairman or Managing Dircctor. This would allow for < centralised policy control cnd yet give considerable local. pawer to the Chairnan, -subjoct:tto his ‘being able to carry his Workers’ Council with him; butt i would: inevitebly involve the Unions in rosvonsibility for management dciddsions. The Workers! -Coundil would heave power in cither ense to receive reports on.all policies dnd tc ask for deteilcd costings ofcil Gpertnents. One half of its members would be clectcd direetly by th: treeade uniens Im ceccordence wi'th their strencts
i z A'UHL eoubine of EPGUpsy, the other half indipcetiy from shop, : ~ office committecs or ‘from Depertmoentel or Plant. Commitvec Sercradire on the sige of the conbines
Wena
Workers Contral in = Nebicn lised Stecl Induetr > ¢tntic
fhis. mixed system of pepresentaticn wcull cilcx unitens to heve considerrble power without giving ther power, such as would enbarrass them in their c “f function cnd ex¢lude minority shop end unicn iy
3) ab the level of *~11 shops, mills end should be clected by secret ballct orgeniscd
g ™~
menbers cligible te vote and stand a
Op menagers ctc.’, adcploynent of lab
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oO} rs
committees in the cvent of disagresmcnt.
a
Where appropriate, Department or Plent ccumittces,
Sui
ecandidatcs, Anpointnc:
hi cur, premetion, hiriz firine, safcty, welfare and disciplinary matters to be to rotification by these. comiittccs, with apesl tc higher
Ceevering all white’ coller as well -s nanuc! workers) with all
t
~
clected frem shop conrittces cte. shculd be provided for with eppropricte higher powers t> the shop committees ctc. snd with special
fo Sey
respensibilitics else for training and educcticon and other
Les responsibilitic Council,
4) In order to cpeerdinate and control the ectivitics
comprnics not covered by notionclisation, the Minister should
6 cdvised br 2 Naticnal Iro: