in South Vietnam of chemical agents directed against personne} and against crops or food supplies (New York Times, 25 March, 21 December 1965; 11 September 1966; and Vietnam Courier (Hanoi), 31 January 1966) has focused new attention on the issue of chemical and biological (C-B) warfare. There is every reason to believe that this development is not coincidental, but involves the deliberate intention of testing and evaluating C-B weapons as a new major strategy applicable to the special conditions of guerilla warfare as ‘they exist in underdeveloped countries. For-this reason, it may be anticipated that the varicty and intensity of this form of warfare will increase in direct proportion to the commitment of the U.S. to military solutions.
Destruction of rice crops According to information currently available, limited gas warfare, involving tear and ‘nausea gases, has been used against military and civilian targets. No reports of the use of so-called Iethal or incapacitating agents (mustard or nerve gases) have been encountered, but there has also been no U.S. statement that these would not be used in South Vietnam. In addition, defoliation, orginally intended to reduce overhead cover in densely wooded areas, has been extended to the specific destruction of rice crops, the staple food in Victnam. According to the New York Times the use of arsenicals and chlorphenoxyacctic acids will be expanded to encompass 1 500000 acres in the coming year, Icading to a potential destruction of one-third to one-half of the rice crop in the northern part of South Victnam. There have also been no reports of the use of germ warfare, but there have been persistent reports of major increases in the incidence of plague. C-B agents can be produced cheaply and involve relatively simple technology, so are accessible with ease to all nations. There is also no obvious limit to the way certain of these agents (poisons, toxins, virus, bacteria) can be disseminated and there is no foreseeable defence effective against all of these agents. Thus, the failure to control the use of C-B warfare and the *The author is Associate Professor, Department of Chemistry, University of Pennsylvania and National Secretary of the American Association of Scientific Workers.
first use actions by the U.S. pose hazards to
humanity which are in some ways as great if not
greater than those posed by the failure to control
atomic weapons.
While the first use of C-B weapons has not
produced major repercussions in the U.S., par-
ticular interest currently focuses on an effort by
faculty members at American universities to rid
their campuses of projects concerned with C-B
warfare, At the University of Pennsylvania, a
major centre of C-B weapons research, suspected
of involvement in the present uses in South
Vietnam, the faculty voted last year te bar secret
or classitied research from the campus. Although
the University administration accepted this policy,
the contested research was renewed on the grounds
that it was not restricted and was freely publish-
able, despite statements to the contrary by project
directors and by U.S. military officials, However,
during the summer, Ramparts magazine, ran an
exposé of the University policy and this led to
administrative responses suggesting that the Uni-
versity was about to terminate the C-B projects.
Currently, the faculty is undertaking a review of
the entire situation. In the main, faculty members
have concerned themselves with the conflict be-
tween secret research and the open publishability
features of academic freedom but a substantial
part of the faculry at Penn has also held that
inbumane, illegal research objectives are in-
compatible with the goals and purposes of a uni-
versity. These faculty members have also con-
tended that the C-B research is part of the chain
of links to presertt applications in Vietnam and
therefore, under the Nuremberg Code, is a war
crinie.
The Geneva Protocols
Although the U.S. does not regard itself as
party to any of the treaties specifically forbidding
C-B warfare, there are strong reasons to believe
that U.S. action directly violates international law.
First, there is the widely held view that with the
adoption of the Geneva Protocols of 1925, the
first use of C-B warfare is now prohibited by the
customary rules of international law. In fact, this
position is implicit in President Franklin
Roosevelt's World War H declaration that the use
of C-B weapons have “been outlawed by the
general opinion of civilized mankind” and “we
eo
shal! under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies”. Secondly, beginning with the Hague Conventions and culminating with the International Military ‘Tribunal at Nuremberg, deliberate attacks upon, or starvation of, civilian populations have been regarded as crimes against humanity (war crimes); in the context of Victnam an attack on a rice crop is a potentially genocidal act and therefore potentially subject to the full sanctions of the Nuremberg Code. Apart from legal grounds, the use of C-B warfare has been opposed on moral grounds, for it has long been known that C-B weapons are relatively
indiscriminate and that, therefore, the victims are
likely to include the most susceptible targets, i-c.,
children, the elderly and pregnant women. In
general, the designation of standard doses, a
device intended to restrict lethality, is regarded as
dubious because it is a probability function based
on a large number of uncontrolled variables. In
the casc of one class of C-B weapons, the
bacteriological agents, the results are inherently
unpredictable and uncontrollable because of un-
knowns in the responses of diffcrent target popula-
tions and the probability of genetic alteration in
the agents (virus, bacteria) following dissemina-
uon.
U.S. scientists write to President Johnson 22 American scientists, including seven Nobel Laurestes, were the initial signatorics to a fetter of 19 September 1966 to the U.S. President. The text of the letter and the list of signatories appear below. The letter has since gained the support of the Federation of American Scientists and been civeutated for additional signatures. Dear Mr. President: We, the American scientists whose names appear below, wish to warn against ony weakening of the world-wide prohibitions and restraints on the use of chemical and biological (CB) weapons. CB weapons have the potential of inflicting, especially on civilians, enormous devastation and death which may be unpredictable in scope and intensity; they could become far cheaper and easier to produce than nuclear weapons, thereby placing great miss destrucuve power within reach of nations not now possessing it; they lend themselves to use by leadership that muy be desperate, irresponsible, or unscrupulous. ‘The barriers to the use of these weapons must not be allowed to hreak down. During the Second World War, the United States maintained a firm and clearly stated policy of not initiating the use of CB weapons. However, in the last few years the U.S. position has become less clear. Since the late 1950's, Defense Depariment expenditures on CB weapons have risen several fold—and there has been no categorical reaffirmation of the World War II policy. Most recently, U.S. forces have begun the largescale use of anti-crep and “non-lethal” anti-personnel chemical weapons in- Vietnam. We believe that this sets a dangerous precedent, with long term hozards far outweighing any probable short term military advantage. The employment of any one CB weapon weakens the barriers to the use of others. No lasting distinction scems feasible between incapacitating and lethal weapons or between chemical and biological warfare. The great variety of possible agents forms a continuous spectrum from the temporarily incapacitating to the highly lethal. If the restraints on the use of one kind of CB weapon are broken down, the use of others will be encouraged. Therefore, Mr. President, we urge that you: Institute 2 White House study oi overall government policy regarding CB weapons and the possibility of arms control measures, with a view to maintaining and reinforcing the world-wide restraints againsi CB warfare. Order an end to the employment of anti-personnel and anti-crop chemical weapons in Vietnam.
Re-establish and categorically declare the intention
ef the United States to refrain from initiating the use
of chemical and hiological weapons.
@ The Signatories
Felix Bloch, Physics, Stanford University; Nobel
Laureate, 1952.
Konrad E. Bloch, Chemistry, Harvard University;
Nobel Laureate, 1964.
Jumes F, Crow, Medical Genetics, University of
Winsconsin.
William Docring, Sterling Chemical Laboratory, Yale
University.
Paul Doty, Chemistry, Harvard University.
Freeman F. Dyson, Institute for Advanced Study.
John T. Edsall, The Biological Laboratories, Harvard
University.
Bernard Feld, Physics, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
Irwin C. Guusalus, Chemistry and Chemical Engineer-
ing, University of Illinois.
Robert Hofstadter, Physics, Stanford University; Nobel
Laureate, 1961,
Arthur Kornberg, Biochemistry, Stanford University
Medical School; Nobel Laurcate, 1959,
Friizx Lipman, Rockefeller University; Nobel
Laureate, 1953.
Robert B. Livingston, School of Medicine, University
of California at San Diego. i
Matihczs Meselson, The Biological Laboratories,
Harvard University.
Severo Ochaa, New York University School of Medi-
cine; Nobel Laureate, 1959.
Ray D. Owen, Division of Biological Sciences, Cali-
fornia Institute of Technology.
Keith R. Porter, The Biological Laboratories, Harvard
University.
Charles Price, Chemistry, University of Pennsylvania.
Eugene Rabinovitch, Botany, University of [inois.