Supporters of Regis Debray have not diminished their efforts of late, in spite of the long delays effected by the Bolivian authorities, Journalists had filled the oil town of Camiri in August days before the trial of Regis Debray was to begin, only to encounter the Government's delaying tactics. The trial is now set for September 18, and there is every indication that once again the world press will be fully represented. The pressure of world opinion has already .>« . forctd the Bolivian authorities to concede one point to the defence. Until recently, they had stated categorically that Professor Debray could be defended only by military counsel appointed by his accusers. A-report which appeared in the Guardian on September 9 indicates that M. Georges Debray, the father of Regig and a prominent Paris barrister, will be permitted to assist in his defence, His role will be limited to ‘advising! the army-appointed lawyer, so ‘that his effectiveness will be circumscribed. Richard Gott, writing in the Guardian of September 11, suggests the reasons why Bolivia could become ‘another Vietnam'. He notes the effectiveness of the guerrillas, who had prepared their operations for more than a year. Since their discovery in March, they have won all the victories against the army, which has lost between 38 and 43 (killed), as compared to between two and five for the guerrillas. The Army's only minor triumph has been to stumble on five dumps of arms and equipment. The Army suffers, among other things, from the. physical hardships of the Country's geography. The extremes of high altitude in the Altiplano (from which most of the Indians in the Army are conscripted) and sea-level tropical intensity in the jungles where the guerrillas are hidden explain the shortcomings of the Government forces in the cruel endurance test. The natural hazards are augmented by the Government's. shaky political situation, Mr. Gott writes, 'The Bolivian Army in any case is small -- estimated at about 15,000 -~ and much of it is believed to be watching La, Paz (where the garrison commander is alleged to be of doubtful loyalty to the regime) and perhaps the majority is busy looking after -- and occasionally shooting -~ the rebellious tin-miners on the Altiplano. Not many soldiers are left for dealing with the guerrillas', Mr. Gott perceptively goes on to analyse two critical factors likely to emerge soon as the most significant aspects of the overall situation. One is the role of the United States. It is clear, on the one hand, that the U.S. hopes to be able to rely on the local forces and to avoid direct intervention. Its role is at present limited to anti-guerrilla training. On the other hand, the political situation is likely to degenerate so rapidly as to force a real decision by the U.S. State Department in the near future. The second point which Mr. Gott insightfully recognises is the distinction between the guerrillas’ ability to influence Bolivian politics and their prospects of catalysing the continental revolution. That they are able to succeed in the first task is bdyond doubt. But they accept the second, more difficult task as the more fundemental. It should not be forgotten that this struggle is not merely one option among many possibilities. To affect Bolivian politics in an enduring way, a revolutionary must have a wider view.
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