It.is ag. well to atart this assesement.by saying a few wortsa about the purpose of such papers, Tha main point is that once having worked out our basic conceptions, 1.e., our estimate of the geneTfal international situation, the role of social democracy, tne declining. position of British capitalian, the role of the colonial revolution, the nature of the Soviet Union etc., such questions as the tempo of events, nuances of policy.of the Government, the mood of the left, are decisive. This approach eharply differentiates us from the sectarians: for them it is oerely necessary to learn slogens and formule, recite them by rete and apply them to 211 situstions. "Cantrista betray, therefore all centrista are.traitore"; “Imbour rules in the interests of the ruling clases, therefore Harold Wilson was bound to take the path he did"; "Only a struggle for socialists policies can take us forward": "The only answer is te build the revolutions party"; these are the stock phrases of the eectarians. In a. very ganeralised sense they are true, But in the art of politics such questions as exactly when the centrists betray (to use the emotional vocabulary of the secteriana); at what stege do Wilson's policies start alienating the working clasa;. wheat kind of socislist policies are most likely to evoke « reaponse in the wass of the population are all-important. One is reminded of what Troteky had to say about. the German Communist Party of the early thirties, in the period when Hitler was coming to power: "In fact....the. Central Committee of the Communiet Party of Germany prooeede from the idea that it is impossible to: defeat fascism without firat defeating social GWerocracy. Is thie idea correct? On the historical seale it is wnconditionally correct... But. that does not at.211 mean that with ite aid, that ia, by simple repetition, one can solve the questions of the od. in idea, correct from the point of view of revolutionary stratesy as a whole, is converted into a lie and at that. into-a reactionary lie, if it ia not translated into the language of tactics. Ia it correct.that in order to destroy unemployment and misery it is first necessary to destroy capitalism? It ie correct. But only the biggest blockhead can conclude from ail this that we do not have to fight this very day, with all owr forces, against the measures with whose aid capitaliem"(operatea the system), (From Germany: the Key to the International Situation). It is useful in analysing the situation in the Labour movement. today to compare the 1965 Blackpool Labour Party conference with tha one thie year in Erighton. Several quite fundamental differences can be gisaned: (1) The completely different atmosthere of the ccnference and in 7articular the attitude of delegates to Wileon, At Blackpool he waa king: when he came inte the hall the only people whe did net give him a hyaterical ovation were the very hard left and the trade wion oprosition - notably the TOW. At Brighton his image was completely tarnished and the platform had to work heard to get applause for him. In general the conference was lees enthusisetic, less passionate and exnressed the deep anxieties which even those who
voted consistently with the Government feel, This change in attitude reflected both a change in the mood of the country as a whole and in the mood of labour activista in particular, In the cowuntry as e whole whilet there is general support for the Government's policy including the wage freeze, people feel that Labour is in a mess. In partieular even though Wilson is atill popular he is no longer regarded as a surer-volitician. Among Labour activists, Wileon is now no longer unchallenged, At Blackpool he was the man who had taken Labour to power after all those years of Toryism, he symbolised a deey feeling in the Lebour movement of elation because of that auceess, ven many of those who criticised the platform and voted against it felt that Wilson had won the election for labour. Today, although the majority of Labour supporters feel they need Wilson, they express this in the négative sense rather than positive (who would take his place? They will ask), (2) Although the voting figures only show-a emall shift to the left { a useful yardstick is to compare the vote gained against the Government! 87#8T2° iey and for disassociation from the Americans over Vietnam at the two oonferences)*the platform suffered some defeat: This amounted to a very aimple thing: while the conference was prepare] to support the general lines of the Government's policies, when skilful opposition cancentreted attention on the worst and most comrete results of the policies it was a different matter. While conference was premared to vote for the economic poliey of the Government it was not crepared to vote for the extreme result of the policy: the deliberate creation of unemsloyment: hence the defeat over work-sharing. Similiarly, it could vote not directly to support the American bombing of the north. : This fact makes for a completely different situation: after Blackpool, tha platform seemed unbeatable and militante could easily get into a state of mind where they thought the strugele inside the Lebour Party was hopeless and pointless, After Brighton there is at least a perspective of being able to beat the platform. Under these circumstances we can call upon people to come into the strugele ingide the Labour Party. The coming months will see thousands of peonle stimulated into industrial action; these new forces can now more easily be brought into the Labour Party. Other features of the Blackpool conference were: (1) the position of the TOV being the “official” and even institutionslised oppositionto Wilson was further developed and deepened. Thia factor has gained significance wider than before: it ie now seeping into the minds of millions of ordinary people into thie country. In particular the nilitants and those affected by the Governnient's policies are beginning to identify themselves with Cousins: after the car workers who came down to lobby conference, booed and shook their fists at. Wilson they cheered Cousins.
* See Appendix 2
Again we have to not that opposition to the Government on Vietnam waa more successful than on incomes policy, This is in apparent contradiction to all that we have ever gaid about the relationship of opposition on foreien- and domestic subjects. The most likely explanation is that the CLfs are moving to the left on Vietnam,especially after the ba. keuvtey of all Wilem's peace missions, but that, by and large, thay tend to be confused by the Garernment's propaganda on incomes policy. (2) ‘That the political capital of the so-called lefts who have remained within the Cabinet is still substantial. Despite the campaign of Tribune end others, all the mepbe ss of the Csbinet who stood for the HEO were suo oo There war an important but not dramatic loes of votes (Sea appendix 1 The main reason why the Greenwoods and Castles can still pose ag lefte is that no real alternative to them has emerged on the parliamentary front. The extremely weak response of thé back=-bench lefte hte been quite unable to-arouge opmosition or act as a focal point for anti-Government forced. It is precisely on the latter point where the Parliamentary lefte are weak eat. They have refused point blank to pose themselves against the Government; instead they seek to advise it to "mend ite ways". i (3) There ie a‘tremendous fund of sup yi for democracy in within the Labour Party as was indicated by the veryfete pathy gained over the John Palmer, Ken Coates and Nottigheam cases, (4) Theat despite everything, conference, in essence, gave Wilson 4a mandate for his policies. A fact the right wing will not be slow ta usa, The prime political taske facing revolutionary marxieste: These are: (1) Selping to build a left wing united front which underetanda the fundamental nature of the Labour Goverment, (2) Working out a correct and working relationship with the TSU /S-union opposition to the Government, (3) Mainteining and developing our own organisation in thie situation, We should not confuse a general oprosition to Wiledn with an oaresition whieh will inevitably develop and reach a higher consciousness, The gener- Sl opmesition to Wilson could eaaily be diverted by demagosie measures: al— ready Brown is 'provirg'’ his independence from the Acérican by demanding that China be admitted to the United Nations, A ecund oepesition which has -the perspective of developing a real alternative to Wilsonism can do only on the besila of understanding the essential nature of the Wileon Govermment, Moreaver, the only war to work out an alternative policy and leadershin is to reject completely Wilacnian, the Labour Government must be regarded not as merely being mistaken but as the enemy. It has to attack the working claae, because Teaistance by the working ¢lass ia the teat important obstecle to the capitalist rationalisation of the institutions, industry and economr of Britain. The Government must,having rejected the socialist option, try te change decisively the relationship of fortes between the working cless and the employers to the favour of the latter,
On this point we must recognise the confusion which exists in the minds of & large proportion of the existing: left wing opposition to Wilson, and especially the leadership. In practical, political and social terma even Cousins and Jenkins are saying that they could and would make a better job of rationalising British capitaliem and without attacking the working cleae, Wilson and oo, ere quite correct to point out the contradictions in their position. Of course the very positions the TGWU/5 union oprosition has taken will tend te evolve along a different path. However, we must face the enormity of the ideological job which needs to be done. A task which ig made all the more difficult because of the prestige and loyalty which Cousins and Jenkins et al will be able to command.
This ie of course, intimately tied un with the job of defining a correct relationship between ourselves and the union opresition. To hold any poaition other than that of critical - and even om ocoasione enthUsiastio support for this opposition would be auicide. On the other hand the vary strength of this optosition, the resources which it has as ita disposal, etc., creates a powerful basis for opportunitiat adaption. This is all the more the cage because all kinds of people, including many disappointed right wing carreerists will be attracted by the new union opposition (witness Mayhew, and Cousins' ready acceptance of Mayhew as the seconder of his resolution on defence costs).
To arrive at this correct relationship we need first of all toa have an ob= jective sociological assessment of this tendency; one free from wishful thinking. om the one side and negative, sectarian conserva iy thinking on the other, We need to analyse this trade union oppositicn/in terms of the individual psychology of its leaders { a common subjectiviet mistake made by the ch-so-marxistlendzist sectarians} but in tema of the social forces operating upon them. The starting point of this analysis is the fact that because of the dual nature of the trad: union: bureaucracy: = the fact that its rests upon workers organisations as well se being the inetrument of the employers pressure on the working class - it is bound, in 4 seriod of orisis, to differentiate into right and left tendencies. These tendencies reflect in an often indirect snd complicated wey the pressure of the two clasa forces on the bureaucracy, It ie no accident that the TOW has within ita ranks dockers and buamen who for partioular reasone heave a tradition of militancy. On the other hand, the five technical unione organise, big and groming sections of the new wotking-oleas,. There is moreover in both oases a powerful inducement to be militant because in that way msebership and organisation can be facilitated in new sections of industry.
#o be continued’
TE 14/10/66